

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sect. M2
8329

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. NAVY

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 MAY - 15 JULY, 1944

PG Numbers 31859-31862

DECLASSIFIED ON 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ
DECLASSIFIED ON WWII RECORDS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
ARCHIVES
RECEIVED
SEP 29 1966
copy number 10/1

DECLASSIFIED ON 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ
DECLASSIFIED ON WWII RECORDS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 MAY - 15 JULY, 1944.

PG Numbers 31859-31862

Grid charts referred to may be
found in the War Diary for 18
January to 30 June, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED BY DOD MEMO OF 5 MAY 1973, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

11-11-11

11-11-11

11-11-11

11-11-11
11-11-11
11-11-11
11-11-11

11-11-11
11-11-11
11-11-11
11-11-11

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 31 MAY, 1944

PG/31859

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

CONFIDENTIAL

16 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0500 to 1011. Apart from AC 1590 to 1850 did not examine below cloud because of measurements, otherwise exhaustive.

2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Motovski Bay and the waters around Fisher Peninsula from 1135 to 1230. No shipping movements.

Flieger Fuehrer 4: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area from 0358 to 1050. Route 90%, northeast part of Jan Mayen 70% examined, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 7256 - Vaernes. Route exhaustively examined.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 11, MO-boat No. 133, motorboats "PS 48", "PS 75".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings: Svanvik: at 0734 on 15 May unit "AG" in 258°.

Hammerfest: at 0746 unit "AG" in 235.3°.

Hammerfest: at 2318 unit "AO" in 264.5°.

Hammerfest: at 0220 on 16 May "ZG 40 TTOT" in 261°.

Hammerfest: at 0347 unit "R5S2" in 236°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

1550

Teleprinter message Secret 985/44 received from auxiliary G.I.S. station Tromsø:

"Agent Larstt sighted a submarine of unknown

CONFIDENTIAL

nationality surfacing in Gryllefjord Senja at 1330. At 2325 on 15 May agent Martin sighted, at a distance of about 1 km. from the coast west of Faggerfjord Ringvassøy, a periscope of an unidentified submarine, which was proceeding northwest at 4-5 knots."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 6254)
U 425 AB 6522) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 6559) sweep 30 miles, 15-hourly
U 737 AB 6834) north/south dislocation.
U 347 AB 6892)

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 387, 711 Narvik,
U 361, 636, 673, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 990, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1215 U 312 put in to Bodø, at 1315 put out from Bodø
for Trondheim.
U 362 proceeding from Trondheim to AB 68.
U 240, 668, 742, 965 proceeding from Bergen to
Narvik via position line 1 AF 4975 - 8155
and position line 2 AF 2851 - 5359.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 476, 995, 997, 344, 348, 394 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 675, 987, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 293 Arendal,
U 292 Larvik,
U 767 Horten,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 365 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in attack areas west of Bear Island
passage. 1 boat approaching.

CONFIDENTIAL

2000

Radio message 1904/735 sent:

"U 362 (Franz): on 27 May, occupy attack area AB 9239, depth of sweep 30 miles, joining group "Trutz" as boat No. 6. With 15-hourly dislocation in the attack area, be at the north limit at 1500 on 17 May, in the south at 0600 on 18 May, etc. Irregular courses, procedure in accordance with Order No. 8. Submerge according to visibility conditions. Remain unobserved. Radio silence unless reporting enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft or attacks."

In radio message 1909/734 the boats were informed of a British unit, which was fixed at 1600 in AB 8629. It might be the carrier formation.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 344 (Pietsch):

"1. Put out from Bergen for Narvik on the evening of 18 May.

2. Proceed at high speed at a distance of 60 miles from the coast as far as 63° N in accordance with Order No. 13. Approach via Westfjord. Report expected time of arrival at approach point 24 hours in advance, also report passing "V 1" by time short signal. In case of bad radio connection, use the relevant coastal service.

3. Radio frequency "Anton".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 348 (Schunk), special operation, see Appendix II/1.

C. Surface forces:

1605 Teleprinter message "Tirpitz" Most Secret 506 received:

"On 16 May, moved to newly constructed berth at Straumsneset (southeast side of Kaafjord)."

D. Organizational:

1310 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret

CONFIDENTIAL

01619 received:

1. U 344 has been in Bergen since 15 May.
2. Cannot proceed to Narvik before the transfer date, as group Central must have 20 boats in readiness."

1600 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division,
C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 01533:

1. Because of escort difficulties for boats putting out from Kiel (the result of minelaying in the western Baltic) U 997 (Lehmann), U 476 (Nietmann) and U 995 (Köhntopp) are to remain at present with group Central.
2. Boats on transfer passage are to put in to Bergen as their port of readiness. Other boats are to remain in the old port of readiness."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II: The bearings in the direction of Iceland are further indications of maneuvering activity of British forces. We must expect an increase in enemy submarine activity off the entrances, especially before enemy operations, convoys or landings.

(Signed) Suhren.

17 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0357 to 0910, nothing to report, not exhaustive.
1 FW 200 carried out special operation "Schatzgräber" from 1820 on 16 May to 0545 on 17 May, nothing to report.
2 FW 190 on shipping reconnaissance of the waters around Fisher Peninsula and against an unidentified warship reported west of Fisher Peninsula. No shipping movements.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route AF 7673 - AE 5763 - 8359 - AF 7673 - Sola from 0400 to 1203, enemy not sighted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0550 to 1124. Route 60% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined, nothing to report.
4 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance in the sea area AF 8719 - AE 6966 - AB 7563 - AF 3548 from 0258 to 1455. Reconnaissance area almost exhaustively examined.
3 BV 138 on reconnaissance of the sea area AF 3542 - AB 8446 - AB 5663 - AC 7177 from 0252 to 1135, exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0713 in AF 1645 a formation of 1 aircraft carrier, 4 warships (probably cruisers), course 030°, speed not identified. 1 "Martlet" with the formation. At 0855 in AF 4889 1 "Catalina", course 135° and at 1153 in AF 7259 1 "Catalina", course 315°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Few transmissions to submarines in the operational area. "S 56" and "S 103" were named in a radio message of first priority sent in the evening.

Murmansk area: destroyers "B", "C", "H", MO-boat No. 133, motorboat "PS 28".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings: Hammerfest: at 2026 on 16 May British unit in 248°, at 0128 on 17 May British unit in 278°.

Svanvik: at 1705 on 16 May British unit in 291°, from 0203 to 0206 on 17 May British radio traffic in 260°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

CONFIDENTIAL

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 6254)
U 425 AB 6522)
U 957 AB 6559) in the attack area, depth of
U 737 AB 6834) sweep 30 miles, 15-hourly north/
U 347 AB 6892) south dislocation.
U 362 AB 9239)

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 387, 711 Narvik,
U 361, 636, 673, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 990, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000

U 312 put in to Trondheim from Bodø.
U 240, 668, 742, 965 proceeding from Bergen to
Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 344, 348, 394, 476, 997 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 675, 987, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 995 Flekkefjord,
U 293 Arendal,
U 292, 767 Larvik,
U 1192 Våløy,
U 365 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in attack areas west of Bear Island
passage.
In radio messages 0845/750 and 1721/755 the
boats were informed of the carrier formation,
which was sighted at 0706 in AF 1645 with 1
carrier, 4 cruisers or destroyers, course 030°.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 344 (Pietsch), U 476
(Nietmann), U 394 (Borger), U 995 (Köhntopp)
and U 997 (Lehmann):

"1. Put out from Bergen for Narvik - Skjomen-
fjord on the evening of 18 May.

2. As far as 63° N in accordance with Order
No. 13. Proceed from the departure point
at high speed at a distance of 60 miles
from the coast.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Report expected time of arrival at approach point in Westfjord 24 hours in advance, also report passing "V 1" by time short signal.

4. Radio frequency "Anton".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short reports from U 312 (Nikolay), third operation and U 315 (Zoller), third operation, see Appendix II/2,3.

C. Naval forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

2035 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 01727 received:

"1. Ports of readiness: U 242 (Panke) Stavanger, U 1164 (Schloemer) Larvik, U 971 (Zepelin) and U 363 (Lees) Kristiansand (South).

2. The 4 boats assigned to Captain U-boats, Norway will be released from group Central on 18 May.

3. The boats to be released on 18 May for passage to the Atlantic will remain in the ports of readiness provisionally until 19 May, because of uncertain information as to the possibility of putting out from Kiel. Sailing date follows."

E. Survey of the situation:

1311 Radio message 1159/25 sent to U-boat base Narvik:

"Today at 0706 an enemy carrier group was sighted by air reconnaissance some 260 miles west of the entrance to Westfjord. Enemy radio traffic, suggesting another carrier group or enemy units, was detected by D/F west of Trondheim. Yesterday 35 carrier-borne aircraft penetrated the Loppa area. Present enemy situation in the area east of Jan Mayen is still unclarified. Transfer of the U-boat base is therefore again necessary and has been ordered for this afternoon for "Stella Polaris" with U-boats and "Huascaran". Re-transfer is intended after clarification of enemy position."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0505 to 1038, exhaustive, nothing to report.
2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Kola - Motovski Bay and the waters around Fisher Peninsula, examined except for Kola and Pummanki Bay, no enemy shipping movements.

Flieger Fuehrer 4: No reports.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0330 to 1033. Route only partially examined on account of weather, southeast side of Jan Mayen 80% examined, nothing to report.
3 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance against a presumed PQ convoy in the sea area AF 4673 - AE 3834 - AB 7548 - AF 2671 from 0451 to 1321, exhaustive, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See IV (d).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area, "S 56" and "S 103" named. Destroyers "Gremyashchi", "J", "B", "C" and "H", at sea, received urgent radio messages in the morning and the evening from Polyarno.

Murmansk area: destroyers "Gremyashchi", "B", "J", MO-boat No. 126, destroyer "E".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

CONFIDENTIAL

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 6254)
U 425 AB 6522) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 6559) sweep 30 miles, 15-hourly
U 737 AB 6834) north/south dislocation.
U 347 AB 6892)
U 362 AB 9239)

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 387, 711 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 673, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 344, 354, 394, 476, 716, 956, 990,
992, 995, 997 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2000 U 240 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
2000 U 668 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
2000 U 742 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
U 965 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
U 394, 476, 995, 997 put out from Bergen to
Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 348 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 675, 987, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 293 Arendal,
U 292, 767 Larvik,
U 1192 Vallø, y,
U 365 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in attack areas west of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0200

Radio message 0118/62 received from U 965 (Ohling), one of the 4 boats approaching from Bergen:

"Torpedoes from British submarine in AF 3754. 2 shadows in grid square 3767."

Yesterday evening about 1900, boats were warned of a submarine sighted in AF 3479 by

CONFIDENTIAL

aircraft on 17 May, i.e. 30 miles north of the position reported by "Ohling". It is probably the same submarine.

U 240 (Link) is the only boat which has still not reported. He was first asked to report on 17 May in radio message 1239/661.

0928 Short signal 0928/762 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"Am being attacked by aircraft."

1128 Radio message 1106/764 sent:

" "Brasack": report type of aircraft and direction of run-in."

1252 Radio message 1218/766 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"Heavy land-based aircraft, probably "Martin" bomber, course 210°."

2118 Radio message 2053/769 sent:

"Meteorological aircraft sighted a U-boat in AB 6677 at 0915, course northwest.

"Brasack": report "No" by short signal on "Anton" if it was definitely not a Ju 88.

Otherwise your report of 0928 will be assumed to be correct."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 1522/44 received from Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, First Division:

"Independently of the new basic instructions for the operations of Battle Group to be sent out within the next few days, attention is drawn to the following: Experiences of U-boats in convoy attacks have indicated a possibility of employing 4th Destroyer Flotilla. The destroyers would operate against the groups of steamers and stragglers belonging to the convoy by combing the sea area through which the convoy passes. Report operational intentions to Naval Chief Command, Norway."

As a result, Naval Chief Command, Norway requested experiences and details in Serial No. Most Secret 5303 A.1.

Accordingly the following was sent in Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret S.O.s only 66/44:

"Most Secret S.O.s only. By hand of officer only. In reply to your Most Secret 5303 A 1 of 19 May:

1. Experiences:

- (a) Stragglers can be expected from every convoy as the result of bad weather and temporary engine trouble. They proceed via predetermined points, provisionally on shorter routes, i.e. along the inner arc of the convoy route. Damaged steamers may be on the actual convoy route, if U-boats have attacked the core of the convoy. Command, however, does not learn of this until relatively late.
- (b) As a rule, there is astern of the convoy a large number of enemy destroyers to prevent the U-boats from getting up steam and to keep them submerged in an area up to about half a convoy day's run astern of the convoy.
- (c) The cruiser or carrier group generally lies up with the convoy, or not more than 60 miles from it. In earlier convoys (26 December), a heavy battle group was also intercepted west of Bear Island passage.

2. Proposal for execution:

Requirements:

- (a) Suitable weather situation with sufficient visibility to preclude surprises.
- (b) Adequate air reconnaissance in and around the sea area intended for the operation, to preclude surprises by enemy forces as in Para 1. (c).
- (c) Quick execution of the operation at high levels of speed to prevent enemy counter-measures being brought into effect.
- (d) Execution: In actions against both PQ and QP convoys, proceed to a point at approximately 20° E, one and a half convoy day's runs or 360 miles astern of the convoy. From there, comb the convoy route and inner arc in the same direction as the convoy, but keeping about 220 miles astern of it. Then break off and return.
- (e) Precautionary measures:
U-boats are forbidden to fire at destroyers in the sea area up to 120 miles astern of the convoy. Then for still another 100 miles, a safety range will be observed to allow for errors in fixes and mistakes in estimating the convoy's position.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (f) It is preferable to operate in the same direction as the convoy, since approaching on a counter-course it would first be necessary to go very close to the convoy to be effective in picking up the stragglers. A minimum distance of 220 miles from the convoy is considered necessary to avoid encountering the convoy escort or cruiser group."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

Unusual number of Russian destroyers at sea.

Re IV (d):

U 240 (Link) should have reported from a position at least 14 hours' passage ahead of the position of the reported enemy submarine. Radio connection was good. Loss to this enemy submarine is therefore improbable. .

(Signed) Suhren.

19 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 0052 to 0855, exhaustive.

- 2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Motovski - Kola Bay from 1825 to 1900. Operation abandoned because of weather before reconnaissance area was reached.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

4 Ju 88 on extensive reconnaissance of the coastal waters off the Danish - Norwegian west coast from 1000 to 1541.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the sea area northwest of the Faeroes. Route 60%, area north of the Faeroes 80% examined.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance:

No aircraft on Jan Mayen airfield, only several Nissen huts, probably billets. On the second approach, fire from heavy and light anti-aircraft guns; 4 light anti-aircraft sites round the field, 1 heavy anti-aircraft site northwest of the field. Southwest of Berrenberg, a hut with 2 masts, presumably a radio station. Small coastal vessel inshore.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few transmissions to submarines in the operational area. At 1538 on 19 May, Polyarno transmitted a code-word of very high priority to all submarines.

Murmansk area: destroyer "H".

Ponoi area: BO-boat No. 201, motorboat "PS 49" which received several very urgent radio messages.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 30, 37, 60, 63, 110, motor minesweepers Nos. 429, 431.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk area.

Bearings obtained by Hammerfest: at 2247 on 18 May, British unit "AC" in 2430.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 6254)

U 425 AB 6522)

U 957 AB 6559) in the attack area, depth of

U 737 AB 6834) sweep 30 miles, 15-hourly

U 347 AB 6892) north/south dislocation.

U 362 AB 9239)

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 387, 668, 711, 742, 965 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 673, 739, 968 Trondheim,

U 278, 344, 354, 716, 956, 990, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1000

U 673 put out from Trondheim for Ramsund.

CONFIDENTIAL

0230 U 476 put in again to Bergen.
0030 U 668 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
U 240, 394, 995, 997 proceeding from Bergen to
Narvik.
2000 Group "Trutz" will proceed to attack areas from
AB 8123 to 8558.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 348 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 675, 987, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 293 Arendal,
U 292, 767 Larvik,
U 1192 Valloy,
U 365 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in attack areas west of Bear Island
passage.

When the number of boats had been brought up to
strength, the formation was again to be extended
from Bear Island passage to the southwest to
intercept a PQ convoy as early as possible.

1632 Radio message 1617/775 sent:

"Group "Trutz": at 2000 on 19 May, proceed at
7 knots to attack areas from AB 8123 to 8558,
depth of sweep 20 miles."

Boats leaving Narvik were to lengthen the
formation, thus the distances between the boats
could be narrowed down to 20 miles.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Of the 5 new boats, which were to put out from
Bergen for Narvik, two had engine trouble.
The remaining 3 boats were directed to proceed
via the position lines with 30 miles between
them to reconnoiter the sea area off the coast
for enemy formations, especially carrier groups
which had often appeared there.

1058 Radio message 1016/688 sent:

"New position lines for "Borger", "Köhntopp"
and "Lehmann":
Position line 1 from AF 4694 to 5729 and position
line 2 from AF 2832 to 2991."

U 240 (Link) had still not reported despite
several requests to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler), U 668 (v. Eickstedt) and U 742 (Schwassmann), see Appendix III/1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

"Bassgeiger":

Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway
Most Secret 5210 A 1 sent to "Bassgeiger":

- "1. Transfer to be effected by Ju 90 (wheeled aircraft). Time follows.
2. Maximum load of personnel including equipment 5 tons.
3. Report which area is most suitable for landing. Prepare surface for landings. Is this free from ruts, and obstacles?
4. Report present enemy situation.
5. How much time is necessary to approach the landing ground?
6. Mark the outer edge of the landing ground with flags. Smoke fires on sighting.
7. Have green, red and white stars ready. Further requirements follow.
8. After landing, signal the machine to the berth. Make it fast at the anchorage to be prepared for it."

0500 "Bassgeiger" replied in radio message 0123/76:

- "Re 3. 3 km. southwest of Alabamahus.
Re 4. Observers identified from time to time.
Re 5. 2 hours. D/F transmitter was destroyed with the ship."

Summary of the "Bassgeiger" situation up to 17 May 1944:

"Meteorological station "Bassgeiger" (Position: Shannon Island on the east coast of Greenland) reported on 22 April: "Station attacked by Americans, enemy temporarily driven off. Lt. Zachter dead. A heavy machine-gun, a sub-machine-gun, much ammunition, 4 rucksacks of U.S. equipment were captured." "Bassgeiger" reported further that the station cannot be saved and that defense from the ground is possible for a limited time only if reinforcements arrive. Reconnaissance showed that the position and strength of the station were known to the enemy. As an aircraft was seen west of the

CONFIDENTIAL

station after the attack and since the route from Sengstrake Bay to the station was marked in a captured map, "Bassgeiger" supposed that the enemy unit was set down there and fetched away by the aircraft. The footprints too led to this point and the enemy was not equipped to remain overnight. Further reconnaissance however, showed that the attackers had reached the island on a dog sledge. Aircraft can however land in Sengstrake Bay on snowy ice and at Alabamahus on smooth ice.

On 26 April, "Bassgeiger" reported enemy patrols west of the station and asked to be evacuated at Alabamahus. Evacuation of "Bassgeiger" was planned, but not possible immediately. Group North/Fleet therefore requested that, since their ship was a total loss, the complete crew of "Coburg" should make for "Bassgeiger" as reinforcements.

On 30 April, Group North/Fleet sent a radio message to "Bassgeiger": "Evacuation at present impossible. Do your best to hold the station, as further operating of your meteorological station is very important in view of the present situation."

"Bassgeiger" reported enemy attack on assault unit repulsed. At Alabamahus there is a smooth, snow-free expanse of ice 2,500 meters long and 500 meters broad, where it is possible to land. The ground stretches in a south-to-west direction and is protected against the prevailing northwesterly wind.

As we knew that on the leeward side of Shannon Island there was a steady current in an ice-free area, it was proposed to evacuate the station by means of a seaplane, BV 222. Naval Chief Command, Norway expected further attacks, perhaps resulting in the capture of "Bassgeiger" and they therefore proposed to Naval War Staff that advantage should be taken of the temporary favorable conditions for evacuation by land-based plane: preparations would take 2 to 3 weeks. On the other hand, evacuation by sea-plane would be difficult and prospects of success doubtful. Luftflotte 5 was requested to extend the meteorological reconnaissance of Jan Mayen to south of Shannon to examine the seaplane landing ground for BV 222. The range of the meteorological aircraft was however, inadequate, and in any case Luftflotte 5 considered that such a reconnaissance would be useless, as at the present time of year the ice-free area would be subjected to continuous changes due to the moving of pack ice by wind, etc.

On 8 May, "Bassgeiger" reported "Station strength increased by crew of "Coburg". Fuel will last up to 20 June. Commander of "Coburg" entrusted with military leadership. Ship blown up on 6 May. Coding equipment destroyed." The meteorological unit "Bassgeiger" consisted of 8 men, while the crew of "Coburg" amounted to 18 men.

CONFIDENTIAL

Luftflotte 5 was doubtful about the employment of BV 222 at this time of year because of the state of the sea and the presence of blue ice which cannot be observed. They suggested Ar 232 or Ar 442 for the evacuation. The following questions regarding the landing ground for land-based planes were sent to "Bassgeiger" on 10 May:

- "1. State size and direction of landing ground.
2. Position and distance of landing ground from the site of the station.
3. Quality of ice on landing ground (surface, accommodating capacity).
4. Details for recognition of the landing ground and the landing cross.
5. Direction of prevailing wind.
6. Quality of approach ground.
7. Possibility of enemy action against the landing ground.
8. Number of personnel and sets to be evacuated."

In reply, "Bassgeiger" reported:

"Re 1. More than 2,500 meters long, 500 meters broad in a south-to-west direction.

Re 2. 5 km. south of the station.

Re 3. Smooth ice surface without snowdrifts; average thickness more than 1.20 meters.

Re 5. Northnorthwest.

Re 6. Flat apart from escarpments in north and northwest.

Re 7. From west to north it can be guarded by our own forces.

Re 8. 26 men, 30 kg. expeditionary luggage. How many kg. per man may be taken? Patrol activity on both sides at present."

Meanwhile one of "Bassgeiger"'s patrol had made a reconnaissance of the ice situation south of Shannon Island and reported on 14 May an open channel without drift-ice about 10 miles south of Shannon. Procedure with all the radio gear and other equipment was impossible, as there was no means of transport. Some of the crew were not completely fit to march over bad ice. The route and purpose would immediately be obvious to the enemy. The journey to the channel with all personnel would take 4 to 5 days if equipment

CONFIDENTIAL

was limited and no radio gear was taken. The channel stretches to south of Penkulus. On the other hand, further reconnaissance on 17 May showed "Smooth undisturbed ice surface south of Alabama more than 6 km. long. Route impaired to the south by soft snow".

D. Organizational:

1954 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats
Most Secret 3875 received:

"1. With effect from 1 June, the following boats will be assigned to new flotillas for administrative purposes:

- (a) In accordance with C-in-C U-boats Ops. teleprinter message 01226 A 2 Most Secret of 12 May, U 289 (Hellwig) will be transferred from 3rd U-boat Flotilla to 13th U-boat Flotilla.
- (b) In accordance with C-in-C U-boats Ops. teleprinter message 01526 A 2 Most Secret of 15 May, U 344 (Pietsch) will be transferred from 3rd U-boat Flotilla to 11th U-boat Flotilla.
- (c) In accordance with C-in-C U-boats Ops. teleprinter message 01325 Most Secret of 13 May, U 394 (Borger) from 1st U-boat Flotilla and U 476 (Nietmann) from 3rd U-boat Flotilla will be transferred to 11th U-boat Flotilla.
- (d) In accordance with C-in-C U-boats Ops. teleprinter message 01325 Most Secret of 13 May, U 995 (Köhntopp) from 3rd U-boat Flotilla and U 997 (Lehmann) from 9th U-boat Flotilla will be transferred to 13th U-boat Flotilla.

2. The transfer date ordered by C-in-C U-boats Ops. is not altered."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d).

"Surprising codeword transmission to Russian submarines and unusual number of minesweepers in Gorlo Strait."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0456 to 1010. (Special operation). Not exhaustively examined, but special assignment carried out without incident.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0140 to 1003.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0315 to 0920. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of weather, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: at 0647, 1144 and 1538 on 19 May a codeword was transmitted to all submarines in the operational area, otherwise few transmissions to submarines.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 33, 111, 112, 117, 118 and another unidentified, BO-boat No. 202, 1 ice-breaker (4038), 1 unidentified vessel (0561).

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 61, 63, BO-boat No. 203: guardboat No. 508, motorboat "PS 49": the latter was often mentioned in what were at times very urgent radio messages.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 37, motor minesweepers Nos. 429, 430, 431, BO-boats Nos. 201, 205.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Hammerfest: at 0015 on 20 May unit "AM" in 229.5°, at 0050 "NUMS4" in 261°, at 0207 "HBDJ" in 263.5°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 5666
U 425 AB 6477
U 957 AB 6742
U 737 AB 6776
U 347 AB 9151
U 362 AB 9185

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 668, 711, 742, 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 344, 354, 476, 716, 956, 990, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0000 U 307 put out from Narvik for AB 88.
1900 U 742 put out from Narvik for AB 88.
U 240, 394, 995, 997 proceeding from Bergen to
Narvik.
1930 U 344, 476 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
0300 U 673 put in to Ramsund from Trondheim
(Atlantic boat).
Group "Trutz" proceeding from AB 6254 - 9239
to AB 8123 - 8558.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 348 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 290, 477, 671, 675, 921, 980, 988, 1000
Kristiansand (South),
U 247, 480 Arendal,
U 1165, 767 Larvik,
U 1192 Vallø, y,
U 293 proceeding from Arendal to Bergen,
U 987 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Stavanger,
U 365 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in patrol line east of Jan Mayen. 1 boat
approaching.

CONFIDENTIAL

1219

Radio message 1135/782 sent:

"1. U 387 (Büchler) will put out at noon on 20 May from Westfjord for attack area AB 8589, U 742 (Schwassmann) will leave early on 21 May for AB 8838, in each case depth of sweep 20 miles. They will form group "Grimm".

2. Groups "Trutz" and "Grimm":
9-hourly dislocation in attack areas, at 0300 on 21 May at the northern limit, at 1200 in the south, etc. Submerge according to visibility conditions. Radio silence except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft or attacks. Order No. 8."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1610

Teloprinter message Most Secret 2572 sent to 11th U-boat Flotilla, for information, Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff:

"U 921 (Leu) will move to Bergen on 21 May for instruction and equipment for Northern Waters. Then, as soon as possible, boat will proceed to Narvik.

Note for 11th U-boat Flotilla:

Boat is to proceed at a distance of 60 miles from the coast. As far as 63° N in accordance with Order No. 13, then at high speed making for Westfjord. Report expected time of arrival at approach point 24 hours in advance, also report passing "V 1" by time short signal. In case of bad radio connection, use relevant coastal frequency. Enemy submarines possible at the entrance to Westfjord. For exchange of recognition signals with land stations, see Recognition-Signals Regulations, Para. 153."

The new boats approaching from the south were warned of increased activity of enemy aircraft and submarines off the Norwegian coast.

0137

Radio message 0058/697 sent:

"To all U-boats from Captain U-boats.

1. Enemy submarine reported by U 965, seen about 60 miles from the approaches to Westfjord. Accordingly keep a sharp lookout, proceed at high speed, zig-zag course.

2. U 668 reported "Sunderland" and "Catalina" flying boats in AF 81 in the afternoon."

V.

Reports of successes: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), third operation, see Appendix II/4.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

1450 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 02013:

- "1. Because of escort difficulties for home boats, it is intended to alter the sailing date of group Central boats to the Atlantic from 21 May to 22 May.
2. From 21 May U 921 (Leu) is assigned for permanent duty to Captain U-boats, Norway. Boat is intended as replacement for U 240 (Link), presumed lost."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (d):

"U 668 (v. Eickstedt) put in to Narvik with damage caused by a "Sunderland". The report of the attack from the operational area was not heard. U 240 (Link) must have had the same bad radio interference and may have been badly damaged at the same time in air attacks, without our picking up the report. We do not yet know whether there is a special significance in the increased air activity off Trondheim."

(Signed) Suhren.

21 May, 1944.

1000 On 19 May, teleprinter message Naval High Command, Department of Naval Personnel 1 3527 Secret:

"Cdr. Suhren (Reinhard) up to now of 27th U-boat Flotilla becomes Captain U-boats, Norway. Captain Peters is relieved of his duties as Captain U-boats, Norway. Order has immediate effect."

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 10° E - Banak from 0417 to 1050, almost exhaustive.

At 0715 in AG 7865 a twin-engined land-based aircraft was sighted, altitude 200 meters, course 160°, nationality not identified. In Barentsberg a burning coal dump, otherwise nothing to report.

2 FW 190 on shipping reconnaissance of the waters around Fisher Peninsula and Kola Bay from 0852 to 0950. Except for Kola Bay and Kola inlet which were not seen because of deep clouds, the area was examined, no shipping movements.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0217 to 1029, nothing to report.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of shipping anchorages in the Shetlands from 2230 to 0116. From 2353 to 0008 north part of the Shetlands exhaustively examined, no shipping identified.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen as far as AA 8525 from 0328 to 1347. Route as far as 11° W partially examined, remainder exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

5 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance in the sea area AF 4679 - AE 5357 - 2961 - 2823 - AA 2579 from 0457 to 1450. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined.

At 1255 in AF 5829, a flying boat was sighted on a northerly course, otherwise nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

At 1437 on 21 May, Polyarno broadcast code-words of very high priority to all submarines. Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Svanvik: at 0005 on 21 May British radio traffic in 260°; at 0250 British radio traffic in 270° 10'.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 8123)
U 425 AB 8161)
U 957 AB 8193) in attack areas, depth of sweep
U 737 AB 8278) 20 miles, 9-hourly north/south
U 347 AB 8159) dislocation.
U 362 AB 8558)

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8589.

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 668, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 990, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 742 proceeding from Narvik to AB 88.
U 394, 997 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 344, 476 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 921 put in to Bergen from Stavanger.

1900

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 1191 Stavanger,
U 291, 365, 477, 671, 987, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 980 Flekkefjord,
U 247, 480 Arendal,
U 767, 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

6 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen. 2
further boats approaching. After a report from
Luftflotte 5 on the increased radio traffic
north of the Faeroes and after air attacks on

CONFIDENTIAL

our boats west of Trondheim,

1157

radio message 1127/798 was sent:

- "1. Increased indications of the approach of an eastbound convoy. Air reconnaissance is being carried out by FW 200 east of Iceland. Expect increased enemy activity from carrier aircraft.
2. "Köhntopp": report grid square and result of air attacks."

U 995 (Köhntopp) had reported an air attack.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Radio intercept service reports indicated air attacks on our boats as they approached from the south.

1825

Radio message 1735/618 sent:

"At 1248 an enemy aircraft was seen in approximately AF 7392 above a U-boat, course 050°, speed 6 knots. Boat submerged."

2148

Radio message 2132/80 received from U 995 (Köhntopp):

"Am being attacked by aircraft in AF 5796."

That was the second attack report from "Köhntopp".

0015

Teleprinter message Most Secret 2577 was sent to Naval War Staff Second Division C-in-C U-boats Ops., Admiral Commanding U-boats, for information 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"U 240 (Link) is missing. On 14 May the boat put out from Bergen with U 668, U 742 and U 965 to proceed via 2 position lines to Westfjord - Narvik. Last seen west of Hellisby. When "Link" failed to report, he was requested to do so in radio message 1239/661 of 17 May and in several later messages. All in vain. The other boat, U 668, was taken by surprise (without location) by a "Sunderland" attack on 16 May and, as a result, was unable to transmit. It is possible that U 240 has been lost to an enemy aircraft or an enemy submarine."

V.

Reports of successes: None.

VI.

U-boat reports:

Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer), third operation, see Appendix II/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. Surface forces:

1843 Teleprinter message Most Secret 745/44 received from Flieger Fuehrer 5:

Subject: Evacuation of "Bassgeiger".

"1. Execution entrusted to Flieger Fuehrer 5. For this purpose a special aircraft will be available in Trondheim (land-based plane) from 21 May onwards.

2. Plan:

- (a) Pre-reconnaissance of the iced landing ground from the air without landing, depending on the general weather conditions and those prevailing in the target area.
- (b) Execution of the assignment in one operation, depending on the results of the pre-reconnaissance and weather conditions.

3. Cargo of 5 tons, i.e. transportation of 26 men and the most valuable gear.

4. Execution:

- (a) Weather reports from "Bassgeiger" from a certain time every 3 hours up to the time of landing or until canceled.
- (b) Marking of landing ground. Specifications follow.
- (c) Communications arrangements: From 2 hours before the probable arrival, direct contact between "Bassgeiger" and the aircraft on D/F wave, arranged by radio advisory station at Tromsø.
On the return trip, tactical short or long wave. Request support to develop radio and D/F service. Details from both communications officers.
- (d) Re 2. (a) and (b): report of take-off to be made if possible 20 hours in advance.

5. For patrol escort on return trip request disposition of second U-boat between the ice limit and the Norwegian coast."

D. Organizational:

1133 Teleprinter message Most Secret 2582 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"German Air Force assumes from the amount of radio traffic north of the Faeroes that a PQ convoy is approaching. If current air reconnaissance

CONFIDENTIAL

intercepts the convoy, permission is requested to dispose U 673 (Sauer) against it from Narvik. (Experimental tower 6, intended for Atlantic trials)."

1600 Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. approved the request.

1445 Teleprinter message 5th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret 1366 I received:

"At 0800 on 21 May 1944, group Central put out from Kiel: U 243 (Mertens) to Flekkefjord; U 1001 (Blaudow), U 971 (Zeplien) and U 363 (Nees) to Kristiansand (South); U 1164 (Schloemer) to Larvik; U 242 (Panke) and U 294 (Schütt) to Stavanger. Radio frequency: U-boat coastal frequency."

E. Survey of the situation:

Luftflotte 5 gave the following information by telephone:

"1. From 0130 to the early hours of the morning we have been intercepting British carrier radio traffic on short wave in the sea area north of the Faeroes as far as Iceland. As we have learned that this short wave traffic, occurring because of the use of rather old aircraft, has been observed only during convoy runs, a convoy is presumed to be in this sea area. Unfortunately we have been unable to obtain cross-bearings and exact details regarding the breadth of the convoy cannot be given. This morning four of our aircraft went out on reconnaissance, but 2 planes had to abandon the assignment owing to technical trouble. A third has now taken off and we have no more available. The results of the reconnaissance have still to come in. At any rate it seems right in the circumstances to prepare the boats for an early operation against a PQ convoy."

2. Intention of German Air Force: From today, a convoy day's run will be flown to re-intercept approaching convoy traffic.

3. According to the listening service, 2 of our U-boats were pursued by British planes in 06 E 13 and 06 E 22.

4. During the night strong formations of enemy aircraft were in the sea area north of the Faeroes."

Approach of new eastbound convoy now seems possible. The boats at Narvik will be made ready as quickly as possible. At present, 12 to 15 boats could be set on the convoy, depending on the number of boats arriving from the south.

(Signed) Suhren.

22 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0504 to 1005, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0223 to 1042. Northern fjords examined, no shipping.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of shipping anchorages in Firth of Forth, Dundee and Montrose from 2125 to 0110 on 23 May.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

3 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance in the same area as on 21 May from 0349 to 1258. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined. At 1100 in AF 5416 and at 1108 in AF 5492, 1 flying boat otherwise nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In the inner Firth of Forth, a convoy of 35 - 40 merchant ships was identified at anchor, totaling roughly 200,000 G.R.T.; also 10 escorts and 2 other merchant ships totaling 6,000 G.R.T.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions. At 1437 on 21 May codewords of very high priority were sent to all submarines in the operational area.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Hammerfest on 21 May: at 1450 British Unit "AC" in 2450: at 1532 British unit "LB" in 2510: at 2230 allied unit "U6X4" in 2580. On 22 May at 0020 "NUMS2" in 2590. At 1445 destroyer "Gromyashchi" (at sea) transmitted 1 codeword of very high priority to Tsyp Navolok (LC 8824). At 0428 Murmansk also broadcast a codeword to all naval forces in Northern Waters.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 8123)
U 425 AB 8161)
U 957 AB 8193) in the attack area, depth of
U 737 AB 8278) sweep 20 miles, 9-hourly
U 347 AB 8519) north/south dislocation.
U 362 AB 8558)

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8589
U 742 AB 8835

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 668, 673 (Atlantic boat),
711, 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 990, 992, 921 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1030 U 668 put out from Narvik for AB 8944.
2000 U 921 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
2000 U 990 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
2100 U 997 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
U 344, 394, 476 proceeding from Bergen to
Narvik.
U 995 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293, 365 Bergen,
U 719, 958, 987, 1191 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 988 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 980 Flekkefjord,
U 247, 480 Arendal,
U 767, 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

8 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen.
1 boat approaching.

CONFIDENTIAL

1944

Radio message 1909/715 sent:

"U 668 (v. Eickstedt) will put out from Westfjord on the evening of 22 May to attack area AB 8944, depth of sweep 20 miles. With 9-hourly dislocation in the attack area the boat will be in the north at 1500 on 22 May, in the south at 2400, etc. Irregular courses, submerging according to visibility conditions. Radio silence except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft or attacks. Boat will join group "Grimm"."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Of the 3 boats approaching simultaneously, two ("Kohntopp" and "Borger") had considerable trouble from enemy aircraft as was evident from the aircraft radio traffic which was intercepted.

1016

Radio message 0347/105 received from U 995 (Kohntopp):

"6 runs-in by "Catalinas" and "Sunderlands". Two attacks warded off on the surface, 10 aerial bombs, 2 men seriously wounded, slight damage to range-finder gear and 3.7 cm. gun cook-off, putting in to Trondheim."

0957

Short signal 0919/100 received from U 995 (Kohntopp):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AF 8221."

1141

Short signal 1120/22 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AF 4667."

1809

Radio message 1735/638 sent:

"According to lively radio traffic, British aircraft are still operating on our U-boats between 64° and 65° N and 2° and 4° E."

Transfer order for U 1060 (Brammer):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1400 on 22 May via Ramsund to Bergen. Report sailing from Ramsund by time short signal on "MC".

2. Proceed via Westfjord and continue at a distance of 60 miles from the coast, making for Fejeosen. From 63° N in accordance with Order No. 13.

3. Report expected time of arrival at Hellisøy

CONFIDENTIAL

24 hours in advance: if radio connection is bad, use coastal frequency.

4. Radio frequency "Anton".

5. For home passage, orders from 11th U-boat Flotilla."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

2010 Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. announced in teleprinter message Most Secret 02218:

"If the PQ convoy has not arrived by 28 May, U 673 is to put out for the Atlantic on 29 May to continue his trials."

2308 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Secret 2278 received:

"Command by Admiral Commanding U-boats temporarily limited as a result of enemy action. You are largely independent for administrative purposes. In urgent cases, enquiries to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (b):

Assembling of a PQ convoy possible.

Re IV (d):

"The sudden operations by strong air patrols in the southern area of Northern Waters as far as west of Trondheim lead to the conclusion that the enemy has learned of the sailing of greater numbers of boats from Bergen. In the long daylight of the northern summer, continuous patrol of this sea area can make undisturbed charging on the surface almost impossible for both the approaching Atlantic boats and the Northern Waters boats. Moreover, in the uncertain weather, action by U-boats against aircraft becomes more difficult."

(Signed) Suhren.

23 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0451 to 1010, nothing to report, exhaustive.
2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Kola Bay and the waters around Fisher Peninsula from 0855 to 0955, exhaustive. At 0930 in Kola Bay off Vaenga 3 merchant ships, each 1,500 - 2,000 G.R.T., 6 merchant ships, each 500 - 1,000 G.R.T., at anchor. In the rest of the sea area, no shipping. Bays and ports unoccupied.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0158 to 1055; north part of Sandoy Island examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0306 to 0939. Route 80% - 90% examined, southeastern part of Jan Mayen 60% examined, nothing to report.
3 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance in the same area as on 22 May from 0548 to 1544. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0726 in AF 4693 1 flying boat, probably "Saro Lerwik", course 030° - 040°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Northern Waters, 22 May: in the afternoon Polyarno several times broadcast codewords to all naval forces in Northern Waters, destroyers "Gremyashchi", "B", "E" and M.T.B. No. 203. Destroyer "C" received a radio message of first priority from Polyarno at 1959. At 1445 destroyer "Gremyashchi" (at sea) transmitted a codeword of very high priority to Tsyp Navolok. From 1310 to 1428 Murmansk broadcast 5 codewords to all naval forces in Northern Waters. Destroyers "C", "B", "E", "H" and an M.T.B. were at sea in the Murmansk area in the evening.

CONFIDENTIAL

Norwegian polar coast: normal transmissions to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 111, 115.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: guardships Nos. 16, 76, minesweepers Nos. 32, 60, motor minesweepers Nos. 429, 431.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.
Bearings from Hammerfest: at 2045 on 22 May British unit "AP" in 272.5°; at 0444 on 23 May British merchant ship "NUMS1" in 244°; at 0302 British unit "AC" in 227°.
Bearings from Kirkenes: at 0448 British unit "AD" in 231°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 8123)
U 425 AB 8161) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 8193) sweep 20 miles, 9-hourly
U 737 AB 8278) north/south dislocation.
U 347 AB 8519)
U 362 AB 8558)

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8589
U 742 AB 8838

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 673, 711, 965, 997 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1830 U 997 put out from Narvik to AB 88.
U 668 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8944.
0730 U 995 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.
U 334, 394, 476, 921, 990 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293, 365 Bergen,
U 987 Stavanger,
U 477, 671 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 980 Flekkefjord,
U 247, .480 Arendal,
U 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valloy,
U 988 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Bergen,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

8 boats in attack areas east of Jan Mayen. 2 boats approaching.

For patrol of the area north of the formation as far as the ice limit which could not be covered by air reconnaissance, the 3 most northerly boats were deployed, depth of sweep 40 miles, while the remaining seven formed a patrol line, depth of sweep 25 miles.

2245

Radio message 2111/725 sent:

"1. U 997 (Lehmann) will put out early on 24 May from Westfjord to AB 8941, joining group "Grimm".

2. Groups "Trutz" and "Grimm" will leave for the attack areas at 0000 on 24 May, depth of sweep 20 miles:
"Hellwig" AB 4624, "Bentzien" AB 4694,
"Schaar" AB 5742. Patrol line from AB 8126 to 8941 in the following order: "Brasack", "de Buhr", "Franz", "Büchler", "Schwassmann", "Eickstedt", "Lehmann".

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The boats approaching from Bergen were again to proceed on reconnaissance via 2 position lines.

1852

Radio message 1815/646 sent:

" "Leu" and "Nordheimer": proceed via position line 1, AF 5712 to 5729, and position line 2, AF 2943 to 2991. Observe Order No. 14."

Sailing order for U 997 (Lehmann), see Appendix III/2.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The destroyer activity off the Russian coast might be connected with a new westbound convoy. On the basis of previous experience, this may indicate the running of a PQ convoy."

(Signed) ¹⁹¹⁶Suhren.

24 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0502 to 1020, almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0223 to 1046. At 0340 in AF 7874 a German U-boat was observed at anchor, recognition signal was answered. At 0600 in AM 2152 2 merchant ships of up to 5,000 G.R.T., course 016°, speed 15 knots.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0457 to 1143. Route and southeast coast of Jan Mayen 90% examined, nothing to report. 3 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance from 0443 to 1427 in the area AF 4916 - AE 5347 - 2577 - AA 9844 - AF 5552, exhaustive, nothing to report. 1 FW 200 on a sea distress mission from 1421 to 2318 to search for U 476 in the sea area AF 5821 - 5554 - 5544 - 5465. At 1920 in AF 5495 rubber dinghy with about 7 men sighted. One of our U-boats was informed by lamp; on return flight, dinghy was not found owing to a heavy shower. Further search proved fruitless. D/F signals given from 1920 - 1950.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV (d).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: on 23 May, lively transmissions to submarines in the operational area. Both at 0907 and 2310 Murmansk sent 1 codeword of very high priority to all submarines.

Murmansk area: MO-boat No. 127.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624) in the attack area, depth of
U 425 AB 4694 } sweep 20 miles.
U 957 AB 5742 }

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126

U 347 AB 8165

U 362 AB 8274

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519

U 742 AB 8559

U 668 AB 8832

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711, 965

Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968, 995 Trondheim,

U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 997 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8941.

U 334, 394, 476, 921, 990 proceeding from Bergen
to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,

U 293, 365 Bergen,

U 987 Stavanger,

U 477, 671, 363, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),

U 290, 1000 Egersund,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 980 Flekkefjord,
U 247, 480 Arendal,
U 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 243 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Flekkefjord,
U 242, 294 proceeding from Kristiansand (South)
to Stavanger,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

9 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen. 1 boat approaching.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The next boats to approach from the south also encountered heavy air patrols.

0736 Short signal 0718/48 from U 476 (Nietmann):

"Am being attacked by aircraft in AF 5573."

1120 Distress message 1106/52 from "Nietmann":

"Secret material destroyed. AF 5573."

1152 Distress message 1133 from "Nietmann":

"Boat sinking fast, cannot hold on any longer. AF 5573."

All boats in the vicinity were sent to help at once on receipt of "Nietmann"'s distress message.

1115 Radio message 1132/651 sent:

" "Pietsch" from Captain U-boats. Operate at maximum speed on "Nietmann"'s distress message AF 5573."

1237 Radio message 1138/652 sent:

" "Borger", "Brammer", "Leu", "Nordheimer" from Captain U-boats. Operate at maximum speed on "Nietmann"'s distress message. AF 5573."

1304 Radio 1213/653 sent:

" "Pietsch", "Leu", "Borger", "Brammer", and "Nordheimer" from Captain U-boats. According to the last distress message, "Nietmann" sank

at 1200 in AF 5573. Crew probably in dinghies. Boats are to search until recalled: report any clues at once. Sea distress aircraft dispatched. Watch out for enemy aircraft."

A sea distress plane of Flieger Fuehrer 5 took off. Admiral Northern Waters at once dispatched 1 patrol vessel, 1 minesweeper and 2 motor minesweepers.

1158 Radio message 1055/52 from 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"British reconnaissance plane reported at 0725: "1 U-boat in 6529 N, 0552 E"."

1447 Radio message 1224/656 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Minesweeper No. 132: with 2 motor minesweepers, proceed at maximum speed to AF 5573 to rescue U-boat crew."

1325 Radio message 1159/65 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Patrol vessel No. 5901: put out immediately at maximum speed to AF 5573 to rescue U-boat crew."

1432 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1492 received from 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"Re "Nietmann":

1. Distress plane with dinghies took off at 1229.
2. Patrol vessel No. 5901 put out from Follafjord at 1245, speed 16 knots.
3. Minesweeper No. 132 and 2 motor minesweepers put out from Aalesund about 1315, speed 15 knots."

1525 Radio message 1325/657 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Aircraft tender will put out from Trondheim for AF 5573. She will pass Halten at 1900."

1519 Radio message 1226/658 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Patrol vessel No. 5901: aircraft tender did not put out. Proceed direct to AF 5573."

1550 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1494 received from 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"At 1515 U 276 (Borchers) put out in answer to "Nietmann"'s distress call."

By direction of Naval War Staff, Second Division, the transport boat "Brammer" will not be sent to "Nietmann"'s aid.

CONFIDENTIAL

1614 Radio message 1433/661 sent:
"1. "Brammer": do not go to the help of
"Nietmann", but proceed in accordance
with Orders Nos. 13 and 14.
2. Patrol vessel No. 5901, minesweeper No.
132 and 2 motor minesweepers should
arrive at the place of sinking, AF 5573,
from 2200 onwards."

1814 Radio message 1735/665 sent:
"Air reconnaissance is transmitting D/F
signals on frequency "Dora" from 1730 for
boats which have gone to "Nietmann"'s rescue.
Dinghies in AF 5571, firing shadower's
signal buoys."

1929 Radio message 1915/665 sent:
"Air reconnaissance sighted a U-boat and
dinghies in AF 5571. This U-boat which
has found survivors should report "Yes"
immediately by short signal."

2057 Teleprinter message received from Flieger
Fuehrer 5:
"Radio message 1935 from sea distress plane:
"Have lost dinghy, continuing the search"."

2135 Radio message 2058/669 received from mine-
sweeper No. 132:
"Attacked by "Sunderland" in AF 5876."

2229 Radio message 2114/670 received from mine-
sweeper No. 132:
" "Sunderland" continues to shadow me. Own
offensive action very limited in rough sea."

2236 Radio message 2155/672 received from Admiral
North Coast for minesweeper No. 132:
"Break off operations. Put in via Grip-
Holen to Kristiansund (North)."
Thus, only patrol vessel No. 5901 was
approaching to search for "Nietmann".

2335 Radio message 2258/85 received from U 990
(Nordheimer):
" "Nietmann" afloat in AF 5574. 10 men on
board. All engines out of action. Rudder
jammed hard to starboard. Lying alongside."

0130 Radio message 2358/681 sent:
Admiral North Coast from Captain U-boats.
" "Nordheimer" reported at 2258 from AF 5574

CONFIDENTIAL

that "Nietmann" is afloat but unable to maneuver. Urgently request towing action by minesweeper."

Transfer order for U 307 (Herrle) and U 315 (Zoller):

- "1. Put out from Bogen for Hammerfest at noon on 25 May.
2. Proceed together via Tjeldsund and the inner leads. From Lødingen to Tromsø with pilots, then under Admiral Polar Coast's escort. Escort will be requested from here. Short stay at Harstad to enable "Zoller" to take on acetylenes from Naval Fitting-out and Repair Works. "Herrle" will report sailing for Harstad by time short signal on "MC" i.e. 479 kc/s.
3. Radio frequency: U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
4. At Hammerfest you will be at 12 hours' readiness."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 995 (Köhntopp) see Appendix II/6.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0142 Teleprinter message Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Admiral Quartermaster II 2450/44 Most Secret received:

"Subject: Operational organization in the northern area.
The following orders are to be effective immediately:

1. With the abolition of the command position of Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters, Captain U-boats, Norway is formed. For administration he comes under Admiral Commanding U-boats, operationally he is under Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. In joint operations of U-boats and surface forces, Naval Chief Command, Norway is the relevant office for instructions for Captain U-boats, Norway, but the Chief Command must not interfere with the actual execution of U-boat operations. U-boat forces and parent ship "Grille" are, as up to now, under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Operationally Battle Group is under the command of Naval Chief Command, Norway; for administration it comes under Fleet. Captain Destroyers is the tactical commander and captain of the formation and will be aboard the "Tirpitz". Forces under his command as before. Captain Destroyers exercises his powers of command in operations involving Battle Group or parts of Battle Group on instructions from Naval War Staff and, immediately, from Naval Chief Command, Norway. Operational direction and command are the sole responsibility of C-in-C Naval Chief Command, Norway. Captain Destroyers is responsible for training Battle Group.
3. For maintaining the necessary liaison between Captain U-boats, Norway and Captain Destroyers Naval Chief Command, Norway will appoint a General Staff Officer with subsidiary powers. This officer will be in charge of reports and orders in Naval Chief Command: that is his particular function. He is aboard "Grille". The technical facilities for command available on the ship and in the staff of Captain U-boats are to be placed at his disposal.
4. Execution of complete organization through Naval Chief Command, Norway. Report execution."

1545 Radio message 1427/730 sent:

"Alteration in command organization in the northern area:

1. With immediate effect, the new command post Captain U-boats, Norway takes the place of Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters.
2. Cdr. Suhren is appointed Captain U-boats, Norway and has assumed command.
3. Captain Peters has been appointed captain of Battle Group. At present he is serving in Germany. Disassociation of the formation will take place on his return."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

U 990 (Nordheimer) has found the sinking U 476 (Nietmann). As the boat appears to be unfit to proceed, an attempt to tow it in the rough sea over the 120 miles to the coast will prove very difficult. We still await further reports from "Nordheimer". It is strange that U 344 (Pietsch), the nearest of the 5 boats to "Nietmann", has not reported. It is also remarkable that, after

CONFIDENTIAL

"Nietmann"'s distress calls, no further enemy aircraft have been reported in this area up to 2100.

The air patrol which has recently appeared in such strength for the first time at the northern exits of the North Sea as far as approximately 66° N can only be there to attack the boats putting out to the Atlantic or to Northern Waters. Perhaps the enemy has observed the greater number of U-boats leaving Bergen in the last few days. It might also be regarded as a harassing measure prior to the invasion.

(Signed) Suhren.

25 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Belushya - Cape Kanin Nos - Banak from 0600 to 1355, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0140 to 1007, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0330 to 1102. Route 90%, Jan Mayen 95% examined. Jan Mayen airfield photographed, enemy not sighted.

3 FW 200 and 1 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance as on previous day from 1044 to 2100. Area exhaustively examined. At 1826 in AF 4661 a "Liberator", course 220°, otherwise nothing to report. 1 FW 200 had to abandon the operation because of radar trouble.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Murmansk area: destroyers "C", "E", "H" and "J".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624) in the attack area, depth of
U 425 AB 4694) sweep 20 miles.
U 957 AB 5742)

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

In port:

U 307, 313, 315, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711, 965
Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1830 U 394 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
1930 U 307 put out from Narvik, at 2400 put in to
Harstad.
1400 U 315 put out from Narvik, at 1750 put in to
Harstad.
U 344 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 921 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
0140 U 476 AF 5574 and
0735 U 990 AF 5677 sunk as result of aircraft
attack.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 365 Bergen,
U 987 Stavanger,
U 477, 671, 363, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),

CONFIDENTIAL

U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 980 Flekkefjord,
U 247, 480 Arendal,
U 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Vallø,
U 243 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Flekkefjord,
U 242, 294 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Stavanger,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

Regarding the rescue of the crew of the sinking
"Nietmann",

0025 radio message 2222/84 was received from U 990
(Nordheimer):

"Up to now 11 men saved. Look out for
shadower's signal buoys. Further distress
star signals seen."

0100 Teleprinter message Most Secret sent to
Luftflotte Command 5 for information Admiral
North Coast:

"According to the last report, U 476 is still
afloat. Salvage is being attempted. If it is
possible to tow the boat, Captain U-boats will
ask for air escort. If necessary, the request
will be made through Admiral North Coast."

0125 Telephone call from Admiral Ciliax:

"In view of the expected enemy situation and
our own weakness, C-in-C Navy, after discussion
with Admiral Meisel, has decided to abandon the
attempt to tow in the boat."

0130 Radio message 2115/91 received from U 990
(Nordheimer):

"Dinghy empty in 5575. Look out for shadower's
signal buoys, Type 3."

0209 Radio message 0005/683 sent:

" "Nordheimer": report if "Nietmann" can be
towed: if so, attempt salvage: otherwise take
on crew and sink the boat."

CONFIDENTIAL

0225 Teleprinter message Most Secret 2650 sent to
Luftflotte 5 and Admiral North Coast:

"Air escort not necessary for towing in U 476
as C-in-C Navy has decided, in view of the
enemy's superiority in forces, to abandon the
boat."

0226 Radio message 0007/682 sent:

" "Borger", "Pietsch", "Leu".
Operate in AF 5574 on "Nordheimer"'s report.
Assist in rescue, if necessary take over anti-
aircraft protection."

0252 Radio message 0150/685 sent:

" "Nordheimer", "Pietsch", "Leu".

1. Decision of C-in-C Navy: crew of "Nietmann"
is to be saved. Boat to be sunk as unfit
to proceed. No attempt at towing because
of enemy's superior strength.
2. Report when you meet patrol vessel."

As U 394 (Borger) reported his position 150
miles north of the sinking position of
"Nietmann", because he had not heard the
dispositional order,

0309 radio message 0135/686 was sent:

" "Borger": put in to Westfjord - Narvik.
Operation on "Nietmann" not necessary. Report
again arrival at "V 1"."

0316 Radio message 0245/687 sent:

"U-boats are to attempt to put survivors of
"Nietmann"'s crew aboard the patrol boat and
then to come to Narvik at high speed."

0406 Radio message 0140/3 received from U 990
(Nordheimer):

"U 476 could not hold out and was sunk by
torpedoes.
Saved: Commander, Chief Engineer, First Watch
Officer, Warrant Quartermaster, 2 Leading
Engine Room Artificers and 15 men."

0400 Radio message 0228/684 received from 13th
U-boat Flotilla for U 276:

"Abandon operation. Put in to Trondheim to
complete fitting-out. Report passing "HA 1"
by time short signal."

0619 Radio message 0525/6 received from U 921 (Leu):

"Arriving at "FN 5" at 0900. Request escort
and doctor."

CONFIDENTIAL

This boat also seemed to have been attacked by aircraft.

0620 Radio message 0400/5 received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Patrol boat met, proceeding together to Trondheim, as transfer of survivors is impossible owing to heavy sea."

0304 Radio message 0158/34 received from Admiral North Coast:

"To patrol vessel No. 5901. Put in at maximum speed to Kya. No towing. If attempts are being made to salvage the boat, cease as quickly as possible."

0835 Radio message 0655/9 received from U 990 (Nordheimer):

"Have been spotted by reconnaissance planes. Urgently request air escort."

0840 Radio message 0814/690 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Patrol vessel No. 5901 reported at 0735:
"Bomb attack in AF 5677 by "Sunderland", U-boat hit and sinking".

0950 Radio message 0915/693 sent:

" "Pietsch": proceed immediately at maximum speed to help "Nordheimer" in AF 5677. Report your position. Your own safety must come first."

1028 Radio message 0943/692 received from Admiral North Coast:

"Patrol vessel No. 5901 reported at 0845:
"U 990 sunk in AF 5596. Have survivors on board".

1036 Radio message 0533/14 received from "Borchers":

"At 0150 2 aircraft were driven off in AF 5674. Damage: 3 men slightly wounded, 2 struck by waves. "HA 1" at 1400."

1051 Radio message 1002/18 received from "Borchers":

"Proceeding with patrol vessel No. 5901. Am in AF 5923."

1056 Radio message 1049/19 received from "Borchers":

"Am being attacked by aircraft in AF 5687".

1116 Radio message 1109/20 received from "Borchers":

"Am being attacked by aircraft in AF 5698."

CONFIDENTIAL

1143 Radio message 1117/696 sent:
" "Piotsch" from Captain U-boats.
Cease search, proceed to Narvik. Report
position."

To send another boat to help seemed senseless,
as the boats' defense was so very limited in
the heavy sea and they could not assist the
patrol boat. Instead heavy fighters and
escort vessels were sent to help.

1157 Radio message 1125/698 sent:
" "Piotsch", "Borchers" from Captain U-boats.
Expect German heavy fighters, Me 110s, also
BV 138s and Do 24s."

1155 Radio message 1053/695 received from Admiral
North Coast for patrol vessel No. 5916:
"Put out at once via Kya for Halten. There
pick up patrol vessel No. 5901."

1207 Radio message 1145/697 received for patrol
vessel No. 5901:
"Fighter protection on the way."

1219 Short signal 1158/26 received from "Borchers":
"Am being attacked by aircraft in AF 5933."

1356 Radio message 1157/29 received from "Borchers":
" "Catalina" shadower in AF 6711. No further
attacks."

1442 Radio message 1406/700 sent:
" "Borchers" from Captain U-boats.
You are free to abandon escort of patrol
vessel and may submerge if, despite the air
escort, the commander considers it more
advisable."

1612 Radio message 1503/603 received from Admiral
North Coast:
"Patrol vessel No. 5901 reported: "Dinghy
containing 11 men rescued, and 10 men saved
directly from the boat. Presumably no
survivors at scene of disaster"."

2255 Teleprinter message 13th U-boat Flotilla
Most Secret 1507 received:
"Patrol vessel No. 5901 put in to Trondheim
at 1915 on 25 May.
Survivors from U 476: commander and 17 men.
From U 990: commander and 32 men. 1 wounded
man died on the way to Trondheim. U 276
(Borchers) put in to Trondheim at 1945 on
25 May, after assisting "Nietmann" in answer

CONFIDENTIAL

to his distress call."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

"Evaluation of available reports from the radio intercept service reveal the presence of British reconnaissance planes since 24 May. Single submarine and rescue formations were reported in AF 57, 58, 81, 82.

Re IV (d):

Since yesterday, we have lost at least 2 boats, U 476 and U 990 to the increased enemy air patrols in the southern approach area. Still no reports from U 344 and U 921.

In future, without considering the delay, the boats must proceed via the inner leads as far as north of Trondheim in preference to the open water passage. In air attacks, the boats will thus have better firing opportunities, they will be effectively supported by the escort vessel and, in the event of an effective bomb hit, there will be more chance of towing the boat in or at least bringing the full complement of the crew ashore."

(Signed) Suhren.

26 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0501 to 1007, exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0234 to 1111.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area from 0330 to 1048. Route 80% examined, nothing to report.

3 FW 200 on sea reconnaissance as on 25 May from 0540 to 1600. Exhaustive visual and radar reconnaissance. At 1235 and 1255 in AF 4639 an air

CONFIDENTIAL

battle between a "Liberator" and a FW 200.
At 1304 in AF 5732 an empty German 4-man dinghy,
otherwise nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: on the afternoon and evening of 25 May and early on 26 May, several code-words of very high priority. At 0300 on 26 May 1 radio message of first priority, otherwise moderate transmissions to submarines in the operational area. "M 201" was named.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 38, 101, 111, BO-boat No. 209, MO-boat No. 126.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "C".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Hammarfest: at 1636 on 25 May U.S. unit "NOBO" in 236°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624)
U 425 AB 4694) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 5742) sweep 20 miles.

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

CONFIDENTIAL

In port:

U 313, 394, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711, 965
Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 307, 315 put out from Harstad to Hammerfest.
1100 U 921 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.
U 344 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293, 365 Bergen,
U 987, 242, 294 Stavanger,
U 477, 363, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 243, 980 Flockefjord,
U 247, 480 Arondal,
U 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valloy,
1800 U 671 proceeding from Kristiansund to Bergen,
U 975 put in to Trondheim from Kiel,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0223 Radio message 0127/53 sent to Naval Chief
Command, Norway:

"Request information by return on rubber
dinghy, presumably reported to you, which has
4 men in it in AF 8310 or 8230."

Data refer to "Nietmann". So it is possible that
the dinghy with 4 men is in AF 5575 or in a
sector southwest via south to southeast within
30 - 50 miles. Air reconnaissance at 1304
reported empty 4-man dinghy in AF 5732.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

1405 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division,

CONFIDENTIAL

C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 02614 received:

"As from 27 May, the following will be assigned permanently to Captain U-boats, Norway: U 987 (Schreyer) and U 363 (Nees) to replace U 476 and U 990."

1900 Admiral Commanding U-boats sent the following teleprinter message Secret 25/1100:

"Administrative command again assumed. Flagship "Otto Wünsche" at Kiel, Blücher Bridge. Callsign 24031 up to 24 May. Limited watches up to 28 May."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (d):

"The commander and 17 men have been saved from U 476 (Nietmann); and from U 990 (Nordheimer) the commander and 33 men, one of whom died on the homeward passage. The commanders are to fly to Narvik on 29 May to make their reports. Otherwise no comments."

(Signed) Suhren.

27 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0504 to 1004, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Belushya - Cape Kanin Nos - AC 8380 - Banak from 0253 to 0958, not exhaustive. At 0615 no shipping in Belushya harbor. No aircraft observed at the airfield at Belushya. Nothing to report.

2 FW 200 on supply flight for "Schatzgräber" from 1400 to 0320 on 28 May, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0150 to 0906, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0533 to 1235. Route exhaustively, Jan Mayen 80% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) By air reconnaissance: None
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

At 0844 Polyarno broadcast a radio message of first priority to submarines in the operational area.

Norwegian polar coast: lively transmissions to submarines in the operational area, "S 56" and "2103" called by name.

Murmansk area: destroyer "C", minesweeper No. 125.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "H", "E", "J".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings on British units from Svanvik: from 1420 to 2248 units in a sector from 253° - 258°.

From Hammerfest: from 1630 to 2241 in 237° - 258°. From Kirkenes: at 1830 in 243°.

- (c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624)
U 425 AB 4694) in the attack area, depth of sweep
U 957 AB 5742) 20 miles.

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

In port:

U 307, 315 Hammerfest,
U 313, 344, 394, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen,
U 987 Stavanger,
U 363 Kristiansand (South).

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1830 U 363 put out from Kristiansand (South) for
Bergen.
0800 U 344 put in to Narvik from Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293, 365, 671 Bergen,
U 242, 294 Stavanger,
U 477, 971, 975, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 243, 980 Flekkefjord,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 247 proceeding from Arendal to Bergen,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 363 (Nees) and U 987 (Schreyer):

"U 363 (Nees) and U 987 (Schreyer):
proceed to Bergen as quickly as possible."

Additional information for 11th U-boat Flotilla:

- "1. After providing instructions and equipment for Northern Waters, send the boats to Narvik as quickly as possible. Proceed in inner leads and via Frohavet at a distance of 60 miles from the coast to Westfjord. As far as Westfjord observe Order No. 13.
2. Report expected time of arrival at approach point 24 hours in advance and also report passing "V 1" by time short signal. If radio connection is bad, use relevant coastal frequency.
3. Radio frequency "Anton".
4. For exchange of recognition signals with land, observe Para. 153 of

Recognition Signal Regulations."

- V. Reports of successes: None.
- C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.
- D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The destroyers picked up in the Gorlo Strait area may be connected with the assembling of a west-bound convoy."

Re IV (b):

"Apart from the 10 boats in the operational area, 2 boats are ready in Hammerfest and 2 in Narvik and there is also the Atlantic boat U 673 (Sauer)."

(Signed) Suhren.

28 May, 1944.

- A. Enemy situation:
- I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

- 1 Ju-88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0505 to 1050, exhaustively examined except for AB 3883 and AB 5396 due to measurements. Visibility impaired by heavy mist. Nothing to report.
- 2 FW 190 on armed meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of Motovski Bay, the waters around Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet, examined as far as Vaonga, no shipping identified.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

- 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0237 to 1050. Anchorages of the Faeroes exhaustively examined, no shipping identified.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

- 1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0326 to 1053. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen area invisible from the north, nothing to report.

- II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Reports on submarines: at 0817 a surfaced submarine in 63° N, 1° 20' E (AF 7381), at 0829 a surfaced submarine in 62° 38' N, 1° 18' E (AF 7621): German Atlantic boats. Norwegian polar coast: considerable transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyers "B", "C", minesweeper No. 118, BO-boat No. 29, MO-boat No. 125, M.T.B.s Nos. 211, 222.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "E".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings obtained by Hammerfest on 27 May: at 1108 British unit "AD" in 235°, at 1510 British unit "AD" in 241°, at 2015 British unit "AH" in 233°, at 2120 British unit "AK" in 250°, at 2140 British unit "AD" in 238.5°. On 28 May: at 0157 British merchant ship "NUMS2" in 251°, at 0202 British merchant ship "NUMS1" in 252°, at 0355 British unit "AL" in 238.5°.

From Kirkenes: at 0345 British unit "AL" in 235.7°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

1602

Teleprinter message Secret 0195/44 received from Evaluation Station West Oberursel:

"With reference to British Fleet units in the north Norwegian area, confirmed by P.O.W.s' statements and other evidence, the following units were identified:

Battleships: "Anson"
"Duke of York".

Aircraft carriers: "Illustrious"
"Victorious"
"Furious".

Auxiliary aircraft carriers: "Pursuer"
"Searcher"
"Striker".

Heavy cruiser: "Kent".

Light cruisers: "Jamaica"
"Royalist"
"Emperor".

Also 12 destroyers.

CONFIDENTIAL

The formations are under the command of Admirals More and Frazer. The cruisers "Emperor" and "Royalist" are described as 10,000-ton cruisers, similar to the "Leander" class, with 6-inch guns; up to now the following aircraft have been identified:

"Baracuda" Squadrons 827 and 820.

Probably on "Furious", "Baracuda" Squadrons 829 and 831.

On "Victorious", "Corsair" Squadrons 1834 and 1836.

On "Illustrious", "Wildcat" Squadron 800.

On "Pursuer", "Wildcat" Squadron 890."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624)
U 425 AB 4694) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 5742) sweep 20 miles.

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

In port:

U 307, 315 Hammerfest,
U 313, 344, 394, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1530 U 987 put in to Bergen from Stavanger.
1530 U 363 put in to Bergen from Kristiansand (South).

U-boat group Central:

U 276 Trondheim,
U 293, 365, 671 Bergen,
U 242, 294, 987 Stavanger,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 477, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 243, 980 Flokkefjord,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 247 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Bergen,
U 975 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Stavanger,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

0038

Radio message 2017/782 sent:

"Groups "Trutz" and "Grimm".

Air reconnaissance against the PQ convoy
abandoned. Increased alertness. Observe
Commanders' Handbook, Paras. 372 - 386,
Order No. 8 and Northern Waters Directions,
No. 21."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

~~C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.~~

D. Plans:

2120 Teleprinter message Luftflotte Command 5 Most
Secret 4313 received:

- "1. To protect our U-boats from enemy air attacks
Flieger Fuehrer 4 in collaboration with the
Sea Distress Commander is executing special
operation "Prien".
2. Purpose of the operation is defensive action
against enemy aircraft attacks in the sea
area 06 East 653/4/5/6 and 554/6.
3. On receipt of codeword "Prien":
 - (a) 2 crash boats will put out for the
above sea area.
 - (b) 4 Mc 110, at least, will operate
continuously in the above-sea area from
0700 to 1700. Thus enemy runs-in and
attacks on crash boats will be driven
off by attacks on enemy aircraft.

- (c) Me 110s will fly only within visual range of the crash boats.

4. Special regulations:

- (a) Attacks on submarines are forbidden, to preclude any confusion with our own boats.
- (b) Our U-boats are always to be expected in the sea area.
5. The operation will be repeated as often as weather and forces allow.
6. Extensive protection for our U-boats (Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 2644 Aircraft Decree of 24 May) is not possible with the present forces.
7. Codeword "Prion" has been transmitted to Captain U-boats, Norway."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Enemy patrol of the North Sea exit against the U-boats putting out for the Atlantic is still in evidence. Shipping movements off the Murmansk coast do not seem to be abating."

(Signed) Suhren.

29 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0459 to 1015, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

8 FW 190 (in 2 operations) on armed meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of the waters around Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet from 1902 to 1950 on 28 May and from 1159 to 1252 on 29 May. No enemy shipping observed. Bays and harbors unoccupied.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0158 to 1000. North and south part of the Faeroes examined, no shipping identified.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flioger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and photographic reconnaissance of Jan Mayen from 0332 to 1047. Assignment not carried out because of weather and fire from medium and light anti-aircraft guns from sites at 70° 59' N, 8° 25' W, otherwise nothing to report. Route 10% - 20% examined, southeast side of Jan Mayen 60% examined.
2 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance with radar gear from 1010 to 1655. AB 9643 - AG 1168 - AB 9248 exhaustively examined, nothing to report.
5 FW 200 took off at 2147 on radar reconnaissance of the sea area AF 2618 - AB 7153 - AE 5232 - AF 7253. Operation carried out without incident.
2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance anchorages east and northeast of Iceland from 1235 to 2151.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1445 in AF 4574 enemy carrier formation consisting of 2 large aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers, course 040°, speed 8 knots, 1 line ahead.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1206 Polyarno broadcast a codeword of very high priority to submarines in the operational area.

Norwegian polar coast: normal transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Ikanka area: minesweeper No. 118, MO-boat No. 251.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

On 28 May Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 248° on a British unit.

Russian destroyer "C" at sea at 0030 on 28 May.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624) in attack area, depth of
U 425 AB 4694) sweep 20 miles.
U 957 AB 5742)

CONFIDENTIAL

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

In port:

U 307, 315 Hammerfest,
U 313, 344, 394, 673 (Atlantic boat), 711,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 272, 354, 363, 716, 956, 987, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1530 U 363, 987 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
1800 U 673 (Atlantic) put out from Narvik for
Trondheim.
U 862 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 247, 293, 365 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 243, 980 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 294, 975 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 276 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

1720 Radio message 1645/792 sent:

"At 1445 air reconnaissance reported 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers in AF 4574, course 040°, speed 8 knots."

2316 Radio message 2213/797 sent:

"At 2200 5 FW 200 took off on reconnaissance against the carrier formation and possible convoy south of the line from AB 71 to AF 25."

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

On receipt of the report of carriers, the boats at readiness were at once sent to the operational area.

2340

Radio message 2117/798 sent:

"U 307 (Herrle) and U 315 (Zoller): put out immediately at high speed via LoppHAVet for AB 89. Escort will be provided by base. Report sailing from Hammerfest by time short signal."

U 711 (Lange) and U 313 (Schweiger) received the following from Narvik:

Sailing order, see Appendix III/3.

Transfer order for U 673 (Sauer):

"1. Put out from Narvik for Trondheim at 1800 on 29 May.

2. Proceed from Rotver under escort of patrol vessel No. 5914 (VYQ) as far as "Schwarz 9", then via "Rot 13", further on route "Rot" and from Bodø under Admiral North Coast's escort via the inner leads. Boat is expected at Bodø at 0400 on 30 May.

3. Radio frequency "Anton".

Note: Fuel and provision replenishing at U-boat base Trondheim, then in accordance with sailing order for Atlantic."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short reports from U 990 (Nordheimer) and U 476 (Nietmann), also comments by Captain U-boats, Norway, see Appendix II/7-9.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"It is not certain whether the carrier formation sighted is operating against the coast or if it is connected with a PQ convoy, which might now be expected. At present, 14 boats would be

CONFIDENTIAL

available for an attack, but their disposition will have to be reformed more effectively to intercept the convoy when the results of the current air reconnaissance have been received."

(Signed) Suhren.

30 May, 1944.

I. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0452 to 1000, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0220 to 1018.
4 Ju 88 on reconnaissance from 1237 to 1943 to re-intercept the heavy enemy formation. No further enemy sighting reports.
1 Ju 188 on reconnaissance of the Shetlands from 1715 to 1847.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of Jan Mayen, course Vaernes - AB 8959 - 8123 - Bodø, from 0407 to 0927. Route as far as 69° 30' N, exhaustively examined, the remainder only 20% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0755 in AE 9647 2 battleships, 3 probable light cruisers and 2 destroyers. Classes not identified, course 090°, speed 20 knots.
At 1746 in Lerwick harbor 1 probable light cruiser or large destroyer.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

On 29 May, the Russian signal station at Dvina estuary (AW 5698) sighted guardboat "Rulewoj" with freighters "Nitrga" (1398 G.R.T.), "Grey", "Barbara Fritsch", "Mudjug"

CONFIDENTIAL

and the tanker "Bug", course not identified.
Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to
submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: destroyer "C", minesweeper No.
62.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: guardships Nos.
71, 75, minesweepers Nos. 60, 63, 110, motor
minesweepers Nos. 429, 431.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.

Bearings obtained by Hammerfest: from 1130 to
2147 on 29 May a British unit in 225.5° - 267°.
Svanvik: at 2055 on 29 May a British unit in
232°. Bodo: on 29 May a British unit in 211°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289 AB 4624)
U 425 AB 4694) in the attack area, depth of
U 957 AB 5742) sweep 20 miles.

In patrol line:

U 737 AB 8126
U 347 AB 8165
U 362 AB 8277

Group "Grimm":

U 387 AB 8519
U 742 AB 8559
U 668 AB 8832
U 997 AB 8941

In port:

U 344, 394, 862 (Atlantic boat), 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 313, 711 put out from Narvik to AB 89.
0600 U 307 put out from Hammerfest to AB 89.
0630 U 315 put out from Hammerfest to AB 89.
U 363, 987 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 673 (Atlantic boat) proceeding from Narvik
to Trondheim.
0100 U 862 (Atlantic boat) put in to Narvik from
Trondheim.

CONFIDENTIAL

2000 Groups "Trutz" and "Grimm" from U 737 to U 997 proceeded to a new patrol line from AB 8126 - AB 8941 to AB 8126 - AB 8964.

U-boat group Central:

U 247, 276, 293, 365 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192 Vallø, ^u
U 243, 980 Flekkøfjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 294, 975 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 715 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to Stavanger,
U 771 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to Bergen.

~~U 348 on special operation.~~

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen. 4 boats approaching. Ice reconnaissance was requested in order to obtain more definite details for patrol of the sea area against a convoy, which may be running in conjunction with the carrier formation sighted.

1022 Radio message 1003/703 sent:

"A Ju 88 took off from Trondheim at 0400 on ice reconnaissance with a view to extending the U-boat formation."

With the 4 boats which recently put out, the patrol line was closed in to 18 miles between each boat and accordingly extended to the south.

1127 Radio message 1054/705 sent:

"At 2000 on 30 May, proceed to the new patrol line from AB 8126 to 8694 in the following order: "Brasack", "de Buhr", "Franz", "Blüchler", "Schwassmann", "Eickstedt", "Lehmann", U 313 (Schweiger), U 711 (Lange), U 307 (Herrle), U 315 (Zöller). New boats join group "Grimm"."

2011 Short signal received from U 425 (Bentzien):

"Land-based plane (s) in AB 4696."

By consultation with Flieger Fuehrer 5, it was ascertained that it could not be one of our

CONFIDENTIAL

planes. As the boats were ordered not to report the usual long-range reconnaissance planes,

2112

radio message 2047/708 was sent:

" "Bentzien": report immediately:

1. "Yes", if plane was the expected Ju 88.
2. Time of origin and course, if not certain of type.
3. If carrier-borne plane, otherwise number of engines."

2341

Radio message 2205/710 received from U 425 (Bentzien):

"Twin-engined, varying courses, shadowing procedure observed for 2 hours."

2342

Short signal 2327/711 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"2 enemy aircraft carriers in grid square - 1 light cruiser in grid square -, 2 destroyers in grid square -."

From the composition it is obviously the same formation as was sighted yesterday in AF 4574.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous: No reports.

V.

Reports of successes: None.

C.

Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D.

Survey of the situation:

1310

Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 5725 received:

Survey of the situation at 1030:

- "1. The carrier formation reported in grid square 4574 at 1455 on 29 May was not re-intercepted during the night by extensive air reconnaissance.
2. At 0755 on 30 May, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers were reported in AE 9651, course 090°, speed 20 knots.
3. Carriers were not re-intercepted by reconnaissance; it was improbable that they were in reality the battleship group, but the possibility could not be excluded.
4. Possible enemy intentions:

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Execution of maneuvers (improbable).
2. Operation against a definite target:
 - (a) against convoy traffic
 - (b) against an unknown point on the Norwegian coast. No clues for either assumption.
3. Escort for possible PQ convoy. In this eventuality the strength of the formation is striking.
4. Demonstration to draw us from another target. In view of the present weather conditions which are likely to continue favorable over all the west European coasts, this is not impossible."

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 0200 on 31 May:

- "1. The carrier formation reported at 1445 on 29 May in AF 4574 was re-intercepted at 2357 on 30 May in AB 4696 by U 957 and at 0107 by U 289. It consists of 2 carriers, 1 light cruiser and 2 destroyers.
2. It seems that the carrier formation has to date proceeded alone at 14 knots. Destination still unknown. Possibly intended to meet a convoy.
3. Air reconnaissance with the convoy about 0800.
4. Because of a sharp northerly deviation of the formation, 10 U-boats were ordered to close in in a patrol line from AB 3584 to 6256. Intention: to gain a good attacking position against a possible convoy or carrier group. 4 boats were put directly on reconnaissance in the carrier group's area."

(Signed) Suhren.

31 May, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Hops Island - 75° N, 35° E - Banak from 0501 to 1000, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance route Banak - South Cape - 75° N, 15° E from 1122 to 1600, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0155 to 1013.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AF 2257 - AA 6762 - 6797 - AF 2551 from 0051 to 1002. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen area exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

6 BV 138 on sea reconnaissance from 0500 to 1548 in the area AB 8694 - 9122 - 6929 - AA 9363 - AF 5343 and further to the limit of their range or as far as the ice limit.

Mission abandoned because of lack of cloud and scarcity of fuel: plane 1 in AB 8568, plane 2 in AB 4571, plane 3 in AB 4522, plane 4 in AB 5148, plane 6 in AB 2836. At 0710 plane 3 identified U-boat at a distance of 15 km. Plane was attacked in spite of turning off and giving recognition signals. Enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0545 in AM 1450 2 probable battleships, 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers, course 120°, speed 15 - 20 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

2333

Teleprinter message 1106/44 Secret 1 received from subsidiary G.I.S. station, Tromsø:

"Agent's report of 24 May: About 800 miles north of Nuvsvaag light at the entrance to Stjernsund, a periscope of a submarine of unknown nationality was sighted. Submarine made off seawards."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

CONFIDENTIAL

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 289)
U 425)
U 957) operating in AB 55 against
U 737) carrier formation.

Group "Grimm":

U 347	U 997
U 362	U 313
U 387	U 711
U 742	U 307
U 668	U 315

In port:

U 344, 394, 862 (Atlantic boat), 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1630 U 344 put out from Narvik for AB 6550.
U 363, 987 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
Group "Grimm" proceeding from AB 6315 -
6684 to AB 3584 - 6256.
2048 Group "Trutz" proceeding to extend the patrol
line as far as AB 6537.
1730 U 675 (Atlantic boat) put in to Trondheim
from Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 247, 293, 365 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 243, 980 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 294, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 771 Hatvik,
U 276 proceeding from Bergen to Stavanger,
U 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

14 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.
U 957 (Schar) did not at once report the
position of the escort formation.

CONFIDENTIAL

His attack area was AB 5740. The twin-engined aircraft reported by U 425 (Bentzion) appeared to belong to the escort of the formation.

0034

Radio message 0018/713 sent:

"Hollwig", "Bentzion", "Schaar", "Brasack":
operate at maximum speed on carrier formation
in AB 5740, probable course between 040° and
070°. Possibly connected with convoy."

0014

Short signal 0014/712 received from U 957
(Schaar):

"The reported enemy forces are in AB 4696.
Strong air activity."

0044

Short signal 0041/714 received from U 957
(Schaar):

"Have lost contact."

"Bentzion" had reported the aircraft in the
same square as "Schaar" i.e. in a position 30
miles north of "Schaar". The latter appeared
to be operating on the formation already. Since
yesterday, the formation had steered a general
course of 010°, making almost 14 knots. The
group may have intended to by-pass the U-boat
formation to the north to make a surprise attack
on the coast from an area which is known not to
be covered by our air reconnaissance except in
special circumstances.

The escort was at any rate very weak, so that
one might almost believe the formation to be on
maneuvers in a chosen area.

However, we must expect as previously, that a
convoy is running in conjunction with the
carrier formation. As yesterday's air reconn-
aissance brought no news, a convoy might
already be lying north of the reconnaissance
area. In view of the lack of details, the
boats were immediately ordered to a new patrol
line in Bear Island passage with a view to
possible interception. Only the 4 northerly
boats were to remain on the carrier formation
to make use of any favorable opportunities to
fire and to reconnoiter the area for the
expected convoy in the vicinity of the carrier
group.

0042

Radio message 0025/715 sent:

"De Buhr", "Franz", group "Grimm": occupy new
patrol line from AB 6315 to 6684 immediately at
maximum speed. Boats in same order."

0112

Short signal 0107/716 from U 289 (Hollwig):

"2 enemy aircraft carriers in grid square.....,
1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers."

CONFIDENTIAL

As "Hellwig" was 40 miles further north, the carrier formation appeared to be maintaining its northerly course.
To cover the area north of Bear Island which, according to the latest ice reports was now navigable, the patrol line was transferred to the north.

0228 Radio message 0215/719 sent:

"Form new patrol line from AB 3584 to 6256, order "de Buhr", "Franz", "Büchler", "Schwassmann", "Eickstedt", "Lehmann", "Schwoiger", "Lange", "Herrle", "Zoller" as now group "Grimm". Maximum speed."

0232 Radio message 0225/720 sent:

" "Hellwig", "Bontzien", "Schaar", "Brasack": follow up as quickly as possible. Strive to attack carriers. Report course. You will form group "Trutz"."

0533 Radio message 0410/79 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"At 2017 fired 1 T5 torpedo at the formation which was varying its course. Explosion after 278 seconds. Submerged because of tube-runner (?). Depth charges. Grid square 4693, 67 cu.m. now thick fog."

Owing to bad visibility, the 4 boats set on the carrier formation apparently lost it. No further report from "Hellwig" who had contact last.

Between 0700 and 0900, U 307, U 313 and U 315 reported aircraft in AB 9195, AB 8380 and AB 9241 which turned out to be our own reconnaissance planes (BV 138s). The visibility continued to be very poor.

1036 Radio message 1003/730 sent:

"Group "Trutz":

1. If you observe course and speed of escaping formation or any other pointers to its position, report at once.
2. Continue to search thoroughly. If "Schaar"'s heavy unit is met, expect reduction in speed. Fog expected to lift at noon."

U 711 (Lange) reported engine trouble at 1513 and again at 2153 that engines were in order.

1828 Radio message 1805/734 sent:

"U 344 (Pietsch) will put out from Andfjord for AB 6560 at 0000 on 1 June."

CONFIDENTIAL

To obtain a survey of the results of the search for the carrier formation, radio message 1815/735 was sent:

1830 " "Schaar": transmit short weather report. "Bentzien", "Brasack", "Hellwig": report position immediately."

In reply came

1854 short signal 1850/736 from U 425 (Bentzien):
"AB 6116".

1940 Short signal 1925/737 from U 737 (Brasack):
"AB 2967."

2025 Short weather report 2025/738 was received from U 957 (Schaar): it stated that visibility was again 5 miles, prevailing wind was eastnortheast, force slight.

2121 Radio message 2048/739 sent:

"Group "Trutz": abandon search if no further clues and proceed at maximum speed to lengthen patrol line of group "Grimm" to the south as far as AB 6537. Order: "Brasack", "Bentzien", "Hellwig", "Schaar"."

Thus the patrol line was increased to 14 boats, distance between each 10 miles, i.e. including the doubtful U 289 (Hellwig), which did not reply to the last request to report.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes:

"At 2017 1 T5 torpedo was fired at the formation which was varying its course. Explosion after 278 seconds. Submerged because of tube-runner (?). Depth charges."

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 0000 on 1 June 1944.

"1. No further reports from U-boats concerning the carrier formation. No news from air reconnaissance, as some of the planes had to break off operations before time because of lack of cover.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. No new information about the carrier group's position. Presumed to have gone further north to the area near the ice limit.
3. No reconnaissance against the formation is expected on 1 June, as the clear weather is unsuitable. Only if the carrier group and the possible convoy connected with it go further east through the U-boat patrol line area, is there a chance of re-interception.
4. The 4 searching boats have abandoned their assignment and are lengthening the patrol line southwards to AB 6537.
5. Intention: Boats are to be left in patrol line, until it is estimated that the possible convoy must have passed them. The patrol line will then be transferred to the southwest to intercept the PQ convoy.
6. As reconnaissance cannot be flown against the carrier formation because of the weather, Captain U-boats has ordered a normal convoy day's run reconnaissance in the usual area. As this measure also may be impossible on account of the weather and the fuel situation, the execution is not yet decided.
7. U 957 (Schaar) reported: At 2017 on 30 May, fired 1 T5 torpedo at the formation which was varying its course. Explosion after 278 seconds. Submerged because of tube-runner. Depth charges.

Note from Captain U-boats: As the boat was then subjected to a depth charge pursuit and as there were certainly only 2 destroyers in the formation (observed 3 times), a heavy unit may have been hit."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Captain U-boats Norway/Admiral Northern Waters.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 348 (Schunk) special operation.

In accordance with 11th U-boat Flotilla Operational Order No. 2 for U-boat operations off the west coast of Norway.

15 April Put in to Bergen. During the whole period did not sight any enemy submarines or attack any convoys in Skudeneshfjord area. Sighted several enemy aircraft. Air attack on 6 May after alarm. Bombs were inaccurate. No locations, very good listening conditions.

Survey of 11th U-boat Flotilla:

Quietly executed special operation without any important incidents. The short nights reduce the enemy's opportunities to operate, just as they do ours.

11th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret - 1213.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 312 (Nikolay), third operation.

29 April 1944 Put out from Narvik.

13 May Put in to Narvik.

30 April - Operated on QP convoy. As the most
3 May. southerly boat of the formation, did not sight convoy or escort forces. Six times forced to submerge by aircraft, no 3.7 cm. guns.

1 May At 0420 in AB 6295 smoke cloud, bearing 040°. Report not made because of approaching aircraft.
At 0425 submerged because of carrier-borne aircraft (monoplane), range 12,000 meters. After surfacing, operated again in the direction of the smoke, but did not see it again.
At 1245 in AB 6178 a similar smoke cloud, bearing 160°, one of our boats smoking badly.
At 1520 in AB 5695 submerged because of approaching carrier-borne aircraft (bi-plane) range 13,000 meters.

2 May At 0620 submerged as carrier-borne aircraft flew past, range 7,000 meters.
At 1520 in AB 7679 submerged as aircraft flew past, range 10,000 meters.
At 1930 submerged as carrier-borne aircraft (monoplane) approached, still 12,000 meters off.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 May At 0655 submerged as seaplane passed at a distance of 13,000 meters.
At 1210 in AF 4133 boat reached what the commander on the basis of the reports had reckoned to be the convoy's position. Nothing was observed.

4 - 12 May Reconnaissance area AF 4114, depth of sweep 30 miles, no sightings, no locations.

12 May Commenced return passage because of engine trouble.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters:

Unsuccessful operation. In spite of very strong attacks by aircraft the commander strove to gain a forward position in the continuous daylight, but was not able to attack.

Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret
- 2448 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 313 (Zoller), third operation.

- 19 April 1944 Put out from Narvik.
- 14 May Put in to Narvik.
Proceeded from Westfjord to AF 2155, group "Keil".
- 20 - 25 April In patrol line in AF 2155.
- 26 April At 1600 air reconnaissance reported a PQ convoy. Operated on report. Convoy not re-intercepted.
- 27 - 29 April In various patrol lines. Disposed against westbound convoy.
- 30 April At 1600 in AB 6681 occupied patrol line in Bear Island passage.
At 1722 altered position by 30 miles, course 000°.
At 1858 first sighting report from "Herrle", then another from "Büchler". Operated on "Büchler"'s report.
At 2156 in AB 6377 a "Swordfish", bearing 000°, range 10,000 meters, run-in warded off, but boat forced to the southeast.
Dummy runs-in.
At 2223 a bi-plane and a fast monoplane, bearing 330°, range 12,000 meters.
Submerged quickly. An aircraft threw out a noise box. Later, destroyers and Diesel noises. On surfacing, saw nothing.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pressed on. Hauled southwards to avoid air escort.

- 1 May At 0310 in AB 6515 a destroyer, bearing 330°, range 9 miles: at 0315 carrier-borne aircraft over destroyer, at the same time smoke cloud, bearing 300°. Run-in. Submerged. Operated to gain a forward position. At 1327 in AB 6784 smoke cloud no longer visible. Although we attempted to follow it up, nothing else was observed. Previously only slight deviation. Presume smoking destroyer. Operated on convoy reported in the north. At 1904 in AB 8312 carrier-borne plane, bearing 340°, distance 10 miles, passed us. Unobserved.
- 2 May At 0215 in AB 8453 noise band, bearing 055° - 070°. At 0429 in AB 8483: according to dead reckoning, shadowers' reports and hydrophone bearing we should be ahead of the convoy. Proceeded towards it. In spite of 10 miles visibility, nothing was seen. Cannot understand it. At 0930 proceeded southwest against the reported destroyer. At 1512 in AB 8715 carrier-borne plane, bearing 180°, range 8,000 meters, altitude 2,000 meters; submerged. At 2030 1 Diesel engine out of action. At 2135 in AF 1319 a "Catalina", bearing 210°, range 12,000 meters, altitude 2,000 meters; submerged. At 2300 Diesel again clear, at 2350 again out of action.
- 3 May At 0210 submerged because of location, bad visibility. At 0522 submerged because of location. At 0624 on surfacing in AF 1538, sighted a plane, bearing 270°, range 5,000 meters, medium altitude; submerged. At 0820 Diesel again clear. At 0830 in AF 1512 a "Hampden", bearing 280°, range 8,000 meters, low level run-in; submerged. This enforced underwater passage and the Diesel breakdowns left us about 50 miles astern of the convoy. Operated on stragglers. Abandoned the operation.
- 4 May Steered for patrol line of group "Trutz". At 0650 in AF 1235 a "Lorwick", bearing 125°, range 12,000 meters. Ran in at fairly low altitude. Submerged.
- 4 - 12 May In AB 7687 and 7937 in patrol line.
- 13 May Commenced return passage because of scarcity of fuel.

CONFIDENTIAL

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters:

Well-executed but unsuccessful operation. In spite of operating initially on an erroneous report from "Büchler" and despite strong enemy air escort, the boat managed to get well ahead. Cannot understand why the convoy was missed and the boat had no opportunity to fire.

Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters
Most Secret - 2486 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), third operation.

- 25 April 1944. Put out from Narvik.
- 12 May Put in to Narvik. Proceeded via Andfjord to AB 84.
- 26 April Operated on eastbound convoy reported by air reconnaissance. At 1719 in AB 9710, 2 aircraft (type not identified) flying low, range 8,000 meters. At 1800 and 1910 in AB 9710 noise of turbines (doubtful), bearing 210° varying to 270°.
- 27 April AB 9480 to AB 9491. At 1200 port Diesel out of action. Maximum speed 10 knots. Attack area AB 9113.
- 28 April AB 9198 to AB 8949. Diesel again clear.
- 29 April Attack area AF 2151 to AB 8897. At 1425 steered on course 070°, maximum speed, against the QP convoy. New attack area AB 6959.
- 30 April Attack area AB 6680. At 1717 reached the area. Southerly position. At 1732 operated on convoy. At 2334 port Diesel out of action.
- 1 May At 0050 Diesel again clear. At 0145 starboard Diesel out of action. At 0400 in AB 6450 turbine noises, bearing 040°. At 0800 in AB 6430 turbine noises, bearing 050° and 330°.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 0900 in AB 6450 turbine noises, bearing 210°.
At 0915 Diesel clear.
At 1130 in AB 6440 aircraft run-in, low level approach from 190°.
At 1145 singing noise, bearing 190°, thought to be a noise box dropped by aircraft.
Turbine noises, bearing 225° and 015°.
At 1330 operated on smoke clouds reported by U 315 in AB 6749. Assumed we were dealing with part of the convoy, no contact.
At 1715 again on main convoy.
At 2045 port Diesel out of action, at 2145 again clear.
At 0145 starboard Diesel out of action, at 0515 again clear.
At 1145 in AB 8750 aircraft ("Catalina" (?)) ran in at medium altitude, range 5,000 meters. Submerged.
At 1650 in AB 7980 submerged because destroyer was approaching from 220°.
At 1656 a depth charge, presume it to be a countermeasure against T5 torpedoes.
At 1700 hydrophone pursuit, Asdic short location transmission by 3 escort vessels, explosive sounding device, at times a singing tone heard for as long as 3 minutes.
At 1801 20 inaccurate depth charges, finally passed in AB 7980 by 7 escort vessels, course 210°.
At 2245 port Diesel out of action.

3 May At 0045 Diesel again clear.
At 1223 operation broken off by Command.
Attack area AB 8770.

7 May At 1600, while executing a practice dive, the after hydroplane jammed between 17° and 20°. Cause not ascertained.

9 May As we cannot deal with the hydroplane trouble with the means aboard and as our diving and operational capacity is impaired, we commenced the return passage to Andfjord at 2035.

Drifting mines: 27 April: AB 9470, heavily overgrown. 30 April: AB 9430 (2). 30 April: AB 6640. 1 May: AB 6450. 1 May: AB 8220. 9 May: AB 8770 and AB 7990, type not identified.

Addendum: At 0822 on 27 April in AB 9710 we exchanged recognition signals with "Weitz" (later missing). Commander asked for a spare part for his Ju-compressor. Not aboard.

CONFIDENTIAL

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters:

As a result of continuous engine trouble, the boat was unable to reach the convoy from the southerly position. No success.

Captain U-boats, Norway/Admiral Northern Waters Most
Secret - 2561 - A. Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/5

COPY

Teleprinter Message:

1. Emergency. Captain U-boats, Norway.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Naval Chief Command, Norway, Ops. Staff.
4. Emergency. Admiral West Coast.
5. Emergency. 9th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 365, third special operation
off the west coast from 1 to 21 May.

- 1 May Put out from Bergen, proceeded via inshore waters to the operational area off Lister as instructed in Operational Order No. 3 for U-boat operations off the west coast.
- 3 - 19 May At 0800 occupied operational area. By day, mostly in Listerfjord, recharged in various places. Increased enemy low level air activity off the coast, particularly on 5 - 7 May by full moon. On 10 and 12 May unconfirmed suspicion of submarines in the operational area. Tests with the German Air Force location set at Lister (39 TD) resulted in apparent location of U-boat, even under water.
- 20-21 May Commenced return passage to Bergen with escort.

11th U-boat Flotilla Serial No. Most Secret 1287.

APPENDIX II/6

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 995 (Köhntopp), transfer passage from Bergen to Trondheim.

- 18 May At 1900 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
 At 2210 left escort at Fejeosen. Surface procedure, course 275°.
- 19 May At 0230 submerged in AF 8717.
 At 1745 surfaced.
 At 2023 in AF 7669 submerged because of location.
- 20 May At 0400 surfaced.
 At 0655 alarm in AF 8177. ("Catalina" or "Sunderland"). No location. A bomb was dropped while we were at 80 meters. At 1355 in 8174 a "Catalina" in periscope, 5,000 meters on the port beam. After a quick survey, the seaplane ran in towards the periscope. We lay at 80 meters. No bombs. At 1445 in AF 8171 flying boat at periscope level, same direction and range. At 1600 no change in the situation. New course of 090°.
 At 1900 surfaced. At 2150 in AF 8143 loud "Naxos" location. Remained on surface, as we were charging.
 At 2152 alarm: "Sunderland" on starboard quarter, no bombs.
- 21 May At 0300 surfaced.
 At 0320 in AF 5787 flying boat, bearing 240°. Defensive maneuver, turned about full speed all out. Plane could not turn with us and flew past the boat 10 meters astern. 5 depth

CONFIDENTIAL

charges, heavy machine-gunfire. No damage. 3.7 cm. gun broke down after the fifth time of firing. Numerous 2 cm. hits observed. Flying boat continued to shadow us. At 0333 submerged. At 0845 surfaced. At 0912 alarm in AF 5785. Flying boat, no bombs. At 1200 surfaced. At 1248 in AF 5791 "Sunderland" flying boat, bearing 000°, ran in, defensive action taken. Good firing position: 1 engine was set on fire, hits scored on cockpit, wings and fuselage. Plane flew over level with torpedo hatch, altitude 12 meters, 5 - 6 bombs close to starboard. Violent vibrations, damage to electrical engine and fuses. While flying off, plane was hit on tail unit. Two of the crew were badly wounded by aircraft armament and by some of our own 2 cm. hits on the protective shield. Crash-dived. No bombs. At 1750 in AF 5793 very quickly deviating hydrophone bearing, buzzing, then Asdic noise, ticking. At 2120 surfaced. At 2130 in AF 5873 an anti-submarine vessel on 120 megacycles, alarm.

22 May At 0415 surfaced. At 0520 location on 210 megacycles. At 0525 in AF 8113, alarm, flying boat, no bombs. At 0820 surfaced. At 0920 location on 215 megacycles. At 0922 in AF 8226, clicking in the "Naxos" location apparently under 4 cm., alarm. At 1030 surfaced, maximum speed. At 1300 put in to Kristiansund and put ashore the badly wounded. At 2300 put out from Kristiansund with escort.

23 May At 0730 put in to Trondheim. Morale of crew good, especially the anti-aircraft detachment, above all P/O Sick Bay.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Boats will in future be ordered to proceed as far as 66° N in accordance with Orders Nos. 13 and 14. Breakdown of 3.7 cm. gun was unfortunate.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2633 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/7

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Captain U-boats, Norway.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Naval Chief Command, Norway.
4. Emergency. Admiral North Coast.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 990 (Nordheimer), fourth enemy operation (transfer to Narvik).

22 May At 1930 put out from Bergen.

24 May AF 8150 (all square data reconstructed). Operated at maximum speed on distress report from U 476 (Nietmann). In AF 5575 at 1920 a plane approached. No recognition signals or guns fired: "Condor" flew in irregular circles until out of sight. An hour and a half later, we received a radio message from the aircraft on the sighting of a U-boat and dinghies. Presume we are near the scene of disaster. Wreckage of tail of aircraft seen. (It was later confirmed that "Nietmann" had shot down a plane). Reached the starting point for the search action at 1950. "Condor" flew off. Searched by zig-zagging 4 miles beyond each side of the search area, always within visual range. Empty dinghy, shadowers' signal buoys put out; in reply, 2 distress signals were given and we proceeded towards the first. We rescued 11 men from a raft in sea, force 5 - 6. Then we made for the second distress signal in AF 5575. At 0015 U 476 with 10 men was sighted. When the commander reported that the boat could hold out only 1 - 2 hours, in view of the continuous "Naxos" location, we sank the boat by torpedo at 0102. Submerged at 0155. surfaced and continued to search. Sighted white star, bearing 050°. Advanced 10 miles in that direction. Patrol vessel No. 5901

CONFIDENTIAL

sighted. Search abandoned after 6 hours. Followed patrol vessel No. 5901 to Trondheim, keeping 300 meters astern on passage. At 0630 a "Liberator" made contact and attacked us at 0730 in AF 5676. After firing 7 times, the 3.7 gun supply failed. 6 depth charges. The last exploded under the boat at the forward edge of the tower, heavy damage. Water in fore compartment, 2 jolly-boats torn away, chlorine gas. At 0735 all men off the boat. Boat sank quickly, by the bow. Patrol vessel No. 5901 saved 34 men. 1 man was killed, 18 missing. At 1915 anchored at Trondheim with patrol vessel No. 5901.

15th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret - 1521.

APPENDIX II/8

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Captain U-boats, Norway.
2. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Naval Chief Command, Norway.
4. Emergency. Admiral North Coast.
5. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 476 (Nietmann), first enemy operation.

- 20 May At 1900 put out from Bergen.
- 22 May At 1620 in AF 8150 a British periscope was faultlessly detected 1,000 meters on the port beam.
At 1630 carrier-borne bi-plane, alarm, priority "white".
At 2000 a "Liberator" in periscope, course south.
- 23 May Surfaced at 1200.
At 1230 in AF 8120 a "Catalina", location curves as it approached, alarm. Surfaced at 1330. "Catalina" alarm. Surfaced at 1600.
At 1640 "Catalina", location curves as it approached, alarm. Surfaced at 1810, course 060°, fast speed. At 1930 we submerged because of a squall. Surfaced at 2100.
At 2130 "Catalina", location curves, run-in, alarm.
- 24 May At 0000 surfaced and started "Aphrodite".
At 0050 "Catalina" flew in on the beam, alarm. After 8 minutes bomb on "Aphrodite".
Proceeded under water. Decided to surface in the morning for defensive action.
At 1630 surfaced in AF 5573.
At 0715 "Catalina" approached; after firing 10 times, jamming in 3.7 cm. gun supply. In spite of our accurate 2 cm. gunfire,

CONFIDENTIAL

determined run-in at altitude of 40 meters. 5 bombs and gunfire. Last hits on bulkhead of after edge of Diesels. Explosion under boat. Second run-in warded off, then submerged. At A - 30 we blew, as electrical engine was out of action and burning. Water in Diesel engine-room, chlorine gas, submerged. In third and fourth attacks, we scored hits on the aircraft engine and cockpit. Because of chlorine gas, all the crew were on the top deck, all boats clear.

At 1600 a. "Condor" exchanged recognition signals: morse not understandable. After circling several times, it flew off.

At 1700 it again circled us for 2 hours.

At 2300 white star in the southeast, answered by white and red stars.

0005

U-boat in sight (Nordheimer).

At 0050 picked up the crew.

0102

Boat sunk by torpedo. There was no air in the tanks and the battery was empty. Presume U 990 had shot down the "Catalina", as boat had not been molested for 17 hours since the attack.

13th U-boat Flotilla Mos. Secret - 1522.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX TO SHORT REPORT FROM U 476 (NIETMANN).

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Immediate. For information Captain U-boats, Norway.

Clear as single address message.

Red - Most Secret.

1. Boat blown. At 50 kg. all crew left the boat.
2. Crew donned life jackets when aircraft alarm was given. Except for 2 one-man dinghies, no rescue gear on top deck.
3. In an attempt to fetch dinghies from the hold Midshipman Tils, P.O. (Engineer) Regber went down with the boat.
4. Crew swam for 80 minutes, sea force 5 - 6, temperature 3°.
5. Several men were seen to drown, mostly just ahead of patrol vessel No. 5901.

13th U-boat Flotilla Serial No. Most Secret - 1571.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/9

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information Naval Chief Command, Norway.
5. Emergency. For information Admiral North Coast.
6. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.
7. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most secret.

Comments by Captain U-boats Norway on the commanders' reports:

- I. U 990 (Nordheimer). Transfer from Bergen to Narvik and loss of boat on 25 May.
 1. Assisting U 476 (Nietmann): The trustworthy commander gave up the skillful and successful search for the crew of the sinking boat after 6 hours, fully convinced that none of the remaining 30 men could still be alive. After 11 men from a large dinghy and 10 men from the U-boat (still afloat) had been rescued, there were still 3 wounded and 2 men lost in a work dinghy and 25 more were missing. They must have been blown away in one-man dinghies. According to our experiences to date, after 17 hours of swimming in the high sea of low temperature without any help, these men must certainly be considered as lost. The commander considered further search useless and, moreover, it would expose the survivors to further danger from the enemy aircraft to be expected if they remained long in this area. I thus justify his decision, although in more favorable conditions further details of the whereabouts of the missing men would have had to be ascertained through continuation of the search.
 2. Re the loss of his own boat: On his return passage, the commander remained on the surface to use his anti-aircraft guns as he felt safe beside the patrol

CONFIDENTIAL

boat. He failed to realise that an attack would always be directed against the more valuable U-boat whose defense would be limited by the rough sea. After the boat had been hit, only 2 one-man dinghies were brought up to the top deck. This was due to the quick sinking and chlorine gas. Rescue of the men in the water was made more difficult for patrol vessel No. 5901 by the heavy swell and violent sea. Despite the commendable action of the vessel, of the 18 missing men, the majority, although wearing life jackets, were drowned as a result of exhaustion very near the patrol vessel: nine of those men were not seen. The commander took all possible measures to save the boat and the crew.

II. U 476 (Nietmann). Transfer from Bergen to Narvik and loss of boat on 25 May.

1. When the boat's air and current supply had sunk considerably because of the need for continuous diving from enemy aircraft, the commander decided to reach full diving readiness again by proceeding to charge with anti-aircraft guns at the ready. As sea conditions for using these guns were most unfavorable he might have tried to hold on by making full use of the intervals between alarms or until there was an improvement in sea and defense conditions.
2. Re the loss of the boat: After the boat had been hit, lack of necessary technical and sea-going experience obviously caused the commander to lose his sense of proportion; he overestimated the danger and too early (about 0800) gave the order to take to the boats. As was shown, the water in the Diesel engine-room did not come over the boards for a long time, so that the ventilator to draw off the chlorine gas and the electric compressor were still in working order. The commander wrongly considered that the crew would be subjected to greater danger from the explosion of the batteries than from taking to the dinghies. The boats were thus put out too soon and then, because of wind and heavy sea, could not keep beside the U-boat as the commander had intended. Sinking of the crippled boat was correct, but could have been achieved by ventilation: use of torpedo was unnecessary.
3. Shooting down of a "Catalina" after the attack is probable, as the boat while still afloat was no longer molested by the enemy. Confirmed by U 990's sighting of a floating tail unit.

III. Experiences:

1. 24 May: at 0100 bomb attack on "Aphrodite"; enemy obviously only acting on location details.
2. The deciding bombs fell on both boats after the 3.7 anti-aircraft guns had failed. Jamming of supplies in both cases by recoiling ammunition

CONFIDENTIAL

frames; first round went slightly out of alignment and led to jamming.

3. 12.7 mm. ammunition bored through tower armament and 2 cm. protection shield, but not through 3.7 shield.
4. Securing hawser of the dinghies was too weak. After putting out, the dinghies could not keep to the lee of the boat, indeed they were more to windward. One-man dinghies were used to protect the large dinghy from breakers.
5. Morse communication between aircraft and U-boat was unsuccessful. Propose change to star signals.
6. It is advisable to allocate a sea distress wave viz. 442 kc/s. for U-boats and aircraft, in accordance with "Emergency radio service of the German Air Force in war-time". If the crew has to leave the boat, the key should be fixed on a continuous note.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2795 - A Ops.

APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway. On board, 19 May, 1944.
Serial No. Most Secret
2553 A. Ops.

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler), U 668 (v. Eickstedt)
and U 742 (Schwassman):

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0000 on 20 May, after replenishing at Bogen if necessary. Boats which will then proceed to Skjomen, Bogen or Ramsund, will switch to the Base wavelength (MC = 410 kc/s.) until they arrive and on that frequency will report their time of sailing to the operational area as soon as possible. Make certain of reception of U-boat radio messages given in four-hourly routines on very long wave.
2. Proceed via Westfjord at 7 knots to AB 88. Increased submarine danger off Westfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
4. Enemy situation: The last PQ convoy (31) was attacked from 30 March to 4 April. On 10 May, air reconnaissance reported an apparent PQ convoy in Bear Island passage. The last QP convoy (28) ran from 30 April to 3 May, strongly escorted by carrier-borne planes, destroyers and, south of 70° N, by flying boats. Carrier groups, attacking our own coastal escorts, have appeared in the last months up to 75 miles from the coast between Trondheim and Tromsø. We can expect similar measures in conjunction with PQ convoys or in the event of an invasion.
5. Own forces:
 - (a) U-boats in attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles, from AB 6254 to AB 9239, in the following order:
U 239 (Hellwig), U 425 (Bentzien), U 957 (Schaar),
U 737 (Brasack), U 347 (de Buhr), U 362 (Franz)
as group "Trutz".
 - (b) German Air Force will patrol a convoy day's run east of Iceland with FW 200s. Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim to Jan Mayen with FW 200s and from Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak with Ju 88s. Further air reconnaissance in the operational area will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
2613 A Ops.

On board, 23 May, 1944.

Sailing order for U 997 (Lehmann):

1. Put out from Narvik on 23 May. Boats which will then proceed to Skjomen, Bogen or Ramsund, will switch to the Base wave (MC = 479 kc/s.) until they arrive and on that frequency will report their time of sailing for the operational area as soon as possible. Make certain of reception of U-boat radio messages for four-hourly routines on very long wave.
2. Proceed via Westfjord to AB 88.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
4. Enemy situation: The last PQ convoy (31) was attacked from 30 March to 4 April. On 10 May air reconnaissance reported an apparent PQ convoy in Bear Island passage. The last QP convoy (28) ran from 30 April to 3 May, strongly escorted by carrier-borne planes, destroyers and, south of 70° N, by flying boats. Carrier groups attacking our own coastal escorts, have appeared in the last months up to 75 miles from the coast between Trondheim and Tromsø. We can expect similar measures in conjunction with PQ convoys or in the event of an invasion.
5. Own forces:
 - (a) U-boats in patrol line from AB 8123 to 8944 in the following order:

Group "Trutz": U 289 (Hellwig), U 425 (Bentzien),
U 957 (Schaar), U 737 (Brasack), U 347 (de Buhr),
U 362 (Franz).

Group "Grimm": U 387 (Büchler), U 742 (Schwassmann),
U 668 (v. Eickstedt).

Procedure in accordance with Order No. 8. Submerge according to visibility conditions. Radio silence except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft and attacks.
 - (b) German Air Force will patrol a convoy day's run east

CONFIDENTIAL

of Iceland with FW 200s. Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim to Jan Mayen with FW 200s and from Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak with Ju 88s. Further air reconnaissance in the operational area will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
2740 - A Ops.

On board 29 May, 1944.

Sailing order for U 313 (Schweiger) and U 711 (Lange).

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0100 on 30 May.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord at increased speed to AB 89, from Lødingen to Harstad with district pilot. Submarine danger off Andfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Observe Northern Waters Orders Nos. 8 and 10.
4. Enemy situation: Air reconnaissance at 1445' on 29 May sighted 2 carriers, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers in AF 4574, course 040°, speed 8 knots. The sailing of a PQ convoy therefore seems possible. Air reconnaissance is being flown against it.
5. Own forces:
 - (a) U-boats in formation from AB 4624 to AB 8941 in the following order: Group "Trutz": U 289 (Hellwig), U 425 (Bentzien), U 957 (Schaar), U 737 (Brasack), U 347 (de Buhr), U 362 (Franz). Group "Grimm": U 387 (Buchler), U 742 (Schwassmann), U 668 (v. Eickstedt), U 997 (Lehmann). Procedure in accordance with Order No. 8. Submerge according to visibility conditions. Radio silence except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft and attacks.
 - (b) The German Air Force will fly a reconnaissance against the reported formation with FW 200s. Daily meteorological flights by Ju 88s from Banak to Bear Island and by FW 200s from Trondheim to Jan Mayen.

Re (a)

U 307 (Herrle) and U 315 (Zoller) will put out from Hammerfest for AB 89 on the morning of 30 May.

p.p. Reche.

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

1875

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
1 - 15 June, 1944
PG/31860

1841

1841

1841

1841

1841

1841

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - 75° N, 30° E, - Banak from 0757 to 1236, exhaustive apart from the stretch AB 6339 - AC 1523, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the central North Sea from 0330 to 0805, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 8292 - 5651 - Vaernes from 0325 to 1028. Route 90% examined. At 0450 in AF 7262 1 flying boat, course 160°, otherwise nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on aerial photographic reconnaissance of Jan Mayen from 1306 to 2110.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "C", "H", "E", minesweeper No. 32, motor mine-sweepers Nos. 429, 430, 432, 431.

Britain: 1 unit intercepted in the Murmansk area.

Hammerfest took a bearing of 301° on a British unit at 0340 on 31 May.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Grimm":

U 347 AB 3584
U 362 AB 3487
U 387 AB 3824
U 742 AB 3852
U 668 AB 3855
U 997 AB 3882
U 313 AB 3888
U 711 AB 6223
U 307 AB 6229
U 315 AB 6256

Group "Trutz":

U 737 AB 6283
U 425 AB 6286
U 289 AB 6531
U 957 AB 6537

In port:

U 394, 862 (Atlantic boat), 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 673 (Atlantic boat), 739, 921,
968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 344 proceeding from Narvik to AB 6560.
U 363, 987 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.
U 394 put out from Narvik for AB 68.

2346

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 365 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192, Våløy,
U 243, 980 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 771 Hatvik,
U 276 proceeding from Bergen to Stavanger,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

15 boats proceeding to positions west of Bear Island. Still no further news of U 289 (Hellwig) which last reported the carrier formation.

CONFIDENTIAL

0948

Radio message 0936/746 sent:

" "Hellwig": report position."
Again no answer received.

In view of the tense, uncertain position, 2 new operational boats approaching from the south were detailed to reinforce the patrol line.

1001

Radio message 0933/747 sent:

"U 363 (Nees), U 987 (Schreyer): proceed to AB 68 at cruising speed, Northern Waters radio frequency."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1911

Radio message 1816/60 sent to U 394 (Borger):

"1. Put out from Bogen at 0000 on 2 June for AB 68 via Tjeldsund - Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with pilot. Cruising speed. Report passing of "Schwarz 25" by time short signal. Submarine danger there.

2. Operational Order No. 15, Northern Waters radio frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2247 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4597/44 received from Luftflotte Command 5:

"Complete execution of a day's run reconnaissance will be discussed by the Chief of the Ops. Division of Luftflotte Command 5 at the German Air Force High Command H.Q. on 2 June. Announcement of operational plans will follow after the return of Chief of the Ops. Division."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"The German Air Force has announced that no further reconnaissance against PQ convoys can take place because of fuel shortage. Since yesterday's reconnaissance revealed nothing as most of the flying boats had to abandon operations early owing to lack of cloud cover, we can now only wait to see if a very strong U-boat patrol line

CONFIDENTIAL

will be successful in interception... Up to date, however, we have no information regarding the running of a convoy or the intentions of the carrier formation lost in AB 4690 on 31 May.³¹

(Signed) Suhren.

2 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 2358 on 1 June to 0756 on 2 June, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 30° E from 0457 to 1001, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the central North Sea from 0355 to 0856, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance northwest of the Faeroes, route Vaernes - AE 6771 - 9442 - Vaernes from 0257 to 1031. Route 70% examined; nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "C".

Teriborka area: minesweeper No. 45.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "H", minesweeper No. 110.

CONFIDENTIAL

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.

Hammerfest bearings: at 0550 on 1 June and
0401 on 2 June British unit in 263° - 274°.

Svanvik bearings: at 1540 on 1 June and 0401
on 2 June British unit in 247° - 270°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Grimm":

U 347 AB 3584
U 362 AB 3487
U 387 AB 3824
U 742 AB 3852
U 668 AB 3854
U 997 AB 3882
U 313 AB 3888
U 711 AB 6223
U 307 AB 6229
U 315 AB 6256

Group "Trutz":

U 737 AB 6283
U 425 AB 6286
U 289 AB 6531
U 957 AB 6537
U 344 AB 6560
U 363
U 987
U 394

In port:

U 862 (Atlantic boat), 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 673 (Atlantic boat), 703,
739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1355 U 289 proceeding from AB 6531 to Andfjord -
Narvik.

U 363, 987 proceeding from Bergen to AB 68.

U 394 proceeding from Narvik to AB 68.

1600 Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz" will proceed via
position line AB 2818 - AB 9117 to AB 4673 -
AB 8836.

CONFIDENTIAL

2317 U 394 proceeding from AB 92 to AF 1690.
2317 U 987 proceeding from AB 68 to AB 7570.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 365, 980 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192 Vallø, "
U 243 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 771 Hatvik,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

14 boats west of Bear Island passage. 4 boats approaching.

0127 Radio message 0127/767 sent:

"According to a bearing obtained, a British unit was about 180 miles west of Bodø at 1920 on 1 June. Possibly a carrier formation."

Intersecting at a very sharp angle and crossing long stretches of land, the bearings were very uncertain, but it did seem advisable to report them.

0509 Radio message 0410/769 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Suspected enemy periscope in AB 6225."

0559 Radio message 0559/770 sent:

"If periscope sighted at 0410 by "Lange" in AB 6225 belongs to a German boat, the boat concerned should report "yes" by short signal immediately."

No report was received.

0643 Radio message 0604/771 sent:

- "1. U 394 (Borger): put out from Andfjord on the morning of 2 June.
2. "Pietsch", "Nees", "Schreyer", "Borger": lengthen patrol line from AB 6561 to 6597, joining group "Trutz"."

CONFIDENTIAL

The formation was thus increased to 18 boats. As U 289 had still not reported, it had to be assumed that the boat had been sunk by the carrier group or at least that its transmitter had broken down.

As no enemy formation had been intercepted up to date, the boats were withdrawn to the southwest again, searching the sea area on passage and then forming up with a greater distance between each boat.

1534

Radio message 1355/776 sent:

- "1. "Hellwig": return to Andfjord - Narvik if your transmitter is out of order, be at point "Schwarz 25" at 0400 on 4 June.
2. Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz": at 1600 on 2 June proceed via position line 1, AB 2818 to 9117, to position line 2, AB 4673 to 8836. Pass position line 1 at 1600 on 3 June, reach position line 2 at 1600 on 4 June. Group "Grimm" in the following order: "de Buhr", "Franz", "Büchler", "Schwassmann", "Eickstedt", "Lehmann", "Schweiger", "Lange", "Herrle", "Zoller". Group "Trutz": "Brasack", "Bentzien", "Schaar", "Pietsch", "Nees", "Schreyer", "Borger".

1922

Radio message 1834/780 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"At 0533 in AB 6282 and at 1118 in AB 6258 thick periscope seen. Submerged, heard electric motors. After three hours of hydrophone pursuit, lost contact. Hydrophone bearing faded to the east."

"Lange"'s report of the enemy submarine was thus confirmed.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2 boats were detailed as security boats in the planned withdrawal by air of meteorological unit "Bassgeiger".

2347

Radio message 2317/783 sent:

" "Schreyer": proceed immediately at maximum cruising speed to AB 7570, "Borger" to AF 1690. The two southerly positions of the line are unoccupied."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs):

- "1. Put out from Bergen on 3 June for Narvik - Ramsund.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Proceed through inner leads to Frohavet, then at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Orders Nos. 13 and 14, steer for Westfjord.
3. Report probable time of arrival at approach point 24 hours in advance, also report passing "V 1" by time short signal. If radio communication is bad, use relevant coastal frequency.
4. Expect enemy submarines at a distance of 60 miles off Westfjord. For exchange of recognition signals with land, observe Section 153 of Recognition Signals Regulations.
5. Radio frequency "Anton" and Northern Waters very long wave.
6. Further instructions follow."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans: Organizational:

In accordance with Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. 02614/Teleprinter message A 2 of 26 May, U 987 (Schreyer) is transferred for administration from 1st to 11th U-boat Flotilla and U 363 (Nees) from 3rd to 11th U-boat Flotilla, both with effect from 1 June.

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (c):

"The two U-boats detailed to act as security boats for the return flight of the meteorological unit "Bassgeiger" can no longer be in position in time as they are still far off in the east as a result of the last few days' action. An attempt will, however, be made to bring them up for an emergency."

(Signed) Suhren.

3 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route

CONFIDENTIAL

Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island -
75° N, 30° E - Banak from 0446 to 0955, not
exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance as far
as the area west of the Faeroes from 0143 to
0944, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the
Jan Mayen area between 0300 and 1000. Route 85%,
Jan Mayen area 10% examined, nothing to report.
1 Ju 290 successfully carried out operation
"Bassgeiger" between 0830 and 2206, route Vaernes
- Jan Mayen - target - Vaernes.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few radio messages to
submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: destroyer "H".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.

Hammerfest bearings: British unit in 229° -
233° between 0932 and 1115 on 2 June.

Svanvik: British unit in 245° - 255° between
0932 and 1710 on 2 June.

18th Group: very lively flying activity (44
aircraft). Reconnaissance of the northern
part of the North Sea with focal point
northeast of the Shetlands.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Grimm":

U 347	U 997
U 362	U 313
U 387	U 711
U 742	U 307
U 668	U 313 on passage.

Group "Trutz":

U 737
U 425
U 957
U 344
U 363
U 987
U 394

In port:

U 862 (Atlantic boat), 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 673 (Atlantic boat), 703, 739,
921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 956, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 289 proceeding from AB 6531 to Andfjord -
Narvik. (E)
U 956 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
U 394 proceeding from AB 92 to AF 1690.
U 987 proceeding from AB 68 to AB 7570.
Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz" will proceed from
AB 3584 - AB 6597 via position line 1 (AB 2818
- AB 9117) at 1600 on 3 June to reach position
line 2 (AB 4673 to AB 8836) at 1600 on 4 June.
1015 U 862 (Atlantic boat) put out from Narvik for
AA 96.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 365, 980, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 1000 Egersund,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 243 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South)
U 276, 348 on special operation.
U 317 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Egersund.
U 1007 proceeding from Kristiansand (South) to
Flekkefjord.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

17 boats proceeding in patrol line formation
from Bear Island passage to the southwest,
distance between each boat 15 miles.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The boats assigned to cover the withdrawal of
"Bassgeiger" received more detailed instructions.

CONFIDENTIAL

1042

Radio message 1005/792 sent:

" "Schreyer" and "Borger": immediately cover sea distress D/F wave, 442 kc/s., as security boats for the special flight. Callsigns: aircraft OlHU, U-boat code group number from Reconnaissance and Combat aircraft table No. 993. In the event of an emergency landing, the aircraft will transmit in plain language on 500 kc/s."

After the news was received of the aircraft's successful landing,

2238

radio message 2221/800 was sent:

" "Schreyer" and "Borger": Turn about, make for positions in line 2 at economical speed."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Still no signal from U-289.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Meteorological unit "Bassgeiger" and the crew of weather ship "Coburg" landed at Vaernes at 2210 from Shannon Island.

D. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Suhren.

4 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 78° 30' N, 11° E - Banak from 0351 to 0953, not exhaustive. At 0440, 0515 and 0555 in AC 4734, AB 6363 and AB 3647 sighted drifting mines, otherwise nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes between 0351 and 1213. At 0524 in LN 2715 1 four-engined U.S. aircraft, type not identified, course 070⁰, otherwise nothing special to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0251 to 1005. Route 90% examined, Jan Mayen area completely examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Hammerfest took a bearing of 268⁰ on a British unit at 0855.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 39.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 113.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Grimm":

U 347

U 362

U 387

U 742

U 668

U 997

U 313

U 711

U 307

U 313 on passage.

Group "Trutz":

U 737

U 425

U 957

U 344

U 363

U 987

U 394.

CONFIDENTIAL

In port:

U 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 673 (Atlantic boat), 703,
739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz" proceeding from position line 1 (AB 2818 - AB 9117) to position line 2 (AB 4673 - AB 8836) at 1600 on 4 June.

U 394, 956 returning to position line 2.

U 289 proceeding from AB 6531 to Andfjord - Narvik.

U 956 proceeding form Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317 Egersund,
U 1192 Valløy,
U 243, 1007 Flokkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 365 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik,
1230 U 673 (Atlantic boat) put out from Trondheim,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

17 boats in patrol line east of Jan Mayen.

1854

Radio message 1804/710:

"Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz":

1. Remain in patrol line from AB 4673 to AB 8836.

2. "De Buhr": while extending the patrol line, determine the ice limit, reporting the last three grid square numbers by short signal on "Anton". Avoid ice damage."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 289 (Hellwig) has not yet put in to port or reported as ordered.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"After U 347's ice report, 10 boats will be disposed in the extended patrol line, while the remaining seven will put in to port for refuelling to be on call. The formation depends on air reconnaissance and at present conferences are being held on this point with Chief of the Ops. Luftflotte 5 at German Air Force High Command H.Q."

(Signed) Suhren.

5 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Hope Island - Edge Island - 79° N, 21° E - South Cape - Banak from 0359 to 1140, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0258 to 1007. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined, nothing to report.

1 He 115 on anti-submarine operations in Foldefjord, from 1452 to 1843, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: guardship No. 75, minesweepers Nos. 52, 53, 69, 101, 110, motor minesweepers Nos. 429, 431.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bearings: Hammerfest took a bearing of 260°
on a British unit at 2040 on 4 June.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Grimm":

U 347 AB 4673
U 362 AB 4687
U 387 AB 4926
U 742 AB 4937
U 668 AB 4966
U 997 AB 5771
U 313 AB 5779
U 711 AB 8124
U 307 AB 8153
U 315 AB 8167

Group "Trutz"

U 737 AB 8196
U 425 AB 8511
U 957 AB 8519
U 344 AB 8554
U 363 AB 8583
U 987 AB 8597
U 394 AB 8836

In port:

U 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 956 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317 Egersund,
U 1192 Vallby,
U 243, 1007 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 365 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
17 boats east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Still no report on the ice limit received from
U 347 (de Buhr).

(d) Miscellaneous:

Teleprinter message Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 2870 sent to Naval War Staff, Second
Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 289 (Hellwig) is missing. Boat put out from
Narvik on 7 May, last message short signal
0107/716 of 31 May, referring to carrier
formation in AB 46. Did not report as requested
on 31 May and as yet has not complied with
orders to put in to port on 4 June."

V. Reports of successes: None....

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1333 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00507 A 2 received
from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C
U-boats Ops.:

"1. As no information is available concerning the
approach of a PQ convoy, the following
investigations must be made at once to find out:

(a) whether those U-boats which have been
longest at sea cannot be withdrawn to the
readiness ports of Hammerfest and Narvik.

(b) at what degree of readiness the boats
withdrawn can lie there.

2. Plans are to be reported."

In reply,

1745 teleprinter message Most Secret 2864 A Ops was
sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C
U-boats Ops.:

CONFIDENTIAL

"Reference your teleprinter message Most Secret
00507 A. 2:

(a) After receiving the report on the ice limit, I intend to withdraw 4 boats to Hammerfest and 3 to Narvik so that 10 boats will remain in the extended patrol line. Disposition depends on air reconnaissance, about which a conference is being held with Chief of Ops. Luftflotte 5 at the H.Q. of C-in-C, German Air Force.

(b) U-boats in port at 12 hours' readiness."

E. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Suhren.

6 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Bardufos from 0252 to 0937, nothing to report, not exhaustive, only the southern part of Jan Mayen examined.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - 75° N, 40° E - Hope Island - Banak from 0459 to 1045, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 on an offensive sweep against shipping and harbors of the northeast Kola coast as far as Iokanka. No shipping around Fisher Peninsula. Kola inlet - Kildin area not examined because of weather. Coastal inshore waters Teriberka - Iokanka examined. At 1700 in AW 2122 2 patrol vessels, at 1722 in AC 8982 1 patrol vessel 10 km. to the northwest and another 2 km. to the west. Only small section of Iokanka harbor examined because of thick cloud cover.

1 Ju 88 on shipping and harbor reconnaissance of the northeast Kola coast from West Fairway to the waters off Morjovets and photographic reconnaissance of Ponoï harbor and the airfield at Shoina from 1531 to 2105. Ponoï and Morjovets not examined because of weather conditions. No shipping in Ponoï. 3 freighters, each 1,500 - 2,000 G.R.T., in Shoina harbor. No shipping in West Fairway.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0142 to 0710.
2 Ju 88 on sea reconnaissance west of the islands off North Scotland from 2258 to 0416 on 7 June.
In AF 7845 1 aircraft believed to be a "Lightning", no attack. Reconnaissance area examined to a breadth of 40 km. except for the area between AN 1120 and AF 7868.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen via Vaernes - AA 9379 - 9383 - Bardufos from 0258 to 1000. Route 80%, northeast part of Jan Mayen 20% examined; nothing to report.
1 BV 138 on an anti-submarine sweep in Westfjord against a southbound convoy, nothing to report.
1 BV 138 on an anti-submarine sweep in AF 3673 - 3628 against a convoy, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Svanvik took a bearing of 257° on a British unit at 1857.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Luftflotte Command 5 Ops. Division I c wired on 3 June:

"According to a report from the B.B.C. on 2 June, the aircraft carriers "Victorious" and "Furious" and the auxiliary carriers "Searcher", "Emperor", "Pursuer", "Pincer" and "Striker" have taken part in the 6 carrier-borne operations against targets off and along the Norwegian coast during the last 2 months. The aircraft taking part had a greater radius of action than previously, so that the ships could remain at a safer distance from the coast.
Note from Luftflotte 5 I c: up to now, carrier-borne aircraft have been: "Wildcats", "Hellcats", "Corsairs" (?), "Seafires", "Fulmars", "Avengers" and "Barracudas"."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Grimm":

U 347 AB 4673
U 362 AB 4687
U 387 AB 4526
U 742 AB 4937
U 668 AB 4966
U 997 AB 5771
U 313 AB 5779
U 711 AB 8124
U 307 AB 8153
U 315 AB 8167

Group "Trutz":

U 737 AB 8196
U 425 AB 8511
U 957 AB 8519
U 344 AB 8554
U 363 AB 8583
U 987 AB 8597
U 394 AB 8836.

In port:

U 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968,
995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 956 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 347, 387, 425, 957, 278, 737, 742 proceeding from the operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.
Group "Trutz": U 668, 997, 313, 711, 307, 315, 344, 363, 987, 394 proceeding to new patrol line from AB 4455 to AB 8495.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317, 982 Egersund,
U 1192 Vallø,
U 243, 1007 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 365 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV.

Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats east of Jan Mayen. 7 boats returning.

1154 Radio message 1054/729 sent:

"Groups "Grimm" and "Trutz":

1. The following will return to Andfjord - Narvik at maximum speed: "de Buhr", "Büchler", "Schwässmann". Immediate readiness after refuelling.
2. The remaining boats will proceed to a patrol line from AB 4455 to AB 8495 in the following order: "Eickstedt", "Lehmann", "Schweiger", "Lange", "Herrle", "Zoller", "Pietsch", "Nees", "Schreyer" and "Borger", as group "Trutz".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 347 (de Buhr) in short signal 0257/6/44 reported the ice limit in AA 3657, i.e. 200 miles northwest of the patrol line.

0954 Radio message 0931/724 sent:

" "de Buhr": Confirm immediately by short signal "yes" that ice limit is in AA 3657, otherwise report new grid square."

1125 Short signal 1058/59 received from U 347 (de Buhr):

"Yes".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1905 Teleprinter message Luftflotte Command 5 I a Secret 2427/44 received:

"Reference your 5441/44 Secret of 6 June: Reconnaissance flights against enemy shipping in Northern Waters will be made only if there is definite information available on PQ or QP convoys."

2150 Naval High Command, Naval War Staff H, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service wired in Most Secret 1061/44 to Naval War Staff, First Division, Naval War Staff, Second Division, for information Naval Chief Command, Norway, for information Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Propose operating meteorological transmitters in

CONFIDENTIAL

the Northern area.

1. One meteorological buoy to be laid by U-boat in the Jan Mayen area and one in the Iceland area to replace the "Bassgeiger" reports. Buoys will be shipped to Narvik in the next few days. Operational readiness will be announced. Inspector Werner will be on board.
2. Bear Island position: U-boat to set up meteorological shore transmitter on Bear Island. Set ready for use in Tromsø. Inspectors Stoebe and Person will transfer it.
3. Spitsbergen position: the same U-boat will set up a meteorological shore transmitter in northwest Spitsbergen ("Kreuzritter" position). Set ready for use in Tromsø. Men in para. 2 will transfer it. After they have set it up, the "Kreuzritter" crew will be evacuated (12 men)."

E. Organizational:

0300 Naval War Staff, Second Division announced by telephone:

"From 0100 large numbers of parachutists have been dropping from gliders on the eastern side of the Cotentin peninsula and near Trouville. At other places straw dummies have been dropped. Seems to be the start of large-scale operations. Increased alertness on all fronts."

0810 Radio message 0343/6/60 received:

"Group Central, Captain U-boats, Norway, 11th U-boat Flotilla: Immediate readiness, indications of invasion."

1050 Most Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 2882 M was sent to 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas:

"In accordance with Admiral Northern Waters/Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1856 Order of 16 April 1944, report as quickly as possible date of immediate operational readiness of U-boats. "Falke" and "Dunkelberg" are ordered to be at immediate readiness. With the cessation of all repairs except those necessary for diving, "Mangold", "Westphalen", "Seidel", and "Kohntopp" in Trondheim and "Franze" in Bergen will have to be at readiness in a few days. Report progress and date of completion."

CONFIDENTIAL

Codeword "Wallenstein" was received in Naval High Command I a 345. Then

1845 teleprinter message Most Secret 2912 A Ops. was sent to 11th U-boat Flotilla, 13th U-boat Flotilla, U-boat base Hammerfest, U-boat base Narvik:

" "Wallenstein" 1200 on 6 June."

1830 Teleprinter message Most Secret 02325 received from 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"Reference your Most Secret 2882 M of 6 June, we report U 716 (Dunkelberg), after 2 days of anti-aircraft training, ready by 10 June, U 992 (Falke) by 7 June; U 278 (Franze) ready by 10 June without equipment and trial run, if run carried out by 17 June; and U 254 (Sthamer) not ready to sail before 14 June."

2350 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1641 received from 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"In reply to Captain U-boats Norway Most Secret 2912 A Ops. of 6 June and Captain U-boats Norway/Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret 2248 A Ops. of 7 May 1944:

U 921 (Werner) at alarm readiness by 2000 on 7 June.

U 361 (Scidol) at alarm readiness by 2000 on 9 June.

The remaining U-boats will not be at operational readiness so quickly."

F. Survey of the situation:

"With the invasion of France, there is always the danger of a subsidiary operation in the Norwegian theater. On receipt of codeword "Wallenstein", U-boat group Central will be put under the command of a new Captain U-boats to operate against a landing. Northern Waters boats are affected only in restricted use of very long wave.

The 7 boats withdrawn from the operational area and those in Bergen and Trondheim are being made ready for operations as quickly as possible and will then remain ready in the bases until the development of events necessitates their sailing."

(Signed) Suhren.

7 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on an offensive shipping sweep along Kola coast as far as Iokanka from 1013 to 1445. Kola coast - Teriberka - Iokanka and the sea area 90 - 100 km. north of Kola coast from Fisher Peninsula to AA 2313 examined. No shipping traffic identified. Iokanka harbor only partially examined. 2 merchant ships, each approximately 1,500 G.R.T., in the northeast exit of harbor.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0227 to 1338.

2 Ju 188 on reconnaissance against shipping anchorages off the east coast of Scotland in the Moray Firth and the Tyne estuary from 1710 to 2025.

2 Ju 88 on extensive reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters off the coasts of Jutland and Norway between 55° and 62° N as far as 160 miles from the coast from 1554 to 1840, enemy not sighted.

1 Ar 196 on reconnaissance against ships reported in the area south of Bergen from 1415 to 1537, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0255 to 1010. Route and Jan Mayen area not exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AN 1654 1 large ship of approximately 10,000 - 12,000 G.R.T., judging from the superstructure probably an auxiliary aircraft carrier.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "H".

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 59, 61.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area. Hammerfest bearings:

British unit at 0821 on 6 June in 233°, at 0358 on 7 June in 277°.

CONFIDENTIAL

Svanvik: at 0930 on 6 June a British unit in 251⁰, at 0150 on 7 June in 273⁰.
Russian radio traffic: slight to moderate.
Britain: very few Archangel broadcasts, none from Murmansk.
Destroyer "H" at 1620 in Polyarno.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4455
U 997 AB 4495
U 313 AB 4816
U 711 AB 4859
U 307 AB 4899
U 315 AB 7327
U 344 AB 7391
U 363 AB 8411
U 987 AB 8452
U 394 AB 8495

In port:

U 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1430	U 425 put in to Narvik from AB 8511.
1530	U 737 put in to Narvik from AB 8196.
2000	U 992 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
	U 956 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
	U 347, 362, 387, 742, 957 proceeding from the operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.
	Group "Trutz" proceeding from AB 4455 - AB 8495 to AB 7684 - AF 2674.
2300	U 365 put in to Narvik from Bergen.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317, 982 Egersund,
U 1192 Vallby,
U 243, 1007 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 480, 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001 Kristiansand (South),
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.
In order to have those boats still at sea nearer the coast in the event of a possible invasion of Norway, the patrol line was transferred accordingly.

0117 Radio message 0004/741 sent:

"Group "Trutz: Occupy new patrol line immediately from AB 7684 to AF 2674. Radio silence except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft and attacks. Look out for new routine times on very long wave."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

1858 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00719/TP A 2 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 365 (Wedemeyer) will be placed under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway with effect from 8 June to replace U 289 (Hellwig). Admiral Commanding U-boats regulates flotilla distribution."

E. Survey of the situation:

0302 Radio message 0231/744 sent:

"All U-boats, for information:
Enemy landings on 6 June between Le Havre and Barfleur, obviously a large scale operation. Speeches of Allied leaders and location of enemy forces indicate that further landing actions may be expected; information as to their targets still not available. Surprise attacks in other areas must be expected."

(Signed) Suhren.

8 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Storefjord - Hope Island - Banak from 0530 to 1142, nothing to report, exhaustive.

2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance of the waters around Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet from 0612 to 0705. Westsouthwest of Eina Bay 1 supply boat on a westerly course, otherwise no shipping movements.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0200 to 1033, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0300 to 0935. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen not examined since planned route had to be shortened because of technical trouble.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Northern Waters: flotilla leader "Baku" and destroyer "J" at sea on 7 June (according to radio traffic).

Hammerfest took a bearing of 273° on a British unit at 0358 on 7 June.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 37, 61, 113, 118, MO-boat No. 252.

Norwegian polar coast: few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

CONFIDENTIAL

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684
U 997 AB 7926
U 313 AB 7963
U 711 AB 8775
U 307 AF 2113
U 315 AF 2156
U 344 AF 2196
U 363 AF 2524
U 987 AF 2564
U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 365, 387, 425, 737, 742, 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716, 992 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0920	U 362 put in to Narvik from AB 46.
0950	U 347 put in to Narvik from AB 46.
0445	U 387 put in to Narvik from AB 88.
0320	U 742 put in to Narvik from AB 49.
1015	U 957 put in to Narvik from AB 85.
1000	U 956 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
	U 992 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317, 982 Egersund,
U 243, 1007 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 242, 397, 975, 715 Stavanger,
U 999 Arendal,
U 677, 678, 971, 1001, 480, 1192 Kristiansand
(South),
U 276, 348 on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 1061 (Hinrichs):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1600 on 8 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

Radio frequency "MC", Northern Waters very long wave.

2. Take on torpedoes at Ramsund. As soon as it is known, report time of sailing by short signal. After sailing, radio frequency "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave.
3. Proceed through Westfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast southwards through Frohavet to Trondheim.
4. Expect to meet U 992 (Falke) putting out from Bergen at 2000 on 7 June via Frohavet.
5. Report by short signal probable time of arrival at "HA 1".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1635 Teleprinter message Most Secret 17391 IW from Naval War Staff (Koralle).

"Subject: Meteorological transmitters in the northern area. Agree in principle to recommendation in Chief of Naval Meteorological Service Ia 1061/44 Most Secret of 6 June 1944. The employment of the 2 Northern Waters transmitters is particularly urgent in view of the importance of continuous weather reports enabling a forecast for the English area."

E. Organizational:

1514 Teleprinter message received from Admiral Commanding U-boats Most Secret 4482 UI:

"1. In accordance with Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., 00719/teleprinter message A 2 of 7 June, U 365 (Wedemeyer) is with effect from 8 June transferred for administration from 9th U-boat Flotilla to 13th U-boat Flotilla.

2. Additional note for 11th U-boat Flotilla: Your request for allocation to the 11th U-boat Flotilla cannot be granted as flotillas must be kept at equal strength."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re III (b):

"All 7 boats which put in to Narvik from the operational area were only 20 to 30 days at sea. Apart from "Schaar" and "Bentzien", they

CONFIDENTIAL

had no encounters with the enemy. Thus they will be ready for further operations shortly and can be kept at readiness for employment in the event of a subsidiary landing in Norway."

(Signed) Suhren.

9 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0439 to 1032, exhaustive; nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0200 to 1000.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0326 to 1011. Route completely examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of mist, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0807 convoy in AE 9555. 7 merchant ships totaling 30,000 G.R.T., 1 probable escort vessel, course 110°.

At 0813 1 merchant ship of 5,000 G.R.T. in AE 9531, course 270°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 32, 37, 53, 113 (at 1915 Nos. 37 and 113 received urgent radio message).

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: Flotilla leader "Baku".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings on a British unit on 8 June:

Hammerfest took a bearing of 251° at 1430,

CONFIDENTIAL

Svanvik took a bearing of 259° - 268° in the afternoon.

Russian radio traffic: slight to moderate, partly very urgent and of first priority.

Britain: very little Murmansk radio traffic, none from Archangel.

(c) By G.I.S. stations:

Naval High Command wired in Most Secret 1205
A 3 of 9 June:

"According to an agent's report, the invasion of Norway is planned for the next 24 hours. Report seems to have been made with a purpose."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Northern Waters boats:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684
U 997 AB 7926
U 313 AB 7963
U 711 AB 8775
U 307 AF 2113
U 315 AF 2156
U 344 AF 2196
U 363 AF 2524
U 987 AF 2564
U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 362, 365, 347, 387, 425, 737, 742, 956, 957,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2030

U 956 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
U 992 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

U-boat group Central:

U 293, 771 Bergen,
U 290, 317, 982 Egersund,
U 1007 Flekkefjord,
U 745, 1165 Larvik,
U 637 Vallø,
U 480, 1192 proceeding from Haugesund to Bergen,
U 276, 348 on special operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1030 Teleprinter message Most Secret 2953 A Ops.
sent:

"Within the next few days, U-957 (Schaar) will be moved to Tromsø for operational reasons. Boat at 12 hours' readiness. Instructions regarding berth are requested. Necessary escort for sailing will be announced at the time. Time of arrival will follow."

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs):

"1. Put out from Narvik - Skjomen at 2030 on 9 June for Hammerfest via Tjeldsund and Finnsnesrennen.

2. With pilot from Lødingen to Tromsø.

3. From Tromsø with escort provided by Admiral Polar Coast. Boat is expected at 0900 on 10 June.

4. From Lødingen, U-boat Northern Waters frequency.

5. 12 hours' readiness in Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), third operation,
Short report from U 957 (Schaar), fourth operation,
see Appendix I/1,2.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Striking escort traffic in the Iokanka area indicates movement of merchant ships. The Hammerfest and Svanvik bearings cannot be of much use, as they run across land and intersect

CONFIDENTIAL

at a very acute angle. Attempts will be made from a southerly D/F station with a view to obtaining useful cross-bearings in the area of approaching PQ convoys."

(Signed) Suhren.

10 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0447 to 0953, nothing to report. Route examined apart from 100 km. south of Hope Island and 100 km. off the coast.

2 FW 190 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance around Fisher Peninsula, Motovski Bay and Kola inlet from 0730 to 0814, nothing to report. No shipping movements observed. Kola inlet not examined because of low clouds.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0148 to 0915.

4 BF 109 and 1 Do 24 took off between 1020 and 1425 from Gossen and Trondheim lake respectively in 3 waves for operation "Prien". Operations broken off at 1210 because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0314 to 1043. Route 70%, northwest coast of Jan Mayen 80% examined, firing, otherwise nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 61, 118, 121.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684

U 997 AB 7926

U 313 AB 7963

U 711 AB 8775

U 307 AF 2113

U 315 AF 2156

U 344 AF 2196

U 363 AF 2524

U 987 AF 2564

U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 362, 365, 347, 387, 425, 737, 742, 957,
965 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,

U 278, 354, 716, Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2045 U 956 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
U 992 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1315 Teleprinter message Most Secret 2972 A Ops.1:

"Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg):

1. Put out from Bergen on the morning of 12
June for Narvik - Ramsund.

2. Proceed through inner leads to Frohavet,
then at a distance of 50 miles from the
coast as far as 66° N in accordance with
Order No. 13, make for Westfjord.

3. Report by time short signal probable time of arrival at approach point and also passing of "V 1".

4. Radio frequency "Anton".

5. For exchange of recognition signals with land, observe section 153 of Recognition Signal Regulations."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 1061 (Hinrichs), third transport trip, see Appendix I/3.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, in Most Secret 1029, wired agreement to meteorological operations planned in Chief of Naval Meteorological Service Ia 1061/44 Most Secret of 6 June.

E. Organizational:

1735 Teleprinter message Most Secret 0103 A 1 received from Captain U-boats Central:

"All U-boats lying in operation ports in southern Norway are to be at 3 hours' readiness by day and at immediate readiness from 2200 to 0700."

F. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

11 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0504 to 1005, almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes. Shot down by German U-boat at 0205 in AN 2911. One member of the crew picked up by the U-boat, unwounded.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 took off at 0311 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen. Overdue since 0941 in AF 6177.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 118.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", motor minesweepers Nos. 429, 431, 437.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.
Svanvik took a bearing of 259° on a British unit at 1537.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684

U 997 AB 7926

U 313 AB 7963

U 711 AB 8775

U 307 AF 2113

U 315 AF 2156

U 344 AF 2196

U 363 AF 2524

U 987 AF 2564

U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 956 Hammerfest,
U 362, 365, 347, 387, 425, 737, 742, 957,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2100

U 737 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
U 992 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

IV.

Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 737 (Brasack):

- "1. Put out from Narvik - Skjomen on the afternoon of 11 June.
2. U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
3. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen to Hammerfest.
4. With pilot from Lødingen to Tromsø.
5. From Tromsø to Hammerfest with escort provided by Admiral Polar Coast. U-boat is expected at 0600 on 12 June.
6. 12 hours' readiness in Hammerfest."

V.

Reports of successes: None.

VI.

U-boat reports:

Short report from U 347 (de Buhr), first operation,
Short report from U 362 (Franz), third operation,
Short report from U 387 (Büchler), sixth operation,
Short report from U 737 (Brasack), sixth operation,
see Appendix I/4-7.

C.

Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D.

Plans:

1640

Teleprinter message Most Secret 2991 Met. sent to

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., and Naval High Command, Naval War Staff H Chief of Naval Meteorological Service:

"Reference Naval War Staff H Chief of Naval Meteorological Service Ia 1061/44 Most Secret, plans:

1. Meteorological buoys are to be laid in the positions as planned after they reach Narvik. Request time of arrival.
2. U 737 (Brasack) will set up a meteorological transmitter on Bear Island, sailing from Tromsø on approximately 15 June. Meteorological buoys will be laid insofar as the invasion situation permits. After setting out buoys, U-boats will be at full operational readiness."

1715

Teleprinter message Most Secret 4887/44 received from Luftflotte Command 5:

"In October 1943, a German Air Force meteorological station was set up on Hope Island by a U-boat from Captain U-boats, Norway. Luftflotte 5 requests that a U-boat evacuate the station at the end of this month. It consists of 4 men and radio gear. Information is requested if and when a U-boat can be made available for this task."

E.

Survey of the situation:

1907

Teleprinter message Most Secret 0110 A 1 received from Captain U-boats Central:

"U-boat situation of Captain U-boats Central at 1600 on 11 June:

1. The following positions in the operational area are occupied: 4398, 4665, 3727, 3764, 2829, 2892, 4338, 3465, 3572, 3585, 3478, 2391 all AN; 8156, 7622, 8447, 8746 all AF.
2. 5 U-boats proceeding to the north approximately between 59° N and 61° N.
3. 6 U-boats proceeding to the Skagerrak.
4. Miscellaneous: 1 Ju 88 was shot down by U 243 in AN 2911 because it failed to give a recognition signal in time; 1 man rescued."

As there are still no signs of enemy operations against Norway, it seems adequate to have the Northern Waters U-boats lying in Trondheim, Narvik and Hammerfest at 12 hours' readiness.

(Signed) Suhren.

12 June, 1944

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75° N, 10° E - Banak from 0458 to 1028, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0237 to 1210. Southern part of Strömb, northern part of Syderö and Nolsö examined.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0258 to 1012. Route on outward flight completely examined, Jan Mayen 80% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Northern Waters: on the evening and night of 11 June destroyers "C", "E", "Gremyashchi", flotilla leader "Baku".

Iokanka area: minesweepers NN, Nos. 37, 59, 111, 118, 120.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Britain: very few Murmansk broadcasts, none from Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

CONFIDENTIAL

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684
U 997 AB 7926
U 313 AB 7963
U 711 AB 8775
U 307 AF 2113
U 315 AF 2156
U 344 AF 2196
U 363 AF 2524
U 987 AF 2564
U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 956 Hammerfest,
U 362, 365, 347, 387, 425, 742, 957,
965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968,
995 Trondheim,
U 278, 354, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2045 U 737 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
1100 U 992 put in to Ramsund - Narvik from
Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 2993 A Ops. sent to Luftflotte Command 5, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., for information Naval Chief Command Norway, 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"Reference Luftflotte Command 5 Ops. Division Ia 4839 Most Secret of 11 June (not to 11th U-boat Flotilla): U 354 (Sthamer) will be ready in Bergen on 24 June, in Narvik about 30 June to transport the meteorological unit back from Hope Island. The same boat took the unit there in the spring."

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Suspicious destroyer and escort vessel activity at sea and off the Murman coast."
Otherwise nothing to report.

(Signed) Suhren.

13 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0453 to 1353.

1 Ju 88 completed operation, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 broke off operations in AB 3617 because of engine trouble, up to then exhaustive reconnaissance, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0148 to 0955, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance between AB 7413 and 7481 from 0358 to 0954. Route 70% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Kirkenes took a bearing of 244° on a British unit at 1955.

Norwegian polar coast: brisk radio messages, predominantly very urgent, to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 59.

CONFIDENTIAL

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 32.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "E",
minesweeper No. 110.
Britain: no units intercepted in the
Murmansk/Archangel area.
Russian radio traffic: slight by day, brisk
in the evening, moderate at night.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684

U 997 AB 7926

U 313 AB 7963

U 711 AB 8775

U 307 AF 2113

U 315 AF 2156

U 344 AF 2196

U 363 AF 2524

U 987 AF 2564

U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 737, 956 Hammerfest,

U 362, 365, 347, 387, 425, 742, 957, 965,

992 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995

Trondheim,

U 278, 354, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 425 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1800 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3034 A Ops.
sent:

CONFIDENTIAL

"Sailing order for U 737 (Brasack):

1. Put out from Hammerfest at noon on 14 June for Tromsø, escort provided by base. Bring 2 complete sets of U-boat clothing, size of boots 41 and 43 cm.
2. Make fast in Tromsø at the Naval Air Station, take on meteorological shore transmitter "Hermann" and Inspectors Stöbe and Person.
3. Arrange escort with First Admiral's Staff Officer, Admiral Polar Coast. Report time of sailing and route in advance by Emergency teleprinter message.
4. Proceed via AC 17 to set up "Hermann" on Bear Island. More detailed instructions will be received from Inspector Stöbe. Report execution by short signal. Return to Hammerfest.
5. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 742 (Schwassmann), first operation, see Appendix I/8.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

Change of personnel, Northern Waters boats:

U 921 (Leu) - new commander, Lt. Werner.

U 965 (Ohling) - deputy commander, Lt. Unverzagt.

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

14 June, 1944:

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 0453 to 1152. Sea area and island of Jan Mayen not examined because of weather conditions, nothing to report.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Bellsund - Ice Fjord - 75° N, 10° E - Banak from 0525 to 1145. Operation carried out on route as ordered; apart from Ice Fjord, examined exhaustively. Hornsund, Bellsund, Van Keulon Fjord, Van Mijens Bay and Sveagruva examined, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

4 Ju 188 reconnoitered shipping berths on the east coast of Scotland, Firth of Tay, Firth of Forth, Moray Firth from 1306 to 1637. Peterhead harbor not examined because of fighter defenses.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - NE 6444 - 6744 - Vaernes from 0256 to 0905. Route not exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

II.

Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

11 freighters totaling 12,000 G.R.T., 3 tankers totaling roughly 4,000 G.R.T. in Moray Firth. 7 merchant ships totaling roughly 37,000 G.R.T. in Firth of Forth.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

On 13 June Russian aircraft "U 2" flew from Belushya (AT 7234) to Karmakuly (AT 4839). Norwegian polar coast: lively, partly very urgent radio messages, and at 1400 a codeword to all submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 112, 117.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", minesweepers Nos. 118, 120 (the latter bearing 113° from Kirkenes).
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk Archangel area.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 7684

U 997 AB 7926

U 313 AB 7963

U 711 AB 8775

U 307 AF 2113

U 315 AF 2156

U 344 AF 2196

U 363 AF 2524

U 987 AF 2564

U 394 AF 2674

In port:

U 737, 956 Hammerfest,

U 362, 365, 347, 387, 742, 957, 965, 992 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995

Trondheim,

U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300 U 425 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.

0400 U 716 put out from Bergen for Narvik.

1300 U 737 put out from Hammerfest, at 2400 put in to Tromsø.

1600 U 957 put out from Narvik for Tromsø, at 2340 put in to Harstad.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats west of Lofoten.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 957 (Schaar):

"1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 14 June.

2. U-boat Northern Waters frequency.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Proceed through Tjeldsund, Finnsnesrennen to Tromsø.
4. With pilot from Lødingen to Tromsø.
5. Admiral Polar Coast, Sea Defense Commandant and Naval Harbor Master, Tromsø have been asked to allocate a berth.
6. 12 hours' readiness. Radio to be manned in Tromsø.
7. Further transfer to Hammerfest planned for 19 June."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

0535 Teleprinter message Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service
Ia Most Secret 110 received:

"Reference your teleprinter message 2991 Met.
Most Secret of 1 June:

1. Time of arrival of meteorological buoys at Narvik and operational readiness will be announced in due course.
2. Chief of Naval Meteorological Service requests most urgently that, as recommended in Ia 1061 Most Secret of 6 June paras. 2 and 3, the positions on Bear Island and Spitsbergen should be occupied and that "Kreuzritter" be evacuated later by the same U-boat."

E. Survey of the situation:

The U-boats were informed by radio of the invasion situation:

"After preliminary heavy air attacks, invasion forces landed by sea and from the air on the night of 6 June under cover of heavy warships. The landings were made between Le Havre and Cherbourg with focal points in the St. Vaast, Bayeux, Quistreham and Trouville areas. Troops which landed on the Channel Islands and in the Dieppe - Dunkirk area were rushed and annihilated. Airborne troops operating in the rear of our front lines were immediately destroyed. Starting with bridgeheads at Carentan and between the mouth of the Vire and the Orne, the enemy set up an extensive front from Caen through Bayeux and Isigny to Carentan. From the west flank at Carentan after continuous landings, new attacks

CONFIDENTIAL

were being made all the time to cut off the Cotentin and Cherbourg peninsula for use as a bridgehead. All attempts of this sort were repelled. The progress of the Allied forces has been brought to a standstill by the closing in of our own fronts, reinforcing them with our reserves. Up to date over 100,000 G.R.T. have been sunk, besides numerous naval craft and special ships. Over 500 aircraft have been shot down, not including enemy losses in transports and gliders which were too numerous to reckon. The strong defensive actions were extremely costly for the enemy in men and materiel, while our losses were comparatively slight. The conduct of the French population in the areas concerned was everywhere helpful."

"According to reconnaissance of the north of Scotland and the Shetlands, apparently no operations against Norway are to be expected at present. However, more Russian convoys may still run while the Russian offensive against Finland is in progress."

(Signed) Suhren.

15 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological, ice and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Prince Charles Foreland - Reindeer Peninsula - Wijdefjord - Ice Fjord - Bellsund - Storfjord - Banak from 0514 to 1304, not exhaustive because of weather conditions, nothing to report.

Of the Spitsbergen fjords, only Bellsund and Ice Fjord east of 15° E were exhaustively examined. Very thick, low-lying fog elsewhere.

1 Ju 88 on photographic reconnaissance of Archangel and Molotovsk from 0255 to 0953.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0152 to 0953. Northern part of Faeroes examined, no shipping observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance of the

CONFIDENTIAL

Jan Mayen area from 0252 to 1041. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen not visible, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

3 ships southwest of Mudyugski Island. At 1845 reconnoitering aircraft reported to all: 4 submarines in the sea area of Komagver, course 320°, speed 14 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate transmission of radio messages, codewords of very high priority to all submarines in the operational area at 0950, 1708 and 1710.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 106, MO-boat No. 252.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 118.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Svanvik bearings: U.S. unit in 257° at 2155 on 14 June.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

0325 Teleprinter message Secret 1106/44 received from G.I.S. station, Kiel:

"Reference the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Reliable source in Stockholm reported on 13 June: A member of the U.S. Embassy announced that the invasion of Norway and Denmark would take place within a few days as soon as the position in France was secured. Today there is a report from the Norwegian Embassy that the invasion of Norway is expected to take place on 15 June. 400 Norwegian saboteurs will cross the Norwegian - Swedish frontier today and tomorrow. The report could not be verified."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

CONFIDENTIAL

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668)
U 997)
U 313)
U 711)
U 307)
U 315) on passage.
U 344)
U 363)
U 987)
U 394)

In port:

U 425, 956 Hammerfest,
U 737 Tromsø,
U 362, 365, 347, 387, 742, 965, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1000 U 737 put out from Tromsø on a special
operation.
0220 U 957 put out from Harstad for Tromsø.
U 716 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
Group "Trutz" proceeding from AB 7684 - AF 2674
to AB 4828 - AF 2216.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats east of Jan Mayen.

0213 Radio message 0140/714 sent:

"Group "Trutz":

Be in new patrol line from AF 4828 to AF 2216
at 1500 on 15 June, former order."

Battle Group reported that, from observations of enemy air reconnaissance over Alta and loud radio traffic, they expected another carrier attack on the "Tirpitz". A PQ-convoy ran simultaneously with the last attack. In spite of the invasion in France, a Murmansk convoy seems probable during the present Russian offensive against Finland. This assumption is strengthened by most D/F bearings and recently reported radio traffic between Murmansk and Britain. As a precaution, the patrol line has been extended east of Jan Mayen, air reconnaissance has been requested from Luftflotte 5 and the U-boats in Narvik and Hammerfest are at increased readiness.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1131

Radio message 1025/721 sent:

"U 737 (Brasack) is putting out from Tromsø for AB 3994 at noon on 15 June."

U 737 (Brasack) was leaving Tromsø to set up the meteorological shore transmitter "Hermann" on Bear Island.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0311

Radio message 0245/715 sent:

" "Schaar": be at 5 hours' readiness immediately."

0314

Radio message 0250/81 sent on "MC":

"Base: "Kamerun" for all U-boats: All boats immediately at 5 hours' readiness."

0243

Teleprinter message Most Secret 3044 sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"U-boats at 5 hours' readiness."

2210

Teleprinter message C-in-C U-boats Ops. Secret 4359 A 5 received:

"U 289 (Hellwig) is declared missing with effect from 31 May 1944. U-boat put out from Narvik on 7 May. Last message on 31 May reported carrier formation in AB 46. Possibly sunk by this formation, fate of crew unknown. For next-of-kin: U-boat operated in Northern Waters. Cause of loss unknown."

2210

Teleprinter message C-in-C U-boats Ops. Secret 4359 A 5 received:

"U 240 (Link) is declared missing with effect from 17 May 1944. U-boat put out from Bergen on 14 May. No signals received. Loss probably due to enemy aircraft or submarine. Fate of crew unknown. For next-of-kin: U-boat lost while proceeding to the operational area. Cause of loss unknown."

V.

Reports of successes: None.

C.

Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D.

Plans:

0210

Teleprinter message Most Secret 0141

CONFIDENTIAL

received from Naval War Staff, Second Division,
C-in-C U-boats Ops. 1. 2:

"Agree to evacuation of meteorological unit from
Hope Island by U 354 at the end of June."

E. Survey of the situation:

1815 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3055 A Ops. sent
to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats
Ops. for information Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 15 June
1944:

1. Group "Trutz" (10 boats) moved from patrol line
AB 7684 - AF 2674 to patrol line AB 4828 - AF
2216 increasing the distance between each boat
to 30 miles, since up to date there have been
no signs of an enemy offensive against Norway.
On the other hand further PQ convoys may be
expected during the present Russian offensive
against Finland. Latter assumption strengthened
by the more frequent appearance of escort
forces off the Murman coast during the last few
days and Battle Group's suspicion of a carrier
force, in which we are not inclined to believe.
2. In spite of several queries, still no decision
regarding the teleprinter request for reconnais-
sance today by Luftflotte 5.
3. 10 boats at 5 hours' readiness in Narvik and
Hammerfest, 2 boats at 12 hours' readiness in
Trondheim."

2156 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5022/44 received
from Luftflotte Command 5:

"Subject: Reconnaissance of a convoy day's run.

1. Luftflotte Command 5's Listening Service and
Naval Chief Command, Norway have no information
regarding the sailing of a PQ convoy.
2. Daily reconnaissance in the west and examination
of Spitsbergen (Ice Fjord and Bellsund) carried
out on 14 and 15 June also failed to provide
information on the presence of a PQ convoy or
carrier formation.
3. With no clues available, fuel reasons alone
make reconnaissance impossible.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I.

Most Secret.

Short Reports.

1. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), third operation.
2. Short report from U 957 (Schaar), fourth operation.
3. Short report from U 1061 (Hinrichs), second transport operation.
4. Short report from U 347 (de Buhr), first operation.
5. Short report from U 362 (Franz), third operation.
6. Short report from U 387 (Buchler), sixth operation.
7. Short report from U 737 (Brasack), sixth operation.
8. Short report from U 742 (Schwassmann), first operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/1

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), third operation.

27 April 1944	Put out from Bergen.
1 May	Put in to Narvik.
11 May	Put out from Narvik.
7 June	Put in again. Proceeded via AB 9831 and AB 86 to attack area AB 6522.
14 - 20 May	Nothing sighted. From 21 May attack area AB 8162, from 24 May AB 4694.
30 May	At 1842 in AB 4696 land-based aircraft, at least twin-engined, range 12,000 meters, type not identified. Varying courses of approximately 320° and 140°. Acted as shadower. Reported by short signal. Did not operate on it as we thought it was only the long-range reconnaissance aircraft which spotted neighboring U-boat "Schaar".
31 May	Operated on carrier formation as ordered by Command although, according to the reports of "Schaar" and "Hellwig", it was further north. However, I assumed that Command had further information. At 2130 broke off operations as ordered, no contact. No information regarding "Hellwig". No explosions heard.
From 1 June	In attack area AB 6283, from 4 June in AB 8191. No sightings or locations.

CONFIDENTIAL

Drifting mines: 14 May: AB 6513, heavily overgrown.

1 June: AB 6119. 2 June: AB 6292, type not identified, probably British.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Operation with no opportunities for attack.
Disappointing operation for a usually reliable commander.
2. On 30 May the U-boat should have approached the suspicious aircraft to gain more information. It belonged to the remote escort of the carrier formation.
3. It would have been more correct to operate on the later reports of the U-boats than on Command's earlier grid square details which were based on "Schaar"'s first signal.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 2927 A. Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), fourth operation.

29 April 1944 Put out from Bergen.

2 May Put in to Narvik.

11 May Put out from Narvik.

7 June Put in to Narvik.

13 May Attack area AB 6594.

20 May Attack area AB 3247.

24 May Attack area AB 5745.

30 May At 1924 in AB 5714 large land-based aircraft and flying boat, probably "Catalina", no attack, submerged. "Fulmar" type of aircraft continuously circling place of submerging, 3 runs-in observed in periscope, no bombs. Withdrew submerged. No hydrophone bearings, multiple hydrophone set not working.

At 2000 very long wave busy. In periscope 2 aircraft carriers, range 5,000 - 6,000 meters, enemy bow right, angle 100° - 110°, apparently avoiding courses. 2 destroyers dead ahead, 1 cruiser, bow left, angle 100°, range 5,000 meters. T5 torpedo fired at carrier astern (about 24,000 tons). Tube-runner, submerged because of approaching destroyer, torpedo discharged after 30 to 40 seconds. Another T5 torpedo fired at destroyer: discharge failure, passed

CONFIDENTIAL

underneath. After 4 minutes 38 seconds knocking on metal, then violent torpedo explosion.

At 2025 two hard thuds, then depth charges or bombs, above the boat, shell splinters.

At 2035 banging and cracking noises, Asdic and several hydrophone bearings. Stern T5 torpedo set.

Surfaced at 2309 after hydrophone bearing faded. Pursued 3 silhouettes, submerged from approaching carrier-borne aircraft, contact lost. For one and a half days steered northeast on searching courses without result. No sign of "Hollwig". Proceeded to the 2 position lines as ordered. After the beginning of the invasion put in to Narvik for refuelling.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

This outstanding commander missed success with the aircraft carrier due to an unfortunate chain of circumstances. The destroyer believed torpedoed.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2959 -
A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 5th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 1061 (Hinrichs), third transport operation.

27 May 1944 Put out from Kiel.

5 June Put in to Narvik.

Proceeded in escort from Kiel via Kristiansand to Egerø and further at a distance of 30 miles from the coast in accordance with Order No. 13.

31 May At 1729 in AF 8473 four-engined aircraft, probably a "Liberator", approached. "Naxos" location at same time as sighting. Range 10,000 meters, bearing 300°, 3 bombs at depth A + 20, probably rocket bombs as there was a rushing noise which became louder before the explosion.

1 June At 1414 in AF 8164, alarm. Bi-plane, probably carrier-borne aircraft, range 12,000 meters, bearing 330°, course 180°.

2 June At 0913 in AF 5644, alarm. Twin-engined aircraft (perhaps Ju 88), range 12,000 meters, bearing 130°, course 300°.

Put in to Narvik through Andfjord via Ramsund.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

The T 5 torpedo complement in transport U-boats - vital in these operations by Northern Waters boats - must be specially protected from bombing.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Immediate. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 347 (de Buhr), first operation.

10 May 1944	Put out from Bergen.
8 June	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via Narvik, Ramsund to exchange torpedoes.
15 May	Proceeded through Andfjord to AB 6892 as boat No. 5 in group "Trutz".
16 May	At 0148 submerged from 2 aircraft, range 8,000 - 9,000 meters. No location. Aircraft alarm at 0910, range 9,000 meters. No location. Types not identified because of distance.
17 May	Reached attack area.
19 May	"Naxos" location, signal strength 3, period of audibility 80 seconds, periodicity 20 seconds, duration of search 1 second. On 19 May patrol line moved to AB 8123 - 8558.
21 May	Reached second patrol line at 0100. Nothing sighted in patrol line.
24 May	Attack area AB 8165, nothing sighted till 30 May.
30 May	At 0720 surprised by aircraft. No location. Aircraft flew wide of the boat in visibility of 200 meters. At an altitude of 100 meters, aircraft only identified vaguely as twin-engined in the fog. Did not submerge. Anti-aircraft guns manned. At 2000 moved to AB 8126 - 8964. At 2330 U 957 (Schaar) sighted carrier formation. While awaiting orders to

CONFIDENTIAL

operate, went ahead on 000° for one and a half hours.

- 31 May At 0018 Command detailed 4 U-boats to operate against the formation. Proceeded at maximum speed to patrol line AB 6315 - 6684, group "Grimm".
At 1951 reached ice limit in attack area AB 3584. Nothing sighted.
- 2 June At 1630 set off for new patrol line AB 4673 through AB 2818.
- 4 June At 1600 reached attack area AB 4673. At 1932 reconnoitered the ice limit while extending the patrol line.
- 6 June At 0201 perceived ice limit in AA 3657.
At 1235 at maximum speed set off on return passage from AB 4243.
- 7 June At 0405 submerged from aircraft. Flew past on course 180°, type not identified as distance was too great. No location.

Comments by Captain U-boats Norway.

Operation with no opportunities for success.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2997 -
A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/5

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Immediate. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 362 (Franz), third operation.

14 May, 1944	Put out from Trondheim.
7 June	Put in to Narvik - Skjomen.
	Proceeded via AF 5610 to attack area AB 9239. No details regarding carrier group sighted on 14 May off Rörvik.
17 May	Reached attack area. "Naxos" locations three times in AB 9261, 9239, 9317.
20 May	Set off with group "Trutz" to attack area 8558. Aircraft sighted in AB 9164, unobserved. 2 bombs far away on surfacing. "Naxos" location in AB 9442. Aircraft sighted in AB 8655, unobserved.
21 May	"Naxos" location in AB 8566, 8582, 8554.
24 May	Proceeded with group "Trutz" to patrol line AB 8126 - 8941.
27 May	"Borkum" location in AB 8274.
30 May	Proceeded with group "Trutz" to new patrol line.
31 May	Set off at maximum speed to patrol line, group "Grimm". German flying boat (BV) in AB 5918.
2 June	Set off to new patrol line, group "Grimm".

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June "Borkum" location in AB 2862.
4 June AB 4687.
6 June After invasion began, returned to Narvik at maximum speed for refuelling.
No attacks followed any locations, submerged each time.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Operation with no chances of success.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2999 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/6

COPY

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. For information Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), sixth operation.

20 May 1944 Put out from Narvik.
8 June Put in to Narvik.
Proceeded via AB 88 to attack area AB 8589, depth of sweep 20 miles (group "Grimm").
From 30 May In patrol line AB 8626 - AB 8964 as boat No. 4. From 2320 to 0100 on 31 May operated on carrier group. No contact.
From 31 May As boat No. 3 in patrol line AB 3584 - 6256.
2 - 4 June Proceeded via position line AB 2818 - 9117 to patrol line AB 4673 - 6836.
Enemy not sighted.
6 June At 1230 commenced return passage for refuelling.
Inaccurate navigation at times because of compass trouble. Various locations on "Naxos", singing or humming for 3 to 5 seconds, repeated once to three times in succession.
No sightings. Suspected jamming of frequencies.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Operation with no opportunities for success.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 2996 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/7

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), sixth operation.

- 13 May 1944 Put out from Hammerfest.
- 7 June Put in to Narvik - Bogen Bay.
- 14 - 19 May In attack area AB 6834.
- 17 May 1 twin-engined aircraft, perhaps Ju 88.
- 20 May Proceeded to new attack area AB 8515.
- 25 - 30 May In patrol line AB 8137.
- 31 May - 1 June Operated with group "Trutz" against reported carrier group, no contact.
- 1 - 2 June In patrol line. In AB 6258 on the morning of 2 June, enemy periscope sighted twice, then hydrophone bearing from electric motor picked up and followed to the east. Lost after a few hours.
- 2 - 4 June Proceeded in reconnaissance line to new patrol line AB 8196.
- 6 June Ordered to return at maximum speed to Narvik for refuelling.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Operation with no opportunities for success.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 2998 - 1. Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/8

COPY

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 742 (Schwassmann), first operation.
(group "Grimm").

20 May 1944 Put out from Narvik.

8 June Put in to Narvik.

Proceeded through Westfjord to attack area
AB 8838.

From 24 May Patrol line from AB 8126 to 8941.

30 May "Naxos" location on a lower frequency, fast crackling noise, very short, D/F conditions unfavorable.

From 31 May In patrol line from AB 8126 to 8964 and from
AN 6315 to 6684.

From 1 June From AB 3584 to 6256.

From 4 June From AB 4673 to 8836.

22 May -

6 June. Enemy not sighted.

Drifting mines: 31 May: AB 3849, heavily overgrown.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Operation with no opportunities for success or special action.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret - 3031 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
16 - 30 JUNE, 1944
PG/31861

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 0058 to 0815, not exhaustive because of weather, otherwise nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0259 to 0804, nothing to report, not exhaustive because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 6474 - 6771 - Vaernes from 0324 to 1045. Route 70% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: lively transmissions to submarines in the operational area, to whom Polyarno broadcast a reconnaissance report and codewords of first priority.

Iokanka area: destroyers "B", "J", minesweepers Nos. 113, 114.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 111.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Russian radio traffic: moderate to lively aircraft traffic.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

CONFIDENTIAL

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828
U 997 AB 4892
U 313 AB 7314
U 711 AB 7354
U 307 AB 7397
U 315 AB 8441
U 344 AB 8476
U 363 AB 8729
U 987 AB 8793
U 394 AF 2216

U 737 AB 4410 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 956 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 362, 365, 387, 742, 965, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 716 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 737 proceeding from Tromsø to AB 3994.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) setting up meteorological
shore transmitter "Hermann" on the north coast
of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0023 Teleprinter message Most Secret 0236 from Naval
Chief Command, East/Captain U-boats, Central
was received:

"As a result of a conference with Admiral
Commanding U-boats, it is proposed to leave all
the boats under Captain U-boats Central (at
present 35, increasing to 38 boats in about 3 weeks)

CONFIDENTIAL

in Norway for refitting and any necessary dockyard repairs, and to allocate them as follows:

1. Dockyard arrangements:

- (a) In Bergen for urgent dockyard repairs absolutely necessary for operations. When Bergen's capacity is not adequate for this purpose, boats must be transferred to Germany or laid up.
- (b) In Horten for repairs effected on board with minor dockyard assistance.

2. Communications:

In Bergen and Horten, store for spare parts and all kinds of repair facilities for restoring complete operational readiness.

3. Equipment and replenishment:

- (a) In Bergen: 10 boats per month above the present refitting capacity.
- (b) In Horten and Kristiansand (South): to be prepared for 10 boats monthly.

4. Extent of equipment:

- (a) Fuel, lubricating oil, distilled and drinking water, potash cartridges (400 for each boat) and the normal U-boat stores.
- (b) Provisions for 8 weeks for each boat.
- (c) Armament:
Bergen: 6 3.7 cm. guns, three of which are for U 370, U 319, and U 348; 4 twin mountings with protective screen, 6,000 rounds of 3.7 cm. ammunition, of which 3,600 rounds are for the same 3 boats, and 12,000 rounds of 2 cm. ammunition.
Horten: 2 3.7 cm. guns, 4 twin mountings with protective screen, 2,500 rounds of 3.7 cm. ammunition, 10,000 rounds of 3.7 cm. ammunition, 10,000 rounds of 2 cm. ammunition.
Kristiansand (South): as at Horten, but no 3.7 cm. guns.

5. All the places concerned are requested to examine the practicability of providing the above requirements and to forward the results of their investigations by return to Admiral Commanding U-boats and Captain U-boats, Central.

6. Additional note for all stations which are informed:

Captain U-boats Central and his boats have no connection with those of Captain U-boats, Norway as regards organization."

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

---(Signed) Suhren.

17 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Prince Charles Foreland via the coast to Reindeer Peninsula - 80° N, 50° E - South Cape - Banak from 0432 to 1303, nothing to report, very incompletely examined.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0226 to 0935, broken off at 0625 in AM 1430 because radio was out of order. Flew over the southern part of the Faeroes, enemy not sighted.

2 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of the central North Sea (West Wall) from 0806 to 1242. Reconnaissance area examined exhaustively by Ju 88 with radar set "200", no enemy sighting report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0447 to 1130. Route exhaustively examined, Jan Mayen covered by mist, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: brisk, partly very urgent transmissions and 2 codewords to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 101.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Svanvik: at 1531 on 16 June, British unit in 253° .

CONFIDENTIAL

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828
U 997 AB 4892
U 313 AB 7314
U 711 AB 7354
U 307 AB 7397
U 315 AB 8441
U 344 AB 8476
U 363 AB 8729
U 987 AB 8793
U 394 AF 2216

U 737 AB 3994 on special operation.

In port:

U 956, 425 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 362, 365, 387, 742, 965, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995,
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2245 U 716 put in to Narvik from Bergen.
U 737 proceeding from AB 3994 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0059 Radio message 0037/737 sent to U 737 (Brasack):

"Await improvement in weather until about 18 June. Always expect enemy submarines. Freedom of attack on all vessels in the operational area."

CONFIDENTIAL

0926 U-737 however reported in short signal 0926/17/742, that the meteorological shore transmitter "Hermann" had been set up.

As U 737 was next to take the meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" from Tromsø to Spitsbergen, at the same time evacuating the meteorological unit "Kreuzritter";

2142 radio message 2114/751 was sent:

- "1. "Brasack": proceed at once to Hammerfest - Tromsø, Naval Air Station.
2. "Schaar": after the arrival of "Brasack" and the delivery of "Edwin", join the next convoy to Hammerfest."

The news cameraman is to make use of the Spitsbergen voyage for his film.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0030 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3068 A Ops. 1 was sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"U 636 (Schendel): in Trondheim in 12 hours' readiness from 18 June."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1015 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3078 A Ops was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops, for information Naval High Command, Chief of Naval Meteorological Service and for information Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"U 737 (Brasack) reported that the meteorological shore transmitter "Hermann" was set up on Bear Island on 17 June. The same boat is now scheduled to take out the meteorological transmitter "Edwin" and evacuate "Kreuzritter"."

E. Survey of the situation:

0227 Radio message 0109/740 sent:

"Southern England and the London area were attacked during the night of 15/16 June and on the morning of the 16th with a new type of explosive of the heaviest caliber. 'Although many Germans doubted after the long delay that we would revenge ourselves', declared Hans Fritsch, 'the hour has now come. We are striking back'."

CONFIDENTIAL

The reaction to the new weapon cannot yet be foretold, but in any case special attention must be paid to the readiness of anti-gas defense.

(Signed) Suhren.

18 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak from 0500 to 0956, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0115 to 0810. Faeroes not examined because of fog, enemy not sighted.

2 Ju 88 with radar set "200" on reconnaissance from 1342 to 1754 against enemy locations reported in the area southwest of Lister. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined by radar, enemy not intercepted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0247 to 0934. Route 40% examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of low-lying clouds.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of transmissions, some very urgent, among them 2 codewords to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Strait/ Archangel area: minesweeper No. 63.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/ Archangel area.

Britain: no Murmansk/ Archangel broadcasts.

CONFIDENTIAL

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828
U 997 AB 4892
U 313 AB 7314
U 711 AB 7354
U 307 AB 7397
U 315 AB 8441
U 344 AB 8476
U 363 AB 8729
U 987 AB 8793
U 394 AF 2216

U 737 AB 3994 on special operation.

In port:

U 956, 425 Hammerfest,
U 957, Tromsø,
U 347, 362, 365, 387, 716, 742, 965, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0820 U 737 put into Hammerfest from AB 3994.
1600 U 992 put out from Narvik for AF 2216.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

1236 Radio message 1215/757 sent:

"1. U 992 (Falke) is putting out from Andfjord early on 19 June for AF 2216, joining group "Trutz" as boat No. 10.

2. "Lehmann" is returning via "SR 1" to Hammerfest at 1000 on 20 June.

3. At the same time boats "Schweiger" to "Borger" will move up one position to the northwest."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Kreuzritter" reported that the ice situation at present would not permit their evacuation by U-boat.

1146

Therefore radio message 1051/755 was sent:

" "Brasack" and "Schaar": await further orders in Tromsø. Sailing delayed. "Brasack" may remain in Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

2230 Teleprinter message Most Secret 605 was received from U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Short report from U 737 (Brasack), seventh operation:

Put out from Tromsø on 15 June 44, put in to Hammerfest on 18 June. Reached landing place on Bear Island at 1500 on 16 June. From 1530 to 2340, unloading and erection of meteorological transmitter "Hermann" near meteorological transmitter "Christian". Return passage begun at 0830 on 17 June after interception of first routine transmission."

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

I. Result of a conference with Major Schulte-Mattler, Commanding Officer of Anti-aircraft Defenses Narvik, about the security measures to protect the berths in Narvik against air attacks:

- "1. The possibility of surprise is materially greater in Skjomenfjord than in Narvik harbor from the point of view of the aircraft reporting network and conditions of visibility.
2. Ships are not a target for carpet bombing, but rather for single low level attacks.
3. Anti-aircraft protection is most favorable in Narvik harbor.
4. Widely separated berths offer slight prospect of success to the enemy.
5. It is therefore intended, independently of

CONFIDENTIAL

the degree of danger from the air, to re-transfer the base ship "Stella Polaris" and the repair ship "Huascaran" to Narvik harbor. -Special boats rollers, floating gangways, will be provided for ships without fixed connection to the shore for the protection of the crew during air-raid warnings."

- II. A teleprinter message was sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla to the effect that all boats in Trondheim which became ready for action were to remain there at 12 hours' readiness until further orders. It seemed advisable, in view of the unclarified invasion position, that some operational boats should also remain in Trondheim as long as there were no signs of the approach of a convoy.

1605 Teleprinter message 4459 A 1 was received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"1. After carrying out conning tower trials in the Atlantic and using up his fuel, "Sauer" (U 673) has orders to proceed to Trondheim for further operations in the Norwegian area.

2. Boat assigned to Norway Flotilla."

2335 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1771 S.O.s only was received from 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"Request allocation of U 673 (Sauer) to 13th U-boat Flotilla. Boat put in here and it is the commander's wish."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D II:

"Apart from the 10 boats in formation in the operational area, the following are now at 12 hours' readiness: 2 boats in Hammerfest, 1 boat in Tromsø, 7 boats in Narvik, 3 boats in Trondheim.

Further, 1 boat is proceeding to the formation. A total of 24 boats is thus ready for action."

(Signed) Suhren.

19 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Bellsund - Ice Fjord - South Cape - Banak, from 0503 to 1032. Only certain parts examined, Bellsund and Ice Fjord not examined because of weather, no enemy ships observed.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0500 to 1300. Area only 30% examined because of weather, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

3 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of anchorages in Firth of Tay, Firth of Forth and Tyne estuary from 2155 to 0305.

2 merchant vessels of about 2,000 G.R.T. at anchor in Firth of Tay, with them 1 "Sunderland" landing, no further shipping observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 6477 - AE 5969 - Vaernes from 0244 to 0902. Route examined only between 0° and 7° W because of low-lying cloud, nothing to report.

II.

Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

From 2355 to 0023 between Largo Bay and Kirkcaldy in AN 0528 a convoy of 25 merchant vessels, each 5,000 - 8,000 G.R.T., 3 destroyers and 7 guardships at anchor, widely scattered.

At 2349 in AN 5434 a convoy of 11 merchant vessels, each 3,000 - 5,000 G.R.T., 7 merchant vessels of up to 2,000 G.R.T., course south, slow speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 111 and 117.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B.

U-boats:

III.

U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828
U 997 AB 4892
U 313 AB 7314
U 711 AB 7354
U 307 AB 7397
U 315 AB 8441
U 344 AB 8476
U 363 AB 8729
U 987 AB 8793
U 394 AF 2216

In port:

U 956, 425, 737 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 362, 365, 387, 716, 742, 965 Narvik,
U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 992 proceeding from Narvik to AF 2216.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg), see
Appendix I.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1933 Coded radio message 1449/140 received from
"Schatzgräber":

Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Naval Chief
Command, Norway.

"Emergency station on the west coast at Cape Nimrod

CONFIDENTIAL

grid square 524 erected with emergency accommodation, provisions for 10 days and 5 watt radio set (wave range 3,000 - 5,000 kc/s). Short signal "ALW" means "request to be evacuated from Cape Nimrod as soon as possible." Broad channels in the ice suitable for flying-boat landings have been observed there since the beginning of May."

E. Organizational:

2153 In radio message 1927/49 (U-boat Base frequency), U-boat base and auxiliary warship "Huascaran" were ordered to return to Narvik on the morning of 20 June with "Stella Polaris", "Sandnaes" and U-boats from Skjomenfjord. Allocation of berths: "Stella Polaris" with "Sandnaes" stern berth at Fagernes, "Huascaran" stern berth north of oil-discharging pier.

F. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

"When it has been established that Skjomenfjord is also essentially more unfavorable with regard to air attacks than Narvik harbor, it is intended to leave the ships of the U-boat base there indefinitely, as control of the base is made considerably easier by the shorter routes and better inter-communication. Otherwise no comments."

(Signed) Suhren.

20 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - west coast of Spitsbergen - Reindeer Peninsula - Ice Fjord - Bellsund - Banak from 2052 to 1010, not exhaustive because of weather, nothing to report. West coast of Spitsbergen, including all fjords except Hornsund and Bellsund, exhaustively examined, no enemy ships intercepted.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0556 to 1346.

Thorshavn examined from a distance of 10 km.
Harbor unoccupied.

4 Ju 188 on reconnaissance from 2205 to 0222.
Of these, 2 Ju 188 made a reconnaissance of anchorages in Moray Firth and Peterhead - Fraserburgh, and 2 Ju 188 reconnoitered anchorages in Scapa Flow and Moray Firth. Moray Firth and Cromarty Firth investigated, no occupation observed. Peterhead harbor apparently occupied by 6 fishing vessels. Otherwise no occupation observed because of bad visibility. Fishing in progress between Banff and Fraserburgh in Moray Firth. A black buoy in AN 4417. One probable patrol vessel at anchor in AN 4445.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0245 to 0850. Jan Mayen area not examined, because of weather, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Scapa Flow: 1 aircraft carrier between Cava-Fara-Flotta. Deck not running the length of the ship, possibly "Ranger" or "Furious"; 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, one battleship, type not recognized, 3 large units (possibly 1 battleship and 2 heavy cruisers). Between Fara and Flotta 2 light cruisers, 4 harbor vessels. Between Cava and Rysa 1 destroyer. Ly Ness floating dock occupied. Between Fara-Flotta-South Walls, training ship "Iron Duke", 17 vessels, each about 1,000 G.R.T. Between Flotta and South Ronaldsay, 2 guardships at net barrage. East of Lowertown (South Ronaldsay) 1 transport, about 5,000 G.R.T. At Burray (Burray) 2 coastal vessels, each about 1,000 G.R.T. In AF 7799 1 merchant ship of about 1,000 G.R.T. In AN 1274 1 destroyer, further occupation not observed because of darkness. No landing craft of any type identified.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: brisk transmissions; among them during the evening and night of 20 June several radio messages and codewords of very high and first priority to all submarines in the operational area. "M 201" mentioned by name.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 112.

Britian: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Britain: very few Murmansk and no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828

U 997 AB 4892

U 313 AB 7314

U 711 AB 7354

U 307 AB 7397

U 315 AB 8441

U 344 AB 8476

U 363 AB 8729

U 987 AB 8793

U 394 AF 2213

In port:

U 956, 425, 737 Hammerfest,

U 957, Tromsø,

U 347, 362, 365, 387, 716, 742, 965 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995

Trondheim,

U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 992 proceeding from Narvik to AF 2216.

1000

U 997 on return passage from AB 4892 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

2020

Radio message 1904/776 sent:

"Group "Trutz":

1. U 716 (Dunkelberg) is putting to sea on the evening of 21 June from Andfjord for

CONFIDENTIAL

AF 2216, will join group "Trutz" as boat No. 10.

2. "Eickstedt" will commence return passage to Hammerfest via "SR 1" at 0200 on 23 June.

3. Simultaneously, boats "Schweiger" to "Falke" will move up one position to the northwest."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

21 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0400 to 0930, almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of the west coast of Fisher Peninsula from 0453 to 0630, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Faeroes area from 0220 to 1030.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0249 to 0939. Route and Jan Mayen only partly examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

19 merchant vessels, totaling about 80,000 G.R.T., and a large number of fishing vessels, twelve

CONFIDENTIAL

of which were merchant ships at anchor, totaling 48,500 G.R.T., remainder on westerly course in the inshore waters off the east coast of the Faeroes.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: brisk, partly very urgent transmissions and a few codewords sent to submarines in the operational area.

"M 201" mentioned by name.

Murmansk area: minesweepers Nos. 38, 39, 111, 112, 114, 117, 118.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweeper No. 59.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

At 2225 on 20 June Kirkenes obtained a bearing of 221.40 on a British unit.

Russian radio traffic: slight, partly very urgent, partly of first priority.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

Radio message of first priority from Murmansk during the evening to the above minesweepers (excluding minesweeper No 118).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828

U 313 AB 4892

U 711 AB 7314

U 307 AB 7354

U 315 AB 7397

U 344 AB 8441

U 363 AB 8476

U 987 AB 8729

U 394 AB 8793

U 992 AF 2216

In port:

U 956, 425, 737 Hammerfest,

U 957 Tromsø,

U 347, 362, 365, 387, 716, 742, 965 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995

Trondheim,

U 278, 354 Bergen.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0815 U 716 put out from Narvik for AF 2216.
U 987 proceeding from AB 4892 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

22 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 0403 to 0850. Broken off because of engine trouble, only flew from Banak - AB 8517 - Banak. Route exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance of anchorages at Thorshavn and Skallefjord. Route exhaustively examined as far as 6° W, the remainder and the Faeroes area not examined because of fog, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: carrier-borne aircraft, 1 destroyer.
(See IV (b)).

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of transmissions, among them several codewords partly of first priority to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "B", motor vessel "PS 48".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828

U 313 AB 4892

U 711 AB 7314

U 307 AB 7354

U 315 AB 7397

U 344 AB 8441

U 363 AB 8476

U 987 AB 8729

U 394 AB 8793

U 992 AF 2216

In port:

U 956, 425, 737 Hammerfest,

U 957 Tromsø,

U 347, 362, 365, 387, 742, 965 Narvik,

U 312, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,

U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1545

U 997 put in to Hammerfest from AB 4892.

U 716 proceeding to Narvik from AB 2216.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

1621 Short signal 1622/707 received from U 307
(Herrle):

"2 carrier-borne aircraft in AB 7354."

As it was uncertain whether these were the escort of a convoy and since yesterday's air reconnaissance had established an assembly of merchant ships near the Faeroes, Luftflotte 5 was at once requested to carry out reconnaissance ahead of our formation.

The readiness of the operational boats in Hammerfest, Narvik and Tromsø was increased.

1739 Short signal 1735/708 received from U 307
(Herrle):

"Carrier-borne aircraft in AB 7355. Possible that I have been noticed."

1816 Radio message 1742/710 sent:

"5 hours' readiness immediately for operational U-boats in Hammerfest, Tromsø and Narvik."

1755 Radio message 1530/709 received from U 668
(Eickstedt):

"From 1200 to 1330 2 "Fulmars" observed flying up and down in AB 4855. Wind north, force 3, sea 3, patches of fog, visibility 10 miles, atmospheric pressure 1,020 millibars, temperature + 1°, 55 cu.m. left."

1830 Short signal 1823/711 received from U 344
(Pietsch):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AB 8441."

1940 Short signal 1910/712 received from U 307
(Herrle):

"Carrier-borne aircraft. My position is AB 7358."

1940 Short signal 1924/713 received from U 315
(Zoller):

"Carrier-borne plane(s). My position is AB 7336."

Accordingly the carrier might be approximately in AB 75.

CONFIDENTIAL

2057 Short signal 2044/714 received from U 711
(Lange):

"Heavy air patrol."

(U 711: the third boat from the north).

2117 Radio message 2017/715 sent:

"Group "Trutz":

At 0800 on 23 June, be in attack areas, depth of sweep 25 miles, as follows: "Eickstedt" AB 6635, "Schweiger" AB 4473, "Lange" AB 4738, and, further, in patrol line from AB 7435 to AF 1329: "Herrle" to Dunkelberg". Proceed at once."

It could be assumed that the disposition of group "Trutz" was now known to the enemy. If a convoy came later, the 3 northerly boats were to prevent any deviation to the north, while the others were to intercept the convoy in a new formation on the known routes. This new formation had to remain unobserved to be effective.

2217 Radio message 2223/716:

"Group "Trutz":

1. Try to reach new formation unobserved. Radio silence even if carrier-borne aircraft are sighted, as long as there are no new discoveries about the carrier group or convoy. Attack reports excepted.
2. Expect our own daily meteorological flights, Trondheim - Jan Mayen."

2310 Short signal 2258/717 received from U 315
(Zoller):

"1 destroyer, heavy air patrol in AB 7626."

This may be the advance escort of the expected convoy, with the carrier to the north some distance away. The carrier-borne aircraft first reported in the north seemed to bear out this assumption.

2353 Radio message 2337/719 sent:

"Group "Trutz": operate at maximum speed on "Zoller"'s report of destroyers in AB 7626. Assume formation on northeasterly course."

Even if 1 destroyer is still a very uncertain clue for a convoy, we cannot afford to miss the PQ convoy. It is the main target and the slightest clue must be exploited as quickly as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

0034 Radio message 2343/720 sent:

"Proceed at high speed to AB 64 as quickly as possible."

1. From Hammerfest: "Mohs", "Brasack", "Bentzien", "Lehmann".
2. From Tromsø: "Schaar".
3. From Narvik: "de Buhr", "Wedemeyer", "Büchler", "Schwassmann", "Unverzagt" via Andfjord, from Lødingen to Harstad with pilots."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1250 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3177 A Ops. sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

" "Brasack": after delivering reserve torpedoes, proceed at once to Tromsø Naval Air Station to take on meteorological shore transmitter, leaving Tromsø on the evening of 26 June. Request escort for the transfer in Tromsø and report time of sailing in advance by teleprinter message, for information Admiral Polar Coast, Naval Harbor Master Tromsø and Naval Air Station, Tromsø. Inspector Reichelt will bring the operational order to Tromsø. He and a war correspondent will make the voyage."

2115 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3194 A Ops. 1 was sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla, for information Admiral Polar Coast, Naval Chief Command, Norway, Ops. Staff and Flieger Fuehrer 5.

"Sailing order for "Seidel", "Werney", "Schendel":

1. Put to sea as soon as possible.
2. Proceed via Frohavet to AF 29, increased speed.
3. U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

2055 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3193 A Ops. was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., for information Naval Chief Command, Norway, for information Luftflotte 5:

CONFIDENTIAL

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2000 on 22 June:

Yesterday's air report of merchant vessels off the Faeroes and the appearance of carrier-borne aircraft in formation indicate a PQ convoy. When the disposition of group "Trutz" had probably been recognized, 3 boats were disposed to the north in order to anticipate a diversionary movement while 8 boats were ordered into patrol line from AB 7435 to AF 1329 to intercept the convoy from this new formation, should the convoy steer a more southerly course. 9 boats in Narvik, Tromsø and Hammerfest at 5 hours' readiness. 3 boats putting out from Trondheim."

0205

Teleprinter message Most Secret 3199 A Ops was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., for information Naval Chief Command, Norway, for information Luftflotte 5, for information Flieger Fuehrer 5:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 0200 on 23 June:

At 2258 U 315 reported a destroyer in AB 7626, heavy air patrol. Assume this to be advance escort of convoy. Carrier more than 100 miles away to the north. 11 boats of group "Trutz" set on it at maximum speed. Expected course of convoy northeast, speed 10 knots. 10 boats are putting out from Narvik, Tromsø and Hammerfest for AB 64, 3 boats from Trondheim. Luftflotte 5 has promised immediate reconnaissance."

(Signed) Suhren.

23 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 30° E - Banak from 0404 to 0815, almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0151 to 0955. Djuppenfjord and northern fjords examined; enemy not sighted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

3 BV 138 on radar reconnaissance in the sea area AB 8581, AB 8782, AB 4956, and AB 7513 from 0200 to 1123. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined by radar and visual reconnaissance, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0300 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5298/44 received from Luftflotte 5:

"Conclude there is a PQ convoy or escort for carrier group from the presence of the enemy destroyer in O7 East 014 and carrier-borne aircraft to the east. Flieger Fuehrer 5 will reconnoiter the area in question with a minimum number of aircraft in direct agreement with Captain U-boats, Norway. Minimum weather conditions (not under 7/10 cloud, sufficient thickness) must be observed to exclude losses. Aircraft are to be informed of the presence of a carrier."

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku".
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.
Russian radio traffic: slight.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Naval War Staff, First Division 1 North wired:

"Subject: Operations in Northern Europe.
In reply to the query about a possible large-scale landing in North Jutland or South Norway which is currently rumored in Stockholm, an extremely reliable agent is of the opinion that, on the basis of available information, such an action is considered by official Swedish political and military authorities to be out of the question both at present and in the immediate future. It could only be a small diversionary operation, as we have frequently stressed here of late. The agent believes, however, that the British and Americans have also lost their enthusiasm to a great extent, as claims on Allied shipping space by operations in Normandy are proving to be far above what was expected. No troops are being brought to Northern England/Scotland;

on the contrary preparations are being made to withdraw them. No large concentrations of shipping in Northern England/Scotland, especially not in the northwest coast harbors from which any large-scale operations would start. Present state of alarm is connected exclusively with threatening developments in Finland."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 4828)
U 313 AB 4892)
U 711 AB 7314)
U 307 AB 7354)
U 315 AB 7397)operating from patrol line
U 344 AB 8441)on PQ convoy believed to be
U 363 AB 8476)in AB 76.
U 987 AB 8729)
U 394 AB 8793)
U 992 AF 2216)
U 716)

In port:

U 362 Narvik,
U 321, 361, 636, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995
Trondheim,
U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

The following boats put out for AB 64 and after recall put in again:

Narvik:

U 742 put out at 0200, at 2330 put in to Narvik.
U 365 put out at 0230, at 1750 put in to Harstad.
U 387 put out at 0345, on 24 June put in to Narvik.
U 965 put out at 0400, at 1600 put in to Harstad.
U 347 put out at 0415, at 2045 put in to Narvik.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tromsø:

U 957 put out at 0430, at 2200 put in to Tromsø.

Trondheim:

U 361 and U 636 put out at 1100 for Narvik.

Hammerfest:

U 425

U 737

U 956.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats operating on destroyer report in AB 7626, where PQ convoy is assumed to be. 9 boats approaching.

0044 Radio message 0009/721 sent:

"Until more detailed reports are received, destroyer in AB 7626 is regarded as advance escort of eastbound convoy or carrier group. Expect to encounter our own air reconnaissance."

0230 Radio message 2300/726 received from U 315 (Zoller):

"Destroyer made off to the southwest."

This still did not preclude the presence of a convoy, but might indicate the escort of the carrier formation, which has steered a southerly course.

0117 Radio message 0051/723 sent:

"Captain U-boats suspects, according to reports to date from U-boats, that "Zoller"'s destroyer is the escort for a PQ convoy in AB 76 and that the carrier is 100 - 150 miles further north. According to previous experience, speed of convoy is 10 knots. Northern Waters Order No. 8. Report any clue at once. D/F wave "Dora" in use."

0154 Radio message 0128/725 sent:

"Group "Trutz":

Strive hard to reach the suspected convoy area by 1000. If there are no clues by then, the boats must be in patrol line from AB 5299 to 6772 by 1900. On no account lag behind."

The patrol line should thus be 10 miles ahead of the convoy, calculating its position by dead reckoning from the position of the reported destroyer and assuming a speed of 10 knots. ~~It is probable that~~ the searching boats and aircraft will furnish further clues, if there really is a convoy.

0718 Short signal 0718/729 received from U 992 (Falke):

"Am being attacked by aircraft in AB 8727."

"Falke" is the second most southerly boat. This report also indicates that the enemy has moved southward.

0956 Radio message 0938/731 sent:

"Group "Trutz": report position at once by short signal."

The following reported:

U 394 (Borger) at 1031 in AB 8277
U 711 (Lange) at 1052 in AB 5848
U 344 (Pietsch) at 1058 in AB 8156
U 716 (Dunkelberg) at 1025 in AB 8561
U 307 (Herrle) at 1057 in AB 8223
U 992 (Falke) at 1152 in AB 8423
U 668 (Eickstedt) at 1307 in AB 5544
U 315 (Zoller) at 1309 in AB 8211
U 363 (Nees) at 1314 in AB 8188
U 313 (Schweiger) at 1330 in AB 5410

"Falke" and "Nees" are especially far astern. It seems as if they had operated on the destroyer making off to the southwest instead of on the northeasterly course of the presumed convoy as ordered.

As there were no clues for a convoy reported either by the U-boats or by the aircraft on exhaustive reconnaissance, the operation was then broken off.

1214 Radio message 1143/741 sent:

"Boats putting to sea from Hammerfest, Tromsø and Narvik: turn about and put in to port again."

1232 Radio message 1146/742 sent:

"Group "Trutz":
Exhaustive air reconnaissance with no results. Presume there is a carrier group but no convoy. Occupy new patrol line from AB 5471 to 8694."

The boats were again to form a patrol line to

CONFIDENTIAL

the southwest and if possible to extend it to the ice limit.

1334 Short signal 1247/744 received from U 992 (Falke):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AB 8198."

1418 Radio message 1346/749 was then sent:

- "1. "Falke": report type of aircraft at once.
2. "Eickstedt": return to Hammerfest at cruising speed.
3. Group "Trutz" in former order, "Schweiger" to "Dunkelberg".
4. "Brasack": special assignment as ordered. Other boats at 12 hours' readiness."

"Falke" reported in radio message 1624:

- "1. Multiple "Naxos" and "Wanze" location; aircraft ran in from a range of 15,000 meters, disappeared into clouds, then turned off, type could not be made out.
2. The arrangement whereby a man kept watch on "Fliege" on the bridge with earphones proved valuable."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0037 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3198 A Ops. 1 sent:

"Sailing order for U 354 (Sthamer):

1. Put out from Bergen on the morning of 24 June for Narvik - Ramsund.
2. Inner leads as far as Frohavet, then make for Westfjord keeping 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 13.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at approach point and also passing "V 1" by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency "Anton".
After making fast at Ramsund, switch on to base wave "MC" 479 kc/s and report.
5. Expect to encounter enemy submarines off Westfjord.
6. Observe Section 153 of Recognition Signal

-CONFIDENTIAL-

Regulations for exchange of recognition signals with the shore."

1237 Radio message 1207/743 sent:

" "Unverzagt", "Wodemeyer" remain in Harstad at 12-hours' readiness."

1521 Radio message 1448/752 sent:

"1. "Seidel", "Schondel": put in to Westfjord - Narvik. Cruising speed. Radio frequency "Anton". Report 24 hours before reaching "V 1".

2. "Werner": remain in Trondheim."

U 987 (Schreyer) has not yet reported in answer to radio message 0938/731. He was again requested to do so in radio message 2303/758.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

0107 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5275/44 received from Luftflotte 5:

"1. Merchant shipping in the Faeroes area consists mostly of small ships, which would not be used for Russian convoys. Only 4 ships of 4 - 5,000 tons and one of 10,000 tons were sighted.

2. There are no indications of an approaching PQ convoy.

3. If the aircraft sighted by "Herrle" was carrier-borne, exercises may be in progress in the Northern Waters area.

4. The extremely tight fuel situation prevents our flying the day's run reconnaissance you requested."

1415 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3216 A Ops sent:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 1400 on 23 June:

Exhaustive reconnaissance in the area AB 8785 - 7278 - 4956 - 8584, without result. In AB 7626 the reported destroyer made off to the southwest about 2200. No further clue apart from the air attack on U 992 at 1247 in AB 8198. Assume

carrier group without convoy, perhaps for anti-submarine operations in approximately AB 78. Group "Trutz" proceeding with 10 boats to extended patrol line AB 5471 to 8694. Boats at readiness are on return passage."

(Signed) Suhren.

24 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 30° E - Banak from 0355 to 0757, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0223 to 1024. North Faeroes and Thorshavn examined.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0246 to 0947. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of fog, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Thorshavn harbor unoccupied. 4 merchant vessels, each 3,000 G.R.T., and 1 merchant vessel of 8 - 10,000 G.R.T. at anchor in Skallefjord.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of transmissions, among them very high priority codewords to all submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "Gremyashchi".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Bearings from Svanvik on 23 June: at 1533 in 253° a British unit, at 2155 in 265° a British unit.

Bearing of 269° obtained from Kirkenes on a British unit at 2155.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: very few Murmansk, no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 313 AB 5471

U 711 AB 5721

U 307 AB 5753

U 315 AB 5793

U 344 AB 8213

U 363 AB 8252

U 987 AB 8292

U 394 AB 8612

U 992 AB 8654

U 716 AB 8694

In port:

U 956, 425, 737 Hammerfest,

U 957 Tromsø,

U 365, 965 Harstad,

U 347, 362, 387, 742 Narvik,

U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,

U 278, 354 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0050 U 387 put in to Narvik.

1800 U 965 put out from Harstad for AB 8694.

1800 U 737 put out from Hammerfest for Tromsø.

1105 U 987 on return passage from AB 8292 to Andfjord - Narvik.

2000 U 354 put out from Bergen for Narvik.

U 361 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

2300 U 636 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.

U 668 proceeding from AB 4828 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since U 987 (Schreyer) had not reported in answer to repeated requests, he received orders to put in to Narvik on the assumption that his transmitter was out of order.

1141

Radio message 1015/769 sent:

- "1. "Schreyer": put in to Andfjord - Narvik, be at point "Schwarz 25" at 1200 on 25 June.
2. "Borger", "Falke", "Dunkelberg": move up one position to the northwest in the patrol line.
3. U 965 (Unverzagt): put out at 1800 on 24 June from Harstad via Andfjord for AB 8694 in patrol line, joining group "Trutz" as boat No. 10.
4. Procedure in patrol line according to Order No. 8 and Commanders' Manual para. 370 onwards. Irregular courses. Always expect to encounter enemy submarines."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0215 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats
Most Secret 4862 U 1 received:

"With immediate effect U 673 (Sauer) is transferred from 6th U-boat Flotilla to 13th U-boat Flotilla for administrative purposes."

E. Survey of the situation:

1727 Teleprinter message Most Secret 02424 A 2 received
from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C
U-boats Ops.:

"1. Investigations are to be carried out and a report made on the following questions:

- (a) Whether the air reconnaissance of Russian harbors is so exhaustive that conclusions can definitely be drawn as to the running or non-running of convoys.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Whether, in view of the very northerly ice limit and the lack of any air reconnaissance, the formation of group "Trutz" south and north of Bear Island offers more chance of intercepting and attacking convoys for a short time.

2. The exhaustive reconnaissance reported on 23 June embraces only a small area. In our opinion, it would be quite easy for a convoy to deviate to the north without being intercepted."

2110 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3248 A Ops. sent:

"Reference your teleprinter message 02424 A 2 of 24 June:

Re 1 (a). Air reconnaissance of Russian harbors has almost always produced sufficient particulars about the composition or arrival of convoys. During the past two months there have been no indications at all that convoys are running.

Re 1 (b). According to our experience, only a simultaneous attack by several boats from a close formation promises success. If there is no air reconnaissance, then the convoy must be intercepted by U-boats as early as possible, so that the operational boats in the northern ports can be suitably disposed. In order to have these boats always ready for an attack, only 10 boats can be kept constantly at sea for reconnaissance. The formation in Bear Island passage has therefore to be loose and thus offers only slight prospects of success; also, with such late interception no further boats could be brought up from the ports. With 20 boats, the distance between each boat would still be 15 miles, not offering much prospect of success, and, furthermore, so many boats could only be kept at sea for limited periods.

Plan: To move group "Trutz" southwest again, the formation stretching as far as the ice limit as in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3193 A Ops. of 22 June."

(Signed) Suhron.

25 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Jan Mayen - Banak from 0404 to 1023.

Assignment broken off at 72° N, 3° W because of loss of fuel. Exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 30° E from 0415 to 0827, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area around the Faeroes. Route 80%, southern part of the Faeroes 40% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Iskanka area: destroyer "Gremyashchi".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Northern Waters boats:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

CONFIDENTIAL

Group "Trutz":

U 313 AB 5471
U 711 AB 5721
U 307 AB 5753
U 315 AB 5793
U 344 AB 8213
U 363 AB 8252
U 394 AB 8292
U 992 AB 8612
U 716 AB 8654
U 965 AB 8694
U 673 Atlantic.

In port:

U 425, 956, 997 Hammerfest,
U 737, 957 Tromsø,
U 365 Harstad,
U 347, 362, 387, 636, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1101 U 668 put in to Hammerfest from AB 4828.
U 737 put in to Tromsø in the afternoon
from Hammerfest.
1245 U 361 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
U 987 proceeding from AB 8292 to Andfjord -
Narvik.
U 354 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation east of Jan Mayen.

0617 Short signal 0617/787 received from U 394
(Borger):

"Carrier-borne plane(s). My position is AB
8292."

"Borger" reported, however, in radio message
0617/68:

"1.

2. Aircraft report: possibly Ju 88, course
west, probably unobserved."

2345 Radio message 2153/702 sent:

"1. Group "Trutz": at 0000 on 26 June proceed

CONFIDENTIAL

at 7 knots to attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles: "Schweiger" AA 6942, "Lange" AA 6994, "Herrle" AA 9662, "Zoller" AB 7711, "Pietsch" AB 7497, "Nees" AB 7768, "Borger" AB 7855, "Falke" AF 1138, "Dunkelberg" AF 1226, "Unverzagt" AF 1296.

2. New formation must remain unobserved. Radio silence except for reports or clues concerning convoys, heavy naval forces, attacks and if observed. Irregular courses. Submerge according to conditions of visibility.

3. Transmit any reports before proceeding."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1653 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3260 A Ops.
sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs):

1. Put out for AB 86 at cruising speed early on 26 June.

2. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

1725 Radio message 1700/799 sent:

"U 365 (Wedemeyer): put out from Harstad via Andfjord for AB 89, cruising speed, at 0800 on 26 June."

Operational Order for U 737 (Brasack), see Appendix III.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 668 (v. Eickstedt), first operation, see Appendix II.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b) and (d):

"The 2 new boats putting to sea will increase group "Trutz" to 12 boats, so that interception of the convoy by the new formation seems assured. 8 to 10 boats remain in readiness in the northern ports; after group "Trutz" has intercepted the convoy, these can be assembled in a narrow attacking formation."

(Signed) Suhren.

26 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 30° E - Banak from 0724 to 1150. Assignment carried out on prescribed route. Exhaustively examined apart from Bear Island and turning point (because of measurements).

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0120 to 0926. Sandby flown over, no shipping observed. North Faeroes examined in passing, no shipping observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0249 to 0951. Route 70%, Jan Mayen area 30% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 2040 on 26 June survey ship "MGLA" anchored off Bugrino (Island of Kolguev AW 3337).

According to a Russian radio message of 26 June, a motor minesweeper group is stationed at Cape Greben (Yugorski Strait AT 8819). Group carries acoustic minesweeping gear. Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 39.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 32.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings from Svanvik: 280° on British unit at 2333 on 25 June. 250° on British unit at 0155 on 26 June.

Bearings from Kirkenes: 252° on British unit at 0156 on 26 June.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 313 AB 4677)
U 711 AB 4927)
U 307 AB 8115)
U 344 AB 8154)
U 363 AB 8197) on passage.
U 394 AB 8436)
U 992 AB 8549)
U 716 AB 8589)
U 965 AB 8835)

U 737 AC 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 957 Hammerfest,
U 737, 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 361, 362, 387, 636, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 365 put out from Harstad for AF 1391.
0900 U 956 put out from Hammerfest for AF 1663.
0100 U 354 put in to Alesund from Bergen,
0800 put out from Narvik.
0000 Group "Trutz" proceeding to new attack areas:

U 313 AA 6942, U 711 AA 6994, U 307 AA 9962,
U 315 AB 7711, U 344 AB 7497, U 363 AB 7768,
U 394 AB 7855, U 992 AF 1138, U 716 AF 1226,
U 965 AF 1296.

1700 U 957 put out from Tromsø for Skjerpby.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

10 boats in formation southeast and northwest
of Jan Mayen. 2 boats approaching.

1246 Radio message 1207/706 sent:

"1. U 956 (Mohs) is putting out from Hammerfest
on 26 June for attack area AF 1663, depth

CONFIDENTIAL

of sweep 30 miles, joining group "Trutz" as boat No. 12.

2. "Wedemeyer" is occupying attack area AF 1391 as boat No. 11."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0115

Radio message 2338/716 sent:

"U 737 (Brasack) is putting out from Tromsø on 27 June via AB 23 northwards for special assignment "Edwin"."

(d) Miscellaneous:

2110

Radio message 2018/721 sent:

"Sailing order for U 361 and U 636:

1. "Schendel": put out from Narvik at 0800 on 27 June for Bogen and proceed through Andfjord with "Seidel" to AF 21. Report sailing from Bogen in advance. Compulsory pilotage from Lødingen to Harstad. Danger of submarines off Andfjord.
2. Approach the operational area unobserved at cruising speed.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

1455

Teleprinter message Most Secret 7978 A 1 received from Naval Chief Command Norway:

"Carrier-borne aircraft repeatedly reported by U-boats on 22 and 23 June lead us to conclude that there is a carrier in the Jan Mayen area. Take-off from Jan Mayen is not impossible but seems improbable as the last aerial photographic reconnaissance on 1 June showed no occupation. A connection may be assumed between the destroyer sighted and the carrier group. We suspect that the enemy is at present patrolling the U-boat patrol line area with a carrier group, but this seems improbable, as other aircraft could be used for this purpose. Appearance of carrier group may also indicate a non-intercepted PQ convoy. The carrier may possibly have been intended to create confusion as on 3 April. With regard to the agent's radio logs captured on 6 June, plans to attack the "Tirpitz" seem most probable; it

CONFIDENTIAL

also appears that operations have repeatedly been broken off because of unfavorable weather, but also that it is intended to put the "Tirpitz" out of action by renewed air attacks. The reason for no attack to date might be the insufficient height of cloud in the Alta area. Sudden attacks against the coast with attacks on convoy traffic were to be subsidiary to the main attack on the "Tirpitz". Presume that the carrier group has now put in to port."

(Signed) Suhren,

27 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0355 to 0902. Greater part of route exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0229 to 1012. Faeroes not examined because of mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0256 to 1009. Route 60%, southern part of Jan Mayen 90%, northern part 50% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 93.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

CONFIDENTIAL

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz" in attack areas:

U 313 AA 6942)
U 711 AA 6994)
U 307 AA 9662)
U 315 AB 7711)
U 344 AB 7497)
U 363 AB 7768) depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 394 AB 7855)
U 992 AF 1138)
U 716 AF 1226)
U 965 AF 1296)
U 365 AF 1391)

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 737 Tromsø,
U 347, 361, 362, 387, 636, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1130 U 361, 636 put out from Narvik for AF 21.
1500 U 737 put out from Tromsø for special
operation "Edwin".
U 956 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 1663
U 354 proceeding from Aalesund to Narvik.
1500 U 957 put in to Skjerpø from Tromsø.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats in formation southeast and northwest of Jan Mayen. 3 boats approaching.

0809 Short signal 0808/719 received from U 965 (Unverzagt):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AF 1374."

1051 Radio message 1016/721 was then sent:

"1. Aircraft reported by "Unverzagt" at 0808 in AF 1374 is probably one of our own

CONFIDENTIAL

meteorological planes. If not, report type.

2. Group "Trutz": expect daily meteorological flights from Trondheim to Jan Mayen. Avoid mistaken reports if possible because of the danger of having bearings taken."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) proceeding to North Spitsbergen to set up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" and evacuate meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

2 war distress reports were received on Northern Waters frequency:

0933

"LLL = aircraft is attacking with torpedo, signature."

1017

"TTT = Torpedo hit.
XXX = Boat badly damaged, sinking."

As the reports were clearly received by Hammerfest, the messages were first thought to come from a boat off the polar coast, possibly from U 957 (Schaar) which might have been attacked with torpedoes by a Russian aircraft.

1140

Radio message 1039/722 sent:

- "1. At 0940 an apparent war distress report "LLL" was received, signature not clear. Boats to report at once if further clues.

2. "Schaar": report position."

Meanwhile the first signature was doubtfully deciphered as U-307 (Herrle). The 2 boats on either side were put on the trail.

1205

Radio message 1146/723 sent:

- "1. War distress report about torpedo hit possibly from "Herrle". If not, "Herrle" should report "No" by short signal.
2. "Zoller": proceed to look for "Herrle" in western part of attack area; "Pietsch": search in the eastern part, high speed."

The decoding was very uncertain. Therefore, as well as "Herrle", the boat which reported an air attack (by our own meteorological plane?) early today was requested to report. In order to preserve secrecy regarding the new formation, the other boats were told not to report at present.

CONFIDENTIAL

1312 Radio message 1304/725 sent:
" "Herrle", "Unverzagt": report position."

In order to cover any other possibilities at the same time, 2 boats were ordered to search in their attack areas and air reconnaissance was requested in the operational area of Group "Trutz".

1442 Radio message 1413/726 sent:
"Group "Trutz":

The following will exchange attack areas: "Schweiger" and "Lange", "Nees" and "Borger", "Falke" and "Dunkelberg", "Unverzagt" and "Wedemeyer". Then search for rubber dinghies in new attack area."

1443 Radio message 1405/104 sent on Command Waves
(German Air Force - Navy) 1 and 2:
Luftflotte 5, Flieger Fuehrer 5 from Captain U-boats:

"1. About 1000 a war distress report was received from a U-boat about a hit from an aerial torpedo. Name of boat and position unknown. Search for rubber dinghies requested in lines from AA 9630 to AF 1220 and AA 9690 to AF 1370.

2. Until 1600 on 27 June, radio communication only with Captain U-boats."

(Parent ship "Grille" at sea from 0800 to 1600 on trials.)

1752 Short signal 1752/728 received from U 965
(Unverzagt):
"My position is AF 1268."

1800 Short signal 1757/729 received from U 307
(Herrle):
"AA 9665."

It could not, therefore have been one of these two.

1913 Radio message 1839/730 sent:
" "Zoller" and "Pietsch": do not operate on "Herrle", but exchange attack areas and look for rubber dinghies."

After further attempts at deciphering, U 956 (Mohs) also seems a possibility; this boat put out from Hammerfest yesterday at 0900 and

CONFIDENTIAL

ought now to be off the polar coast level with Tromsø. The 2 boats just putting to sea from Andfjord were at once directed to that area and air help was requested from Sea Rescue Regional Command 9, Tromsø.

1928

Radio message 1907/731 sent:

" "Seidel", "Schendel": make for AB 9530 at high cruising speed. Caution, danger of submarines. Expect our own Sea Rescue planes."

1942

Radio message 1925/732 sent:

" "Mohs": report position at once."

2025

Short signal 2025/733 was received from U 956 (Mohs):

"My position is AB 8981."

This possibility was thus also excluded. As it was now urgent, it was necessary to have the other boats report if help was still to be brought in time.

2058

Radio message 2035/734 sent:

"All boats which have not yet reported today, make short signal "Yes" at once."

2137

Radio message 2115/735 sent:

1. Casualty at sea still unexplained. Not off polar coast.
2. "Seidel", "Schendel": proceed further to AF 21 at cruising speed.
3. Meteorological aircraft will look for rubber dinghies in group "Trutz"'s area on 28 June, take-off from Trondheim about 0300."

The following of the 9 boats which were not in contact reported:

2124 U 344 (Pietsch).

2128 U 394 (Borger).

2139 U 363 (Ncos).

2152 U 315 (Zoller).

2258 U 313 (Schweiger).

Flioger Fuchrer 5, whose meteorological aircraft was to look for rubber dinghies early on the following day, was informed of the 4 attack areas concerned.

CONFIDENTIAL

2006 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3291 A Ops 1 sent:

"U 987 (Schreyer) is missing. Put out from Bergen at 1530 on 29 May. Disposed in patrol line, group "Trutz". Last reported on 31 May with radio message 2337/685 off Westfjord. No further clue. Loss by submarine or aircraft attack presumed. The boat did not report on 23 June when requested and so far has not obeyed the order of 25 June to put in to Andfjord."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1915 Teleprinter message Most Secret 7310 was received from Naval Chief Command, Norway to Naval War Staff, Second Division.

"Subject: Evacuation of the German Air Force Meteorological unit on Hope Island. According to information from Luftflotte 5 there is still drift ice off Hope Island, which would impede a U-boat; it is necessary to postpone the evacuation by about 10 days. Propose that U 354 puts to sea about 10 July. Request agreement."

E. Survey of the situation:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 4640 received from Admiral polar coast to Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"Assumption of the presence of a carrier about 150 miles east of Jan Mayen proved by bearings and actual sightings. Possible purpose: air patrol against our U-boat activity and sudden attacks on the coast. Large formations of carrier-borne aircraft approached fleet anchorages. Execution of attack failed because of weather."

In teleprinter message Most Secret 3293 A Ops., U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 0100 on 28 June was sent:

"At 0933 on 27 June, war distress report on Northern Waters frequency about aerial torpedo attack. Unclear signature interpreted as "Herrle". Second distress report at 1017: boat was sinking after torpedo hit. 2 boats set on "Herrle", every two attack areas exchanged in group "Trutz" for a search on both sides. To avoid revealing the new disposition, only "Herrle" and "Unverzagt" were requested to report. The latter had

CONFIDENTIAL

reported an air attack earlier on. Both reported about 1800. Further decoding of signature and same signal strength at Hammerfest and Narvik indicate "Mohs". After "Mohs" report, aircraft and U-boat operations were broken off. All other boats were then requested to report. To date, 3 boats have not reported. Meteorological aircraft will take off about 0300 to look for rubber dinghies in group "Trutz"'s area."

(Signed) Suhren.

28 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N; 30° E - Banak from 0355 to 0814, nothing to report, not exhaustive because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0307 to 1144. Bays between Sandby and Syderø as well as northern part of the Faeroes examined, no occupation observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0251 to 1111. Route 90%, Jan Mayen 40% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Gremyashchi", destroyer "B".
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Russian radio traffic: slight.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.
Radio traffic between destroyer "Gromyashchi"
and Archangel at 0202.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6942)
U 313 AA 6994)
U 307 AA 9662)
U 344 AB 7711)
U 315 AB 7497)
U 394 AB 7768)
U 363 AB 7855) in attack areas.
U 716 AF 1138)
U 992 AF 1226)
U 365 AF 1296)
U 965 AF 1391)
U 956 AF 1663)

U 737 AC 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 347, 362, 387, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1200 Group "Trutz" proceeding to a patrol line
from AB 4411 to AB 8821.
U 361, 636 proceeding from Narvik to AF 21.
U 313 on return passage from AA 6994 to Bergen.
U 363 on return passage from AB 7855 to
Andfjord - Narvik.
0800 U 957 put out from Skjerpby, put in to Tromsø
at 1700.
1300 U 354 put in to Narvik from Aalesund.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic:

12 boats in formation southeast and
northwest of Jan Mayen. 2 boats
approaching.

CONFIDENTIAL

After the formation of group "Trutz" was revealed by yesterday's reports from all the boats in connection with the questionable casualty at sea, it was moved some distance.

1131

Radio message 1116/760 sent:

"Group "Trutz": proceed at once at 7 knots on course 035°."

1220

Radio message 1159/761 sent:

- "1. From 1200 on 29 June new patrol line from AB 4411 to 8821, order: "Lange", "Herrle", "Pietzsch", "Zoller", "Borger", "Dunkelberg", "Falke", "Wedemeyer", "Unverzagt", "Mohs", "Schendel", "Seidel". Form group "Trutz". Radio silence except to report main target, attacks or if observed. Remain unobserved if possible.
2. "Schweiger": return to Bergen, from 66° N in accordance with Order No. 14, from Trondheim via inner leads.
3. "Nees": return to Andfjord - Narvik."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) proceeding to North Spitsbergen to set up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" and evacuate Meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

The approaching "Wedemeyer" has not yet reported.

0142

Radio message 0104/745 sent:

"Mohs", "Schendel", "Seidel": proceed via AF 2220 on "Wedemeyer"'s probable course, "Schendel" to the north, "Seidel" to the south. Look out for rubber dinghies. Keep watch on 500 kc/s."

0109

Short signal 0109/44 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Yes".

Suspicion was now confined to the 3 boats, U 365 (Wedemeyer), U 716 (Dunkelberg) and U 992 (Falke).

0151

Radio message 0134/747 sent:

"Wedemeyer", "Falke", "Dunkelberg": report at once by short signal "Yes".

CONFIDENTIAL

0225

Radio message 0149/748 sent:

"Group "Trutz" and approaching boats from Captain U-boats, Norway:

Meteorological He 111 is taking off from Trondheim shortly before 0300 for a simultaneous search for rubber dinghies between 68° 30' N and 69° N and 7° E to 3° W."

0257

Short signal 0257/750 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Repeat radio messages Nos. 733 and 736 if they concern me."

The boats which had not contacted Captain U-boats seemed to have had difficulties with reception. Fortunately they also reported later.

0346

Short signal 0346/751 received from U 992 (Falke):

"Yes."

Only U 716 (Dunkelberg) had now not reported.

0414

Short signal 0411/752 received from U 716 (Dunkelberg):

"Yes."

Call to Flieger Fuehrer 5 was canceled. Of the Northern Waters boats only the missing U 987 (Schroyer) might still be involved. The possibility was investigated.

0419

Short signal 0416/753 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Yes."

Obviously the war distress report could not have been from one of our boats; it must either be accepted as a negligent transmission or an enemy decoy attempt.

V.

Reports of successes: None.

C.

Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D.

Plans:

2212

Teleprinter message Most Secret 4637 A 2 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Reference Naval Chief Command, Norway Most

CONFIDENTIAL

Secret 7310 of 27 June:
Agree to sailing of U 354 on 10 July."

E. Survey of the situation:

1031 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3299 A Ops sent:

"All Northern Waters boats have reported again after yesterday's war distress report. Investigations about misuse of radio are in progress. Otherwise we assume an enemy ruse to cause our boats to transmit and then to take bearings on them. Better interception of the sender by keying the radio name at the beginning and the end of war distress reports is proposed."

(Signed) Suhren.

29 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0335 to 0915, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes. Faeroes not examined because of low clouds, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0246 to 1053. Route 90% examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of low-lying cloud, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

A 10 Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Murmansk area: minesweeper No. 117.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer
"Gremyashchi", minesweepers Nos. 61, 118.
Radio traffic between Russian destroyer
"Gremyashchi" and Archangel at 0009 on 29 June.
Belushya area: minesweepers Nos. 63, 110, 112,
114, 116, 120, minelayer No. 93.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/
Archangel area.
Russian radio traffic: slight.
Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6662)
U 307 AB 4487)
U 344 AB 4737)
U 315 AB 4848)
U 394 AB 4888)
U 716 AB 7263) on passage.
U 992 AB 7381)
U 365 AB 7631)
U 965 AB 8445)
U 956 AB 8485)

U 737 AC 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 354, 362, 387, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 739, 921, 968, 995 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 361 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8493.
U 636 proceeding from Narvik to AB 8821.
U 313 proceeding from AA 6994 to Bergen.
U 363 proceeding from AB 7855 to Andfjord -
Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic:

10 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.
2 boats approaching.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) proceeding to North Spitsbergen to set up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" and evacuate meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

1015

Teleprinter message Most Secret 3352 A Ops. 1 sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla, for information Naval Chief Command, Norway.

"Transfer order for U 739 (Mangold), U 921 (Werner), U 955 (Kbhntopp):

1. Put out from Trondheim for Narvik on the morning of 30 June.
2. Proceed via Frohavet, then keeping 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 14, approach via Westfjord.
3. Report estimated time of arrival at approach point and also passing of "V 1" by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave.
5. Observe Section 153 of Recognition Signal Regulations for exchange of recognition signals with the shore."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

4th Destroyer Flotilla is putting to sea via "SR 1" for exercises in the area AB 9315 - 9358 - AC 4858 - 4815. Returning on 1 July via LoppHAVet.

D. Plans:

1840 Teleprinter message Most Secret 138/44 received from G.I.S. sub-station, Tromsø:

"The G.I.S. station, Norway is planning a scouting operation against Spitsbergen, to be carried out by 8 to 10 men. For this purpose it is necessary to arrange for a U-boat to transport the scouting unit there and to take them back after about 8 days. G.I.S. sub-station requests a decision on whether a boat can be allocated for this purpose, and if so, when. C-in-C U-boats has given his approval. Time planned is middle of July."

Teleprinter message Most Secret 3356 A Ops was then sent to G.I.S. sub-station, Tromsø:

"Reference your 137/44 Most Secret of 29 June: U-boat can be made available in middle of July."

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Belushya base seems to be in full working order again since the ice has melted."

Re D:

"After his return from North Spitsbergen, "Brasack" may again be considered for the Ice Fjord operation."

(Signed) Suhren.

30 June, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 30° E - Banak from 0332 to 0748, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

4 BF 109, in 2 operations, on aerial photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay from Vaenga to south of Murmansk from 0532 to 0755. Only patches of Kola Bay examined because of heavy mist. 4 merchant ships, each some 4,000 G.R.T., at anchor at Vaenga. Apparently 2 floating docks at Murmansk.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0211 to 1012. Djupene - Kalsoe - Kanne and Fugleffjord examined in visibility of 100 km., no shipping movements observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0245 to 0959. Route 75%, Jan Mayen 50% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few transmissions to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku".
Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 118.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 102, 103, 114, 115.
Belushya area: minesweepers Nos. 63, 120, minelayer No. 93.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.
Bearings from Svanvik: at 0223 on 30 June
British unit in 269°; at 0050 on 30 June
British unit in 255°.
From Kirkenes: bearing of 253° on a British unit at 0050 on 30 June.
Russian radio traffic: slight.
Britain: few Murmansk, no Archangel broadcasts.

(c) By G.I.S. stations:

0142

Teleprinter message Secret 1280/44 received from G.I.S. officer of Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"Command reporting area Norway: Between 2000 and 2300 on 28 June, fleet units were sighted in the following areas between 15 and 30 miles from the coast:

(a) Molde - Andalsnes - Kristiansund.

(b) Bergen area.

(c) Egersund - Flokkefjord area.

Re (a): Strength: 6 M.T.B.s, 4 submarines, 4 minesweepers or fast motor minesweepers.

Re (b): Strength: one aircraft carrier with destroyer escort, 2 fast motor minesweepers, 2 or 4 lighter units consisting of M.T.B.s and motor gunboats.

Re (c): Strength: 1 cruiser (about 8,000 tons, "Kenya" class), escort boats, destroyers, 2 fast motor minesweepers (Sperrbrocher type), 2 ships like tankers.

Footnote: Air reconnaissance requested.
Source: a hitherto reliable agent."

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AB 4411
U 307 AB 4452
U 344 AB 4495
U 315 AB 4813
U 394 AB 4856
U 716 AP 4974
U 992 AB 7324
U 365 AB 7365
U 965 AB 8178
U 956 AB 8429
U 636 AB 8493
U 361 AB 8821

U 737 North Spitsbergen on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 354, 362, 363, 387, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0340 U 363 put in to Narvik from AB 7855.
0600 U 739, 921, 995 put out from Trondheim for
Narvik.
U 313 proceeding from AA 6994 to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) proceeding to North Spitsbergen to set up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" and evacuate meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

CONFIDENTIAL

2148

Radio message 1832/248 received from
"Kreuzritter":

"Inspector Knöspel met with an accident at 1005 this morning when blowing up a whaling hut. He died two hours later. U-boat to remove unit has arrived."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 742 (Schwassmann) was sent in Most Secret 3354 A Ops. 1:

- "1. Put out from Narvik for Harstad on the morning of 3 July.
2. Compulsory pilotage from Lødingen to Harstad.
3. U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Northern Waters very long wave still covered in Harstad.
4. 12 hours' readiness in Harstad.
5. Naval Harbor Master, Harstad has been informed of boat's arrival."

1600

Telprinter message Most Secret 3370 A Ops was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops:

"Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3299 of 28 June on the subject of the war distress report.

1. No misuse of a war distress report at 0933 and 1017 by any U-boat radio station, excluding boats at sea, has been established.
2. Because of the uncertainty regarding the radio signature and the suspicion that an enemy unit might be acting as decoy, it was finally necessary to request all boats at sea to report, in order to clarify the position and to enable help to be sent. Betrayal of the boats' formation had to be accepted.
3. All boats reported again. Suspicion of deception by enemy unit now again confirmed (second unexplained incident).
4. Northern Waters boats therefore received orders to transmit signatures both at the beginning and the end of war distress reports. It can hereby be decoded more quickly and the report proved genuine.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. In future, if war distress reports are not clear, the boats will exchange areas and search along both limits of their areas, thus avoiding any radio traffic at sea."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

4th Destroyer Flotilla at sea on exercises in the southern part of Bear Island passage.

D. Organizational:

2305 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1839 received from 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"In view of the increased U-boat activity, a small U-boat supply base is being set up in Kristiansand (South) as a branch of 11th U-boat Flotilla. Disciplinary subordination to 11th U-boat Flotilla. Accommodation in U-boat barracks, Marviken; request details of whether these are ready. Drafting of Supply Lt. (j.g.) Claasen (officer in charge of the U-boat base and responsible for discipline), Commissioned Supply Officer Stoltz and Supply P.O. 1st Class (accountant) Hipper will take place on 1 July. 1 quartermaster N.C.O. is already there. Task: partial re-fitting and supervision of U-boats with the cooperation and support of Sea Defense Commandant, Kristiansand (South) who, up to now, has been responsible for this work. Particulars will be settled verbally with Lt. Claasen. Boats may call in after the arrival of Lt. Claasen about 1 July."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (e):

"The report, like earlier ones, seems extremely dubious."

Re IV (d):

"In order to relieve the base at Narvik, some boats in readiness are in future to be accommodated in Harstad, which is well-suited for this. The approach to the operational area is shortened by 6 hours for these boats."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
3104 A Ops.

On board, 19 June, 1944.

Sailing order for U 716 (Dunkelberg).

1. Put out from Narvik - Skjomen at 1600 on 20 June via Tjeldsund - Andfjord for AF 2216.
Compulsory pilotage from Harstad to Lødingen.
Constant danger of submarines off Andfjord.
2. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Observe Northern Waters Orders 8 and 10.
3. Enemy situation: In spite of the invasion in France we can still expect PQ convoys and carrier formations, especially as the Russian offensive is going on against Finland.

4. Own forces:

- (a) U-boats in patrol line from AB 4828 to AF 2216 in order:

U 668 (Eickstedt), U 313 (Schweiger), U 711 (Lange),
U 307 (Herrle), U 315 (Zoller), U 344 (Pietsch),
U 363 (Nees), U 987 (Schreyer), U 394 (Borger),
U 992 (Falke).

Proceed in accordance with Order No. 8.
Radio silence except to report enemy vessels,
carrier-borne aircraft and attacks. Submerge
according to visibility. U 997 (Lehmann) on
return passage from AB 4892 to Hammerfest.

- (b) German Air Force will not reconnoiter against convoys until we have definite indications of their sailing.
Daily meteorological flights, Trondheim - Jan Mayen and Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E (or Hope Island) - Banak.

p.p. Roche.

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, First Division.
2. Emergency. Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
3. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
4. Emergency. 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 668 (v. Eickstedt),
first operation.

- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| 1 April | Put out from Kiel. |
| 2 April | Put in to Kristiansand (South). |
| 3 April -
12 May. | Readiness boat for group Central. |
| 13 May | Put out from Kristiansand. |
| 14 May | Put in to Bergen. |
| 14 May | Put out from Bergen, via 2 position lines
AF 7117 via AF 8117 to AF 5316 to Narvik. |
| 15 May | At 0232 short location (3 seconds) on 218 cm.
in AF 8782. |
| 16 May | At 1540 a "Catalina" and a "Sunderland",
course west; managed to out-manuever them
on the surface, range 7,000 meters.
At 1715 in AF 8117 a "Sunderland" was driven
off twice in low level run-in. Aircraft
armament firing in AF 8115. Stick of bombs
dropped astern on second run-in. No
casualties, shaft D/F loop shot through. |
| 17 May | At 0229 aircraft location 3 times. Very high
tone. At 0032 distant aircraft in AF 7663
(type not identified); sighted for a short
time.
At 2400 after taking on torpedoes at Ramsund,
put in to Narvik base. Repair work in Narvik
until 21 May. |

CONFIDENTIAL

22 May Put out from Narvik.

25 May Put in to Hammerfest. Proceeded to attack area AB 8944 to a position in patrol line from AB 8836 to 8594 ("Grimm").

30 May At 1615 met U 997 in AB 8834 to deliver decoding tables.

31 May At 1232 submerged because of circling flying boat, range 7,000 meters in AB 6443. No attack.
At 2200 occupied new position in patrol line from AB 3855 to 3858.

2 - 6 June At 1700 proceeded via 2 position lines from AB 5226 via AB 4965 to patrol line AB 4969 to 4962. Nothing sighted.

6 June At 1252 new position in patrol line from AB 4455 to 8495 ("Trutz").

8 June At 0230 patrol line moved to AB 7673 - 7688.

9 June At 1415 arrived at new patrol line from AB 4821 to 4856, remained there till 1500 on 15 June.
Until 21 June, no enemy sighted.

22 June Submerged because of 2 carrier-borne aircraft, type "Fulmar" in AB 4855, no attack.
At 2155 in attack area AB 6635, depth of sweep 25 miles.

23 June At 0015 operated on destroyer in AB 7626.
At 1340 proceeding to patrol line from AB 4669 to 5475.
At 1600 commenced return passage to Hammerfest as ordered. Drifting mine in good condition on 31 May in AB 6448; drifting mines on 23 June in AB 5468, on 24 June in AB 6754, on 25 June in AB 9339, all overgrown.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Not a remarkable operation, no chances of success.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 3262 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (d) Set up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" in accordance with instructions from Inspector Stöbe.
 - (e) Evacuate meteorological unit "Kreuzritter" with gear from positions 12 and 18 according to particulars from the leader, Inspector Knöspel.
 - (f) Allow war correspondent to take films.
 - (g) Observe every caution in navigation and against possible enemy troops, vessels and aircraft. Radio silence as far as 78° N except to report enemy vessels, carrier-borne aircraft and attacks, further north transmit only if spotted by the enemy or if it is vital to the execution of the assignment.
 - (h) Do not report execution by short signal until AG 77 is reached.
 - (i) Return passage to Hammerfest - Tromsø - Narvik.
5. Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 15 in force. Do not operate independently on enemy reports received until the order to attack is given.
6. U-boat Northern Waters frequency. From 1200 on 25 June, code book "M-Niobe" will be used on all frequencies.

p.p. Roche.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY
1 - 15 JULY, 1944
PG/31862

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$
 The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$
 The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

The value of the expression is $\frac{1}{2}$.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - 75° N, 31° E - Hope Island - 73° N, 25° E - Kirkenes from 0410 to 0921, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0258 to 0922. North Faeroes examined, nothing of interest observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0258 to 0922. Route 60%, Jan Mayen area 20% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate transmission of radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Tsyp Navolok area: MO-boat No. 126.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski", minesweepers

Nos. 61, 114, 115, 118.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Svanvik bearings: British unit in 254° at 0735 on 30 June.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

CONFIDENTIAL

In patrol line:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AB 4411
U 307 AB 4452
U 344 AB 4495
U 315 AB 4813
U 394 AB 4856
U 716 AB 4974
U 992 AB 7324
U 365 AB 7365
U 965 AB 8178
U 956 AB 8429
U 636 AB 8493
U 361 AB 8821

U 737 AC 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 H        ,
U 957 Troms  ,
U 347, 354, 362, 363, 287, 742 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward-bound:

1130 Group "Trutz" proceeding to new attack areas,
depth of sweep 30 miles:
U 711 AA 6657, U 307 AB 4475, U 344 AB 4495,
U 315 AB 4768, U 394 AB 4856, U 716 AB 7229,
U 992 AB 7324, U 365 AB 7388, U 965 AB 8178,
U 956 AB 8473, U 636 AB 8493, U 361 AB 8844.

1600 U 739 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
1600 U 995 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
2200 U 921 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
U 313 proceeding from AA 6994 to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1105 Radio message 1017/701 sent:

"New attack areas for group "Trutz" from
1800 on 1 July, depth of sweep 30 miles:
"Lange" AA 6657, "Herrle" AB 4475, "Pietsch"
4495, "Zoller" 4768, "Borger" 4856,
"Dunkelberg" 7229, "Falke" 7324, "Wedemeyer"
7368, "Unverzagt" 8178, "Mohs" 8473,
"Schendel" 8493, "Seidel" 8844."

CONFIDENTIAL

The formation was to be made more irregular to mislead enemy reconnaissance, and was to return slowly to the southwest.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 setting up meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin" on North Spitsbergen and evacuating meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

1624

Teleprinter message Most Secret 3387 A Ops. sent to Sea Defense Commandant, Tromsø for "Schaar":

"Transfer order for U 957 (Schaar):

1. Put out from Tromsø for Narvik at noon on 2 July.
2. U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
3. Compulsory pilotage from Harstad to Lødingen.
4. From Lødingen use frequency "MC", 479 kc/s. Report to base.
5. Anchor off "Grille" to service hydrophones.
6. When passing "Luchs 2", carry out hydrophone exercises in accordance with orders on board."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

2115

Teleprinter message 11th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret 1849 U to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. received:

"In contrast to the previous ruling, training boats of the Anti-submarine School which can be used for operations, i.e. on 1 July, only UD 5, later UD 3 (at present in a home port) and 2 new Type VII C U-boats joining the Anti-submarine School, must join group Central instead of Captain U-boats, Norway in the event of invasion. Duties at the Anti-submarine School are not affected by this and will be carried out without restrictions. As before, 11th U-boat Flotilla will look after supplies for these U-boats in the event of invasion and will then report them to Captain U-boats, Central as operational. UD 5 will be subjected to the same alterations in communications and command arrangements as group Central."

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

2 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Kirkenes - 74° 30' N, 30° E - Bear Island - 72° 30' N, 27° E - Kirkenes from 0345 to 0809, almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0218 to 1035, enemy not sighted. Flight cut short to enable the plane to take avoiding action.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0248 to 1000. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of low-lying clouds, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski", minesweepers Nos. 118, 120.

Britain: 1 probable unit picked up in the Murmansk area, none in Archangel.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6657)
U 307 AB 4475)
U 344 AB 4495)
U 315 AB 4768)
U 394 AB 4856)
U 716 AB 7229) in attack area, depth of
U 992 AB 7324) sweep 30 miles.
U 365 AB 7388)
U 965 AB 8178)
U 956 AB 8473)
U 636 AB 8493)
U 361 AB 8844)

U 737 North Spitsbergen on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 957 Tromsø,
U 347, 354, 362, 363, 387, 739, 742, 921,
995 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300

U 957 put out from Tromsø, at 2000 put in to
Harstad.
U 313 on return passage from AA 6994 to
Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan
Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) on return passage from
North Spitsbergen with meteorological
unit "Kreuzritter".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 921 (Werner) see
Appendix I/1.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1535 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3397 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops, Naval Chief Command, Norway, Flieger Fuehrer 5, Flieger Fuehrer 3, Naval Air Station Tromsø:

"U 354 (Sthamer) will probably arrive in Tromsø on 3 July to take on a German Air Force filter for fuelling with Diesel fuel and to discuss the flight to evacuate "Schatzgräber". During the flight, U 354 will act as security boat on the ice limit, if necessary will provide for refuelling. Finally the boat will evacuate meteorological unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

"The meteorological unit "Schatzgräber" on Alexandra Land has reported in the last few days 9 men severely ill, apparently suffering from trichinosis. We are now attempting to evacuate these men in a large land-based aircraft or seaplane. U 354, which is not to evacuate meteorological unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island until 10 July, will be able to give support to this action and is being fitted with gear to supply the aircraft with Diesel fuel."

(Signed) Suhren.

3 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0359 to 0616, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of

CONFIDENTIAL

the Faeroes from 0250 to 1038. Faeroes not examined because of mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0246 to 1000. Route 60%, southeastern area of Jan Mayen 80% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: minesweeper No. 53.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "Baku", "U", "J", minesweepers Nos. 61 and 110, minelayer No. 94.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area. At 2207 on 2 July Murmansk sent an operational radio message to Whitehall.

Russian radio traffic: during the day slight, in the evening and night of 2/3 July moderate to brisk. Traffic concentration was in the Archangel/Bolushya area. Units, including destroyers, often named.

Britain: very few Murmansk broadcasts, none from Archangel.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6657)
U 307 AB 4475)
U 344 AB 4495)
U 315 AB 4768)
U 394 AB 4856)
U 716 AB 7229) in attack areas, depth
U 992 AB 7324) of sweep 30 miles.
U 365 AB 7388)
U 965 AB 8178)
U 956 AB 8473)
U 636 AB 8493)
U 361 AB 8844)

CONFIDENTIAL

U 737 North Spitsbergen on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 354 Tromsø,
U 347, 362, 363, 387, 739, 742, 921, 957, 995
Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300 U 313 put in to Bergen from the north via the
inner leads.
0000 U 354 put out from Narvik, at 0730 put in to
Tromsø.
0300 U 957 put out from Harstad, at 0800 put in to
Narvik.
0800 U 921 put out from Narvik for AB 88.
1800 U 347 put out from Narvik for AB 88.
1855 U 315 on return passage from AB 4768 to Bergen
via Frohavet.
2030 U 742 put out from Narvik for Harstad.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1111 Radio message 1013/724 sent:

- "1. Group "Trutz", excluding "Lange" and "Herrle":
at 1600 on 3 July alter attack areas by
40 miles, course 200°.
2. U 921 (Werner) is putting out from Andfjord
at about 1500 for AB 88."

The formation was to be moved back gradually to
the southwest. Some of the boats would now be
relieved from the formation after 30 days.

1855 Short signal 1855/733 received from U 315
(Zoller):

"Have commenced return passage because of fuel
position."

The U-boat had been at sea only 35 days, had
therefore used up a great deal of fuel in only
two operations against the enemy. The boats
were therefore ordered to proceed at economical
speed.

2049 Radio message 2014/734 sent:

- "1. "Zoller": return to Bergen, from 66° N
in accordance with Order No. 14, from

CONFIDENTIAL

Trondheim via inner leads.

2. "Borger" will occupy "Zoller"'s attack area, "Dunkelberg" "Borger"'s, etc. as far as "Seidel".

3. U 921 (Werner) will occupy attack area AF 2134, depth of sweep 30 miles, in group "Trutz" at 0600 on 5 July.

4. "Borger", "Lange", "Pietsch" and "Herrle" will be relieved then."

2115 Radio message 2029/736 sent:

"The following will put out from Andfjord on 4 July: U 347 (de Buhr) about 0300, U 742 (Schwassmann) about 0500, both for AB 88."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0956 Radio message 0938/723 sent:

" "Sthamer" from Captain U-boats. As soon as you are ready, put out from Tromsø for AG 9880 at increased speed."

U 354 (Sthamer) will act as security boat and fuel supply boat for a flight to evacuate meteorological unit "Schatzgräber" from Franz Josef Land; most of the men in the unit are suffering from trichinosis.

2006 Teleprinter message Most Secret L 35 received from Inshore Defenses Unit:

"U 354 (Sthamer) will put out from Tromsø at 2100 on 3 July for "L 1"."

U 757 (Brasack) on return passage from North Spitsbergen with meteorological unit "Kreuzritter".

1632 Short signal 1632/728 received from U 737 (Brasack):

"Have completed mission."

This report came from AG 77 in accordance with the operational order.

2128 Radio message 2046/738 sent:

" "Brasack" from Captain U-boats. Up to now "Hermann" is 14 minutes overdue. Report "Yes" by short signal if Inspector Stöbe considers that you should call at Bear Island."

CONFIDENTIAL

2241

Short signal 2240/739 received from U 737
(Brasack):
"No."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 995 (Köhntopp), see
Appendix II/2:

"Schwassmann" and "de Buhr":

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 3 July, notify time of departure in advance on "MC".
2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AB 88. Compulsory pilotage from Lødingen to Harstad. Submarine danger off Andfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 15, U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The destroyers picked up in the Archangel - Belushya area indicate supplies for a further extension of the base at Belushya."

(Signed) Suhren.

4 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0400 to 0921, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0144 to 0958, enemy not sighted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area from 0246 to 1010. Route 80%, southeastern area of Jan Mayen 90% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: Sec under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: BO-boat No. 209.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 61, 63, 110, MO-boat No. 252.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski", minesweepers Nos. 116, 121, minelayer No. 93.

At 2040 Russian aircraft reported: U-boat intercepted (attacked?) in 71° 52' N, 31° 02' E (AC 5794).

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Svanvik bearings: British unit in 262° at 0940 on 3 July. At 0947 on 4 July Kirkenes took a bearing of 254°, minimum signal strength over 3 degrees, on a British unit communicating with Cleethorpes. Wave 36.19 meters.

Svanvik took a bearing of 266°, minimum signal strength over 5 degrees.

Russian radio traffic: moderate.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6657)

U 307 AB 4475)

U 344 AB 4756) in attack areas, depth

U 394 AB 7129) of sweep 30 miles.

U 716 AB 7224)

U 992 AB 7287)

CONFIDENTIAL

U 365 AB 7375)
U 965 AB 7649)
U 956 AB 7669) in attack areas, depth of sweep
U 636 AB 8741) 30 miles.
U 361 AB 8761)

U 737 AB 38 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 362, 363, 387, 739, 957, 995 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0130 U 354 put out from Tromsø for AG 9980 on a
special operation.
0100 U 995 put out from Narvik, put in to Harstad
at 0650, at 1130 put out from Harstad for AB 88.
0450 U 742 put in to Harstad from Narvik, at 0710
put out from Harstad for AB 88.
U 347, 921 proceeding from Narvik to AB 88.
U 315 on return passage from AB 4768 to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.
4 boats approaching.

2130 Radio message 1905/754 received from U 956
(Mohs):

"Unmistakable periscope in grid square 7665.
Sonic telegraphy recognition signal not
acknowledged."

We must always expect enemy submarines in our
formation. As the formation was now revealed,
the boats had therefore to be moved.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 737 (Brasack) on return passage from North
Spitsbergen with meteorological unit
"Kreuzritter".

1426 Radio message 1337/752 sent:

" "Brasack" from Captain U-boats.
Pressure and temperature reports from "Hermann"
since 3 July repeatedly unreadable, group
consisting only of "T". Report "Yes" by short
signal if Inspector Stöbe considers you should
call at Bear Island."

CONFIDENTIAL

1645 Short signal 1645/753 received from U 737
 (Brasack):

"Yes."

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance prior
to the evacuation of meteorological unit
"Schatzgräber".

(d) Miscellaneous:

1050 Transfer order for U 278 (Franze):

Sent in teleprinter message Most Secret 3417
to 11th U-boat Flotilla:

- "1. Put out from Bergen on the morning of 5
July for Narvik - Ramsund.
2. Proceed via the inner leads to Frohavet,
onward at a distance of 50 miles from the
coast as far as 66° N in accordance with
Order No. 14, make for Westfjord.
3. Report by time short signal probable time
of arrival at approach point and also
passing of "V 1".
4. Radio frequency "Anton".
After reaching Ramsund switch to Base
wave "MC", 479 kc/s, and report to base.
5. Expect enemy submarines off Westfjord.
6. For exchange of recognition signals,
observe Section 153 of Recognition Signal
Regulations."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The U-boat reported by the Russian aircraft
cannot be one of ours. At this time of the year
the Russians suspect that our U-boats are in
their waters again and are therefore nervous."

Re IV (b):

"It is possible that enemy submarines have been
operating against our formation since it was
revealed by the false sea distress signal of 27
June and the resultant radio traffic."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0400 to 0915, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0231 to 1045. Faeroes not examined because of low-lying fog, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0152 to 0855. Route 75%, Jan Mayen area 50% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: BO-boat No. 209.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "B", minesweepers Nos. 113 and 120, minelayer No. 94.

Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 110 and 1, minelayer No. 94.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

Bearings: at 0947 on 4 July British unit bearing 254° from Kirkenes.

At 0947 on 4 July British unit bearing 266° from Svanvik.

Russian radio traffic: slight:

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

CONFIDENTIAL

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 711 AA 6944)
U 307 AA 6992)
U 344 AB 7143)
U 394 AB 7416)
U 716 AB 7511)
U 992 AB 7574) in attack areas, depth
U 365 AB 7592) of sweep 30 miles.
U 956 AB 7669)
U 995 AB 7866)
U 636 AB 7956)
U 361 AF 1327)
U 921 AF 2119)

U 354 AC 28 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 737, 997 Hammerfest,
U 362, 363, 387, 739, 957 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 278, 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0730 U 737 put in to Hammerfest.
2130 U 278 put out from Bergen for Narvik.
U 347 proceeding from Narvik to AF 2421.
U 742, 995 proceeding from Narvik to AB 88.
U 315 proceeding from AB 4768 to Bergen.

0200 Group "Trutz", excluding "Mohs", proceeded on
a course of 200° for 50 miles.

2300 Group "Trutz" proceeded to new attack areas:
U 307 AA 6944, U 716 AA 6992, U 992 AB 7143,
U 365 AB 7416, U 965 AB 7511, U 636 AB 7574,
U 956 AB 7592, U 361 AB 7866, U 921 AB 7956,
U 347 AF 1327, U 995 AF 2119, U 742 AF 2421.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen,
3 boats approaching.

After the enemy submarine report had been
received from U 956 (Mohs),

0137 radio message 0025/757 was sent:

"1. Group "Trutz" excluding "Mohs": alter
attack areas by 50 miles, course 200°,
cruising speed.

2. "Mohs": from 0800 on 5 July, you are free to attack enemy submarines in your former attack area only.

3. Exceptions are: "Schendel" to occupy attack area AB 7956, "Seidel" AF 1327, "Werner" AF 2119, "de Buhr" AF 2421."

The 3 approaching U-boats were brought into the new formation.

1120

Radio message 1033/761 sent:

"1. New attack areas for group "Trutz":
"Herrle" AA 6944, "Dunkelberg" 6992,
"Falke" AB 7143, "Wedemeyer" 7416,
"Unverzagt" 7511, "Schendel" 7574, "Mohs"
7592, "Seidel" 7866, "Werner" 7956,
"de Buhr" AF 1327, "Köhntopp" 2119,
"Schwassmann" AF 2421, all depth of sweep
30 miles. Proceed at 7 knots to arrive
in positions by 0600 on 6 July.
Procedure in accordance with Order No. 8,
submerge according to visibility. Radio
silence except to report main targets,
attacks or if observed.

2. The following will return at 0600: "Lange"
to Hammerfest, "Pietsch" and "Borger" to
Andfjord - Narvik."

2001

Radio message 1813/768 received from U 965
(Unverzagt):

"Out-maneuvered fan-of-four in grid square
7536. End-of-run detonators, German attack
periscope."

As a German U-boat would have fired a fan-of-
three at the most without a bubble track,

2320

radio message 2235/774 was sent:

"Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.
"Unverzagt" reports enemy submarine in AB
7536. Expect enemy also to have thin periscopes.
In the new attack areas, the 6 westerly U-boats
will remain submerged from 0000 to 1230, the
6 easterly boats from 1230 to 0030. Irregular
courses."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance prior
to the evacuation of "Schatzgräber"

0116

Radio message 0032 sent:

" "Sthamer" from Captain U-boats.
Report ice limit from AG 9887 in the direction

CONFIDENTIAL

of 030°, report last three grid square numbers by short signal on "Anton", also whether passage is possible for specially strengthened vessels. Avoid ice damage."

(d) Miscellaneous:

1045 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3467 sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Transfer order for U 668 (v. Eickstedt):

1. Put out from Tromsø with escort on the morning of 6 July, from there with a pilot to Lødingen and then to Narvik - Ramsund.
2. U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
3. From Harstad switch to Base wave "MC", 479 kc/s, and report to base.
4. Exercises are to be carried out during passage at "Luchs 3" and "Luchs 2" in accordance with the orders on board.
5. Hammerfest U-boat base will ensure that Naval Communications Officer Tromsø is promptly informed of time of arrival at both points "Luchs".

"Setting-up of new meteorological stations in the Arctic" received from Naval Chief Command, Norway in Most Secret S.O.s only 1072 W.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 363 (Nees), first operation, see Appendix II/1.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2240 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3476 A Ops. sent to Luftflotte Command 5 and Flieger Fuehrer 3:

"Request reconnaissance of Belushya and Kostin Strait at the earliest opportunity to determine shipping, ice and booms."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"The torpedo attack on "Unverzagt" may have been made by the same enemy submarine reported

CONFIDENTIAL

yesterday by "Mohs". "Unverzagt" was unexpectedly far north, probably he received radio instructions to move too late.

The U-boats can have a greater chance of surprising enemy submarines if they submerge for half a day, thus half of the formation will always escape enemy reconnaissance, especially from the air. As the attack areas have been ordered for 50 miles south of the position of the enemy submarine, no further move is intended at present."

(Signed) Suhren.

6 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0400 to 0915. Route almost exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance of the Faeroes area from 0140 to 1006, enemy not sighted. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0253 to 1000. Route 60% examined, northeastern part of Jan Mayen 20% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: destroyer "B".

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader

"Baku", minelayer No. 93, minesweeper No. 63.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Hammerfest bearings: at 2130 on 5 July
British unit in 256°, at 0340 on 6 July
British unit in 256.6°.
Svanvik took a bearing of 255° on a U.S.
unit at 0303 on 6 July.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: very few Murmansk broadcasts,
none from Archangel.

At 2353 on 5 July a radio message of
first priority was sent on 27.27 meters
from Polyarno to Whitehall for "Zu 4"
(unidentified).

At 0543 on 6 July flotilla leader "Baku"
sent a message on the Iokanka frequency
(passed on by Archangel).

At 1759 on 6 July Belushya transmitted a
radio message of first priority to all naval
forces in Northern Waters and flotilla leader
"Baku".

At 1821 on 6 July Iokanka sent a radio
message of first priority to all naval forces
in Northern Waters.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 307 AA 6944)
U 716 AA 6992)
U 992 AB 7143)
U 365 AB 7416)
U 965 AB 7511)
U 636 AB 7574) in attack areas, depth of
U 956 AB 7592) sweep 30 miles.
U 361 AB 7866)
U 921 AB 7956)
U 347 AF 1327)
U 995 AF 2119)
U 742 AF 2421)

U 354 AG 96 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 997 Hammerfest,
U 362, 363, 387, 739, 957 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 315 proceeding from AB 4768 to Bergen.

CONFIDENTIAL

0600 U 711 on return passage from AA 6944 to Hammerfest.
0600 U 344 on return passage from AB 7143 to Andfjord - Narvik.
0600 U 394 on return passage from AB 7416 to Andfjord - Narvik.
0730 U 737 put in to Hammerfest after special operation.
U 278 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
1500 U 668 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

2259 Radio message 2143/791 sent:

"1. German meteorological aircraft will be flying on anti-submarine reconnaissance in the area AB 87 to AB 72 between 0430 and 0830 on 7 July. Group "Trutz" and returning U-boats are to remain submerged during this period so that enemy submarines may be spotted.

2. Careful hydrophone watch while surfaced, keep a constant watch on very long wave and make use of periscope frequently so that nothing can pass unseen within visual range. See Order No. 8."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance prior to the evacuation of meteorological unit "Schatzgräber".

0527 Short signal 0515/34 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"Ice limit in AG 9620."

0740 Short signal 0734/41 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"Passage possible for specially strengthened vessels."

1116 Radio message 1013/782 sent:

" "Sthamer": carry out ice reconnaissance from 45° E to 40° E. Report only special deviations. Remain for the present in the vicinity of AG 96."

(d) Miscellaneous:

"Lange" reported that his boat must go into dock, then

1516

radio message 1503/786 was sent:

"Alteration of plans:

"Borger" to return to Hammerfest, "Lange" to Narvik."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2043 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1348/44 received from Flieger Fuehrer 5:

"Reference your teleprinter message 3481 Most Secret of 6 June. Anti-submarine operations cannot be undertaken as the necessary offensive weapons cannot be carried. However, anti-submarine reconnaissance will be flown and reports made by radio. Details of time at which the aircraft will fly over sea area mentioned will be given on the previous evening."

2043 Teleprinter message Most Secret 1354 received from Flieger Fuehrer 5:

"Meteorological aircraft will fly on anti-submarine reconnaissance in the desired sea area between 0430 and 0830, reporting every submarine by radio. Make sure U-boats are informed."

In teleprinter message 00636 of 6 July, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. agreed to the employment of U-boats to set up meteorological stations in the Arctic as proposed in Naval Chief Command Norway Most Secret S.O.s only 1072 W of 4 July.

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Flotilla leader "Baku" apparently proceeding from the Iokanka area to the Belushya area."

Re IV (c):

"The ice limit is already very far north. Perhaps the U-boat will be able to penetrate to Alexandra Land and evacuate the sick "Schatzgräber" personnel."

(Signed) Suhren.

7 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak from 0400 to 0851, not exhaustive. A drifting mine at 0520 in AC 4172, otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0242 to 1046, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0222 to 1100. Anti-submarine patrol carried out between 4° E and 3° W. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of thick low-lying clouds, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. On 6 July Belushya (AT 7234) ordered all fishing vessels from Rusanova and Krasino (south coast of Novaya Zemlya) to deliver their catch immediately.
Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and probably another (7210), mine-sweepers Nos. 63, 110, 113, 115, 120 and 122, minelayer No. 90.
Iokanka transmitted several aircraft reports to flotilla leader "Baku" including one at 1500 giving the position of an aircraft as 67° 50' N, 41° E.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.
Bearings: Kirkenes and Hammerfest took bearings on the evening and night 6/7 July on several British units in the 251° - 231° sector; Hammerfest also obtained a bearing of 284° at 0322 on 7 July (enemy submarine?).

CONFIDENTIAL

Russian radio traffic: slight during the day, moderate in the evening and night of 6/7 July. Flotilla leader "Baku" received numerous messages, mainly very urgent and of first priority.

Britain: no Murmansk/Archangel broadcasts.

2. Aircraft SCWQ (18th Group) reported U-boat in PG 36 N, 54 E (KA 06 W) at 0305. Aircraft (18th Group) was over a U-boat in PK 38 N 03 W at 0305 German Standard time. Aircraft SCWQ (18th Group) reported a submerging U-boat in PK 38 N 03 06 W, at 0305. At 0307 aircraft SCWQ to Donnybristle: at 0305 over U-boat in PK 36 N (03) 06 W.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 307 AA 6944)
U 716 AA 6992)
U 992 AB 7143)
U 365 AB 7416)
U 965 AB 7511)
U 636 AB 7574) in attack areas, depth
U 956 AB 7592) of sweep 30 miles.
U 361 AB 7866)
U 921 AB 7956)
U 347 AF 1327)
U 995 AF 2119)
U 742 AF 2421)

U 354 Spitsbergen, AG 93 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 737, 997 Hammerfest,
U 362, 363, 387, 739, 957 Narvik,
U 312, 315, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0600 U 315 put in to Trondheim from AB 4768,
at 1630 put out for Bergen.
2030 U 668 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
1630 U 737 put out from Hammerfest for Tromsø.
U 278 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
U 344, 711 proceeding from AB 73 to Narvik.
U 394 proceeding from AB 73 to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1939 Radio message 1905/704 sent:

"Group "Trutz".

No enemy submarines spotted by today's reconnaissance. It will be repeated on 8 July. Therefore remain submerged between 0430 and 0830."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance prior to the evacuation of meteorological unit "Schatzgräber".

1207 Radio message 1136/104 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"AF 7122: approach to islands clear. Where is "Schatzgräber"?"

After a telephone conference with Naval Chief Command, Norway,

1406 radio message 1303/800 Officers only was sent:

" "Schatzgräber" is in AF 4479, approach from the south. Supposed to be ice-free. When approaching, give recognition signal by firing a white single star, then one red and one green. The station will then acknowledge with several red stars. Avoid ice damage at all costs. Further instructions will follow. Take care as radio traffic may be picked up by the Russians."

1451 Radio message 1344/701 Officers only sent:

" "Sthamer" from Captain U-boats:

1. If it is possible to get through without endangering the U-boat, evacuate the meteorological unit at once: it consists of 10 men, of whom nine are seriously ill with trichinosis, not infectious. Then return immediately.
2. All equipment will remain on the site for the relief, all secret documents and scientific records are to be brought back.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Charts show incorrect coastal outlines. When the headland north of Cape Neale is on a bearing of 060° and Cape Neale and Crowther come into line, set a course of 023° clear of land to Schatzgräber Bay. The station is on the east side of this bay.

4. If you cannot make your way through, send position by short signal."

0100
(8 July)

Radio message 2347/61 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"AF 4775: northern drift ice limit, fairways. Before that only isolated thin drift ice-fields. Wind east, force 1, fog banks, visibility 5 to 8 miles."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold) sent in Most Secret 3497 A Ops, see Appendix I/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), fourth operation, see Appendix II/2.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Remarkable number of minesweepers in the Gorlo Strait area:

The Hammerfest bearing at 0322 might be connected with the enemy submarine last reported in AB 7536 on 5 July. Anti-submarine reconnaissance will therefore be continued for a few days by the daily meteorological aircraft. The reports from the aircraft of 18th Group must refer to outward bound Atlantic U-boats or those of group Central."

(Signed) Suhren.

8 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance and examination of Belushya and Kostin Strait from 0407 to 1110. Route: Banak - Belushya - southern exit of Kostin Strait - Belushya - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0054 to 0854, enemy not sighted. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0443 to 1043. Anti-submarine patrol carried out between 3° E and 5° W. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying fog, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

From 0710 to 0800 4 whalers, each some 500 G.R.T. in Belushya harbor. No aircraft seen on Belushya airfield. 3 hangars. Anti-aircraft defenses consisted of light guns in 2 emplacements. No booms spotted in Northern part of Kostin Strait. Ice floes in the southern part of Kostin Strait, Belushya harbor and the remainder of Kostin Strait free of ice.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: flotilla leader "Baku".

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "K", minesweepers Nos. 53, 63, 110, 113, 120, minelayers Nos. 90 and 93.

Naryan Mar area: 1 aircraft intercepted on the night of 7/8 July.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

At 0258 on 8 July an unidentified signal station in the Novaya Zemlya area received the following radio message of high priority from Belushya (AT 7234):

"Transmit ships' radio message immediately." (presumably convoy traffic in Novaya Zemlya area). Wavelength 444 meters.

Britain: no Polyarno/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 307 AA 6944)
U 716 AA 6992)
U 992 AB 7143)
U 365 AB 7416)
U 965 AB 7511)
U 636 AB 7574) in attack areas, depth
U 956 AB 7592) of sweep 30 miles.
U 361 AB 7866)
U 921 AB 7956)
U 347 AF 1327)
U 995 AF 2129)
U 742 AF 2421)

U 354 AF 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 362, 363, 387, 668, 957 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0500 U 739 put out from Narvik for AF 22.
2010 U 394 put in to Hammerfest from AB 7416.
2255 U 344 put in to Narvik from AB 7143.
2300 U 711 put in to Narvik from AA 6944.
U 315 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U 278 proceeding from Bergen to Narvik.
0520 U 737 put in to Tromsø from Hammerfest,
at 1705 put out for Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

2214

Radio message 2144/730:

"Today's reconnaissance again failed to spot any enemy submarines. It will be repeated on 9 July. Group "Trutz" is to remain submerged from 0430 to 0830."

CONFIDENTIAL

2255 Radio message 2219/732:

"Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

1. On all days when there is air reconnaissance against enemy submarines, the 5 easterly boats of the formation are to remain submerged until 0230 and in the afternoon from 1600, while the 6 westerly boats submerge from 0200 to 1630. All boats should submerge during the air reconnaissance.
2. If no anti-submarine air reconnaissance is announced, then from 9 July the easterly boats will remain submerged from 1600 to 0430 and the westerly boats from 0400 to 1630."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) reported in short signal 0008/79 that from AF 4742, i.e. the entrance to Cambridge Sound, the boat could no longer penetrate the ice to Schatzgräber Bay.

0142 Radio message 0122/760 sent:

"If you can no longer force your way through, withdraw to avoid being caught in the ice."

0538 Radio message 0510/713:

" "Sthamer" from Captain U-boats.
Aircraft made a good landing near "Schatzgraber".
Will fly the sick men back in 1 or 2 days.
Until then, wait clear of the ice limit."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0259 Teleprinter message Secret 4168 U received from 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"On 10 July a sub-station of the 11th U-boat Flotilla of Kristiansand (South) U-boat base will be set up in Kristiansand (South) as a U-boat Command Station under the disciplinary command of 11th U-boat Flotilla. Teleprinter communication via Sea Defense Commandant, Kristiansand (South). Correspondence via 11th U-boat Flotilla except for questions of positions. Commanding officer - Supply Lt. Claason with a small office of 6 men.

CONFIDENTIAL

Duties:

- A) He controls local disciplinary matters regarding U-boat personnel based in Kristiansand (South) in cooperation with Sea Defense Commandant, Kristiansand (South).
- B) Base commanding officer is camp commandant of U-boat billets in Marviken.
- C) Main duty is the control of all U-boat supplies in cooperation with the local supply and dock sub-stations of the arsenal."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The brisk traffic in Gorlo Strait continues. Apparently small supply convoys are running again to bases in Novaya Zemlya. It would be advantageous for our U-boats to operate against them with torpedoes as long as no Murmansk convoys are running."

(Signed) Suhren.

9 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Hope Island - Banak from 0405 to 0912, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

1 BV 222 successfully carried out special operation "Schatzgräber" between 1852 and 0652.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0157 to 1002, enemy not sighted. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0300 to 1015. Anti-submarine patrol carried out between 3° E and 5° W. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying clouds, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 59, 116.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "K", minesweepers Nos. 37 and 113, minelayers Nos. 90 and 93.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweepers Nos. 63 and 110.
In the afternoon Iokanka transmitted several aircraft reports giving various positions to flotilla leader "Baku".
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: Kirkenes took a bearing of 264°, minimum signal strength over 6 degrees, on British unit at 1907 on 8 July.
Svanvik took one of 271°, minimum signal strength over 8 degrees.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.
Britain: no Polyarno/Archangel broadcasts.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 307 AA 6944)
U 716 AA 6992)
U 992 AB 7143)
U 365 AB 7416)
U 965 AB 7511) in attack areas, depth of
U 636 AB 7574) sweep 30 miles.
U 956 AB 7592)
U 361 AB 7866)
U 921 AB 7956)
U 347 AF 1327)
U 995 AF 2129)
U 742 AF 2421)

U 354 AF 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 344, 362, 363, 387, 668, 711, 737, 957 Narvik,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 739 proceeding from Narvik to AF 2421.
1030 U 737 put in to Narvik from Tromsø.
U 278 put in to Ramsund from Bergen.
U 315 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

0129 Radio message 0100/736 sent:

- "1. U 739 (Mangold) is proceeding from Andfjord to attack area AF 2421, depth of sweep 30 miles, joining group "Trutz". Boat will arrive at 0400 on 10 July.
2. At the same time, group "Trutz" will proceed to the next attack area in the north or west.
3. "Herrle": return to Andfjord - Narvik via AB 4950 at 1600 on 10 July."

2024 Radio message 1958/743 sent:

"Reconnaissance against enemy submarines in group "Trutz"'s area will take place again on 10 July between 0430 and 0830."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance for the evacuation of the meteorological unit "Schatzgräber".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

1948 Teleprinter message Secret 0985 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. A 2:

"Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 6455 of 8 July. It is not planned to increase the number of U-boats. U 673 is on return passage, thus the complement of boats will be 32."

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Sühren.

10 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0755 to 1321, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0230 to 1000, enemy not sighted. Sumboe harbor, Syderb examined, no shipping.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0257 to 1012. Anti-submarine patrol as on 9 July. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying clouds, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Sighting reports from signal stations in the Novaya Zemlya area concerning convoys proceeding from and to Kara Sea: on 7 July off Cape Chernaya (Kostin Strait AT 7378) 2 minesweepers, 1 freighter on southwesterly course at 0351. Loginov shoal (Kara Strait AT 8427): 1 minesweeper on northnortheasterly course at 0447. Chirachi (Kara Strait AT 8464): 2 minesweepers on southwesterly course at 0900. At 0214 on 8 July off Cape Grøben (Yugorski Strait AT 8819): 1 destroyer, 1 minesweeper, 1 freighter, course southwest, and at 0435 1 minesweeper, 1 freighter, 1 tanker, course northeast.

CONFIDENTIAL

Loginov shoal: at 0535 1 destroyer, 4 mino-sweepers, 4 freighters and another vessel, course-north-northeast.

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and destroyer "K".

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

Kirkenes took a bearing of 249° on British unit at 2348 on 9 July.

Svanvik took a bearing of 258° on a British unit at 2348 on 9 July.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Polyarno/Archangel broadcasts.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 307 AA 6944)
U 716 AA 6954)
U 992 AB 4777)
U 365 AB 7173)
U 965 AB 7426)
U 636 AB 7541)
U 956 AB 7584)
U 361 AB 8599) on passage.
U 921 AB 7946)
U 347 AB 7991)
U 995 AF 1337)
U 742 AF 2146)
U 739 AF 2421)

U 354 AF 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 278, 344, 362, 363, 387, 668, 711, 737,
957 Narvik,
U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0300 U 315 put in to Bergen from Trondheim.
1400 U 739 on return passage from AF 2421 to Harstad.
2100 U 307 on return passage from AA 6944 to Andfjord - Narvik.

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

13 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1512 Radio message 1444/750 received from U 739
(Mangold):

"Making for Harstad. First Watch officer has diphtheria. My position is AF 2266."

In order to maintain the same number of boats in the formation despite the loss of U 739, U 307 (Herrle), which had just been relieved, had to return to the attack area.

1638 Radio message 1615/752 sent:

"1. "Mangold": have crew gargle with potassium permanganate, bridge personnel one targesin tablet 3 times daily. Take First Watch Officer to hospital in Harstad. Await confirmation of diagnosis. Report by telephone.

2. Group "Trutz", including "Herrle": occupy former attack areas."

1723 Radio message 1700/754 received from U 307
(Herrle):

"Returning with severe case of appendicitis from "Dunkelberg". My position is AB 4868, 18 cu.m. left."

U 307 had a medical officer on board. Because of the sick man it seemed necessary to speed up the return passage. The disposition of group "Trutz" could therefore be held at first with only 11 U-boats. It was better to have the northern attack area weak than the southern.

2024 Radio message 2011/755 sent:

" "Herrle", group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats:

1. "Herrle": return to Andfjord.

2. Group "Trutz": return to former attack areas from AA 6992 to AF 2421."

After "Mangold" had transferred the sick man and the diagnosis had been confirmed, we intended the boat to return to the operational area. If the U-boat had to remain in quarantine in Narvik, U 387 (Büchler) was in readiness in Harstad.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamor) on ice reconnaissance for the evacuation of meteorological unit "Schatzgräber".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 387 (Buchlor) sent in Most Secret 3575 A Ops 1:

- "1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 11 July via Ramsund for Harstad.
2. Compulsory pilotage from Lödingen to Harstad.
3. Radio frequency in Harstad is still "MC", 479 kc/s; Northern Waters very long wave.
4. 12 hours' readiness in Harstad.
5. Naval Harbor Master Harstad has been notified of the boat's arrival."

1020

Telprinter message Most Secret 3540 A Ops. 1 sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"Transfer order for U 968 (Westphalen):

1. Put out from Trondheim on the morning of 11 July for Narvik.
2. Proceed via Frohavet, then on at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 14, make for Westfjord (submarine danger).
3. Report probable time of arrival at approach point 24 hours in advance, also passing of "V 1" by time short signal.
4. Radio frequency "Anton". Northern Waters very long wave.
5. For exchange of recognition signals with shore, observe Section 153 of Recognition Signal Regulations."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 394 (Borger), first operation,
Short report from U 737 (Brasack), seventh
operation (second part), see Appendix II/3,4.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Much of the traffic to Kara Sea appears this year to be passing through Kara Strait, perhaps to avoid the danger of mines in the smooth waters west of Yugorski Strait after last summer's experiences."

(Signed) Suhron.

11 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E - Banak from 0401 to 0944, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0142 to 0906. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0250 to 0956. Route 30% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying clouds, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0403 in AE 9919 1 merchant ship of 4,000 G.R.T., course 100°, speed 10 knots. At 0645 in AE 9519 7 merchant ships, each 4,000 - 5,000 G.R.T., course 090°, speed 10 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

On 10 July Cape Greben (Yugorski Strait AT 8819) reported depths of water in Varneka bay at low tide as 1.1 meters by the pier, 2.5 meters at

200 meters from the shore. Later at 1340 a motor minesweeper was reported standing on and off. At 0942 on 10 July Gusini Nos North (AT 4856) reported an unknown vessel in Møllera Bay. On 9 July steam trawler "Kassatka" (609 G.R.T.) off Lagerni (west of Matochkin Strait AT 4625).

Norwegian polar coast: very few radio messages to submarines in the operational area.

Murmansk area: on the previous day flotilla leader "Baku" was in radio communication with Archangel, Belushya, Iokanka. Minesweeper No. 38.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer No. 4. Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

Bearings: Kirkenes, Hammerfest and Svanvik took bearings on British units in the 233° - 262° sector.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: very few Polyarno broadcasts, none from Archangel.

At 0333 on 11 July Hammerfest took a bearing of 251°, minimum signal strength over 6 degrees on British unit "AW". Wavelength 36.19 meters.

At 0050 on 11 July Kirkenes took a bearing of 255°, minimum signal strength over 2 degrees, on a British unit in communication with Cleethorpes. Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 240°, minimum signal strength over 10 degrees. Wavelength 36.19 meters.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 716 AA 6992)
U 992 AB 7143)
U 365 AB 7416)
U 965 AB 7511)
U 636 AB 7574) in attack areas, depth
U 956 AB 7592) of sweep 30 miles.
U 361 AB 7866)
U 921 AB 7956)
U 347 AF 1327)
U 995 AF 2129)
U 742 AF 2421)

U 354 AF 47 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 278, 344, 362, 363, 387, 668, 711, 737, 957
Narvik.

CONFIDENTIAL

U 312, 703, 968 Trondheim,
U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2100 U 739 put in to Narvik from AF 2421.
1030 U 968 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.
2100 U 387 put out from Ramsund for Harstad.
U 307 proceeding from AA 6944 to Andfjord -
Narvik.
2100 Group "Trutz" proceeding 30 miles on course
180°, U 716 to AA 6899.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1715 Radio message 1616/771 sent:

"Group "Trutz": from 2100 on 11 July alter
attack areas by 30 miles, course 180°.
"Dunkelberg" will, however, occupy attack area
AA 6899, depth of sweep 40 miles."

The transfer was to be made to prevent enemy
submarines having any definite clues to the
position of the formation.

0015 Radio message 2329/778 sent:

"U 387 (Büchler): put out from Harstad early
on 12 July for AF 22. Expect to meet "Herrle"
putting in to Andfjord about 0500. Report by
short signal when 15° E is passed."

The U-boat was sailing to replace U 739
(Mangold) (in quarantine in Narvik), so that
the patrol line would again consist of 12 boats.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) on ice reconnaissance for the
evacuation of meteorological unit "Schatzgräber".

1417 Radio message 1346/768 sent:

"Evacuation of "Schatzgräber" completed.
Proceed via AC 24 to evacuate "Svartisen".
According to last report, ice limit is 15
miles southeast of Southern Point. If there
is still no through passage, send position
short signal, otherwise report when the unit
is taken on board and return to Hammarfost -
Tromsø - Narvik."

CONFIDENTIAL

2035

Radio message 2017/775 sent:

"Sthamor" from Captain U-boats.
Recognition signal for "Svartisen" as in
radio message 1303 of 7 July; station
will reply with red, green and then red
single stars in succession."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Addendum to Short Report from U 394 (Borger),
first operation, see Appendix II/5

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message 01015 received from Naval
War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

"Reference your Most Secret S.O.s only 84/44 of
6 July.

Re 1. Mines have been ordered. Operations will
be carried out as you recommended, about
mid-August. Only TMC mines will be used.
General operational order will follow.

Re 2. Agree to your plans. U 957 released for
first reconnaissance. Send secret plans
regarding cooperation with the German Air
Force to Ops."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

"If the German Air Force can provide sufficient
aircraft for the purpose, interception of traffic
east of Wilkitzki Strait would make our U-boat
operations much easier in the West Siberian Sea.
Last summer we learned that the BV 138 is not
sufficiently seaworthy or quick enough at taking
off to be berthed in an unprotected bay for
intermediate refuelling. Luftflotte 5 must first
be asked what the situation now is. The best
thing seems to be the use of a long range
aircraft (BV 222) which would only need to be
refuelled from a U-boat in an emergency and
which is able to cover a maximum range to the
east."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and other reconnaissance, route Banak - Ice Fjord - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - Banak from 0400 to 1048. Route almost exhaustively examined, Spitsbergen exhaustively examined. Anti-aircraft guns in the Ice Fjord area, otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0402 to 1218. No anti-aircraft defenses.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0249 to 1125. Route 25% examined, east coast of Jan Mayen exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0056 on 12 July Polyarno sent codewords of very high priority to all submarines in the operational area.

At 1926 Kirkenes took a bearing of 259°, minimum signal strength over 6 degrees, on a British unit "AX".

Hammerfest's bearing was 252°, minimum signal strength over 7 degrees. Wavelength 36.19 meters.

At 2031 on 12 July Hammerfest took a bearing of 261° on British unit "AZ" in communication with Cleethorpes. Wavelength 36.19 meters.

At 0350 Hammerfest took a bearing of 256°, minimum signal strength over 6 degrees, on British unit "AL" in communication with Cleethorpes. Wavelength 36.19 meters.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In the operational area:

Group "Trutz":

U 716 AA 6899 depth of sweep 40 miles.

U 992 AB 7179)

U 365 AB 7476)

U 965 AB 7547)

U 636 AB 7841)

U 956 AB 7838) in attack areas, depth

U 361 AF 1213) of sweep 30 miles.

U 921 AF 1312)

U 547 AF 1384)

U 995 AF 2176)

U 742 AF 2457)

U 354 AG 98 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,

U 387 Harstad,

U 278, 344, 362, 363, 668, 711, 737, 739,
957 Narvik,

U 312, 703 Trondheim,

U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1230 U 307 put in to Narvik from AA 6944.

0600 U 387 put in to Harstad from Narvik, at 1030
put out from Harstad for AF 22.

U 968 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) evacuating meteorological
unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Plans:

Teloprinter message Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret S.O.s only 85/44 A Ops. sent to Luftflotte 5 for information Flieger Fuehrer 5, for information Flieger Fuehrer 3:

"Operations by U-boats on the West Siberian Sea route again planned for summer 1944:

1. Request early reconnaissance of ice situation off Cape Jelaniya and in Kara Sea.
2. Request details of how many aircraft can carry out reconnaissance in the direction of Yugorski Strait - Dikson - Wilkitzki Strait, and whether refuelling from a U-boat as was done last year off the north coast of Novaya Zemlya (BV 138) or near Sverdrup Islands (BV 222) will be necessary."

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

13 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0801, exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes. Fjords of North Faeroes examined, no shipping.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0340 to 1048. Route as far as 1° E exhaustively examined, remainder of route and Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying cloud, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Cape Chernaya (Murman coast AW 2193):
at 1840 on 12 July 1 motor minesweeper,
course northwest, at 0530 on 13 July 2
vessels, course southeast.

Kanin Nos (AW 3141): on the evening of 12
July and early on 13 July several steam
trawlers and patrol vessels standing on and
off. Yugorski Strait (AT 8823): at 1830 on
12 July 1 vessel on southwesterly course, at
2315 1 minesweeper standing on and off, at
0335 on 13 July 1 minesweeper on northerly
course, lost to sight.

Krestovaya Bay (northwest of Novaya Zemlya
AT 4337): at 0030 on 13 July 1 minesweeper
standing on and off, at 0415 on southwesterly
course, lost to sight.

Cape Chernaya (Murman coast AW 2193): at 1422
1 minesweeper on southeasterly course.

Cape Greben (Yugorski Strait AT 8819): at 1030
2 motor minesweepers standing on and off.

Yugorski Strait (AT 8823): at 0240 1 mine-
sweeper on northerly course, at 0348 1 mine-
sweeper on easterly course, at 0345 1 survey
vessel on southerly course, at 1725 1
aircraft on southerly course.

Cape Chernaya (Kostin Strait AT 7377): at
1125 2 aircraft on northwesterly course.

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of
radio messages to submarines in the
operational area.

Iokanka area: minelayer No. 93.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/
Archangel area.

Bearings: Kirkenes took a bearing of 259° on
a British unit at 1926 on 12 July.

Hammerfest took a bearing of 252° on a
British unit at 1926 on 12 July.

Hammerfest took a bearing of 261° on a
British unit at 2031 on 12 July.

Russian radio traffic: slight.

Britain: no Polyarno/Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 716 AA 6899)

U 992 AB 7119) in attack areas, depth

U 365 AB 7476) of sweep 30 miles.

U 965 AB 7547)

U 636 AB 7841)
U 956 AB 7838)
U 361 AF 1213) in attack areas, depth
U 921 AF 1312) of sweep 30 miles.
U 347 AF 1348)
U 995 AF 2176)
U 742 AF 2457)

U 354 AC 12 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 278, 307, 344, 362, 363, 668, 711, 737, 739,
957 Narvik,
U 312, 703 Trondheim,
U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AF 22.
U 968 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

11 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen.

1540 Radio message 1506/796 sent:

- "1. "Büchler" will occupy attack area AF 2457 at 1200 on 14 July, group "Trutz".
2. Then group "Trutz" will move attack areas by one position north or west. "Dunkelberg" in attack area AA 6891, "Falke" in AA 9316, all depth of sweep 30 miles.
3. The 6 westerly boats should remain submerged from 0400 to 1630, the easterly boats from 1600 to 0430."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) evacuating meteorological unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1. Transfer order for U 1061 (Hinrichs) sent in Most Secret 3618 A Ops. 1:

"1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 13 July. Radio frequency "MC", Northern Waters very long wave.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Take on torpedoes in Ramsund. As soon as it is known, report time of sailing by short signal.
3. After sailing from Ramsund, change to frequency "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave.
4. Proceed through Westfjord and, at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, south through Frøhavet to Trondheim.
5. Expect to meet U 968 (Westphalen) off "V 1" at approximately 2200 on 13 July.
6. Report probable time of arrival at "HA 1" by short signal."

2. Transfer order for U 278 (Franze) sent in Most Secret 3619 A Ops. 1:

- "1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 14 July via Ramsund to Harstad.
2. Compulsory pilotage from Lødingen to Harstad.
3. Radio frequency "MC", Northern Waters very long wave.
4. As soon as it is known, report time of sailing from Ramsund by time short signal.
5. 12 hours' readiness in Harstad.
6. Naval Harbor Master Harstad has been notified of the boat's arrival."

3. Transfer order for U 394 (Borger) sent in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3622 A Ops. teleprinter message to U-boat base Hammerfest:

- "1. Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 16 July for Narvik - Ramsund.
2. U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
3. From Hammerfest to Tromsø escorted by 65th Patrol Vessel Flotilla. Then on to Lødingen with pilot.
4. From Lødingen switch to Base frequency. "MC", 479 kc/s, and report to base.
5. En route carry out exercises off "Luchs 3" and "Luchs 2" as ordered. U-boat base Hammerfest has notified Naval Communications Officer, Tromsø to expect the boat."

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Transfer order for U 362 (Franz) sent in
Most Secret 3630 A Ops. 1:

- "1. Put out from Narvik at 0830 on 14 July via Bogen to Hammerfest.
2. As far as Harstad, radio frequency is Base frequency "MC", 479 kc/s, Northern Waters very long wave. From Harstad, U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
3. Compulsory pilotage from Lødingen to Tromsø.
4. From Tromsø to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit has been informed.
5. Carry out hydrophone exercises as far as "Luchs 3". Before putting out from Tromsø, report to Naval Communications Officer, Tromsø. Observe Para. 8 of the Order.
6. Report promptly by short signal time of sailing from Narvik - Bogen.
7. 12 hours' readiness in Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), fourth operation,
Short report from U 711 (Lange), sixth operation,
see Appendix II/6,7.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1939 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3976 received from Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Fourth Division:

"Reference your Most Secret 3611:

The radio intercept group can be despatched from Kirkenes on approximately 15 July. We shall have Naval Communications Officer, Narvik install sets. It is essential to contact Naval Communications Officer, Narvik from here regarding the number of boats, berths, etc. necessary to expedite execution."

The following teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 331/44 was received from Naval Liaison Officer Luftflotte Command 5 on the cooperation of aircraft and U-boats in the West Siberian Sea:

"Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret

CONFIDENTIAL

S.O.s only 85/44 A Ops.

Request immediate answer to following questions:

1. How long will the operation last?
2. What claims (in respect of areas to be covered, number of flights, etc.) are to be made on the aircraft concerned for duration of the operation?
3. Is previous information of a suitable anchorage necessary or will last year's results suffice?
4. Is one ice reconnaissance before the operation sufficient?
5. What success is expected from the completion of this mission after last year's negative results?
6. Is it possible to carry it out even if only an ice reconnaissance has taken place and no aircraft is operating in the operational area?"

Then the following teleprinter message Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret S.O.s only 89/44 A Ops. was sent to Luftflotte Command 5 for Naval Liaison Officer:

"Re 1. About the beginning of August to the end of September.

Re 2. Reconnaissance against expected supply traffic as far into Wilkitzki Strait as possible. About 3 operations from Norwegian bases, in each case with 1 or 2 flights using the refuelling U-boat, if an intermediate landing is not possible (BV 222).

Re 3. Apart from last year's landing points, refuelling off Nordenshelda or on the ice limit had been considered.

Re 4. Requested ice reconnaissance is necessary for the first reconnaissance U-boat. Further reconnaissance depends on results.

Re 5. Last year the radio intercept group on the U-boat picked up over 100 different call-signs east of Wilkitzki Strait, indicating the amount of tonnage perhaps held up by the appearance of U-boats. U-boats sank 6 ships of up to 6,000 G.R.T. from 2 small convoys. If the boats can remain unobserved, a surprise success seems possible. In the absence of Murmansk convoys, operations here seem profitable. About 6 U-boats will take part.

CONFIDENTIAL

Re 6. Interception of traffic already at sea enables the U-boats to concentrate and attack simultaneously. Otherwise no complete success can be scored. Operations can be carried out without air support, in which case ice reconnaissance is valuable."

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

14 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0755, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0312 to 1210. Landed in Lister because of the weather. Faeroes not examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0246 to 1223. Route as far as 1° W 80% examined, the remainder of the route and Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying cloud, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Cape Chernaya signal station (Kostin Strait AT 7378) reported several minesweepers active southeast of the station at 2155 on 13 July.
Norwegian polar coast: lively transmission of radio messages to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: minelayer No. 94, minesweepers Nos. 112 and 114.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ponoi area: minesweepers Nos. 32 and 102.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: minesweeper No. 110.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/
Archangel area.
Bearings: Kirkenes took bearings of 243° -
259° on a British unit between 1210 on 13
July and 0303 on 14 July.
Hammerfest: bearings of 243° - 259° from
1210 to 0303 on 14 July.
Svanvik: bearings of 256° - 257° from 1320
to 1810.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.
Britain: very few Polyarno, no Archangel
broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 716 AA 6899 depth of sweep 40 miles.
U 992 AB 7119)
U 365 AB 7476)
U 965 AB 7547)
U 636 AB 7841)
U 956 AB 7838) in attack areas, depth of
U 361 AF 1213) sweep 30 miles.
U 921 AF 1312)
U 347 AF 1348)
U 995 AF 2176)
U 742 AF 2457)

U 354 AC 12 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 278, 307, 344, 362, 363, 668, 711, 737,
739, 957 Narvik,
U 312, 703 Trondheim,
U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1530 U 362 put out from Narvik, at 2100 put in to
Harstad.
1130 U 968 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.
U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AF 2457.
1200 Group "Trutz" proceeding to new attack areas
one position further north or west. U 716
to AA 6891, U 992 to AA 9316.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation southeast of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) evacuating meteorological unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island.

0125 Short signal 0106/42 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"My position is AC 1297."

The boat had orders to send a position report if unable to force a way through the ice.

0315 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3631 A Ops. sent to Naval Chief Command, Norway and Flieger Fuehrer 3:

" "Sthamer" reported from AC 1297 (18 miles south of Hope Island) at 0106 on 14 July, that there was no through passage through the ice."

1122 Teleprinter message Most Secret 8785 W received from Naval Chief Command Norway:

"Reference your Most Secret 3631 A Ops. With the present steady east wind in polar waters, no alleviation in the ice position can be expected within a short time. Recommend that "Sthamer" should withdraw and wait until meteorological air reconnaissance confirms a favorable ice situation."

However as ice conditions can change very rapidly, contrary to the advice of Naval Chief Command, Norway, the U-boat was not withdrawn.

1115 Radio message 1052/705 sent:

" "Sthamer": try to reach "Svartisen" by hauling out from the east or the west, but avoid ice damage."

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 737 (Brasack) sent in Most Secret 3638 A Ops. 1:

"1. Put out from Narvik - Bogen in the evening for Trondheim.

2. Proceed to Bodø, from there via inner leads to Trondheim escorted by 3rd Inshore Defenses Unit.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Radio frequency "Anton", Northern Waters very long wave.
4. Boat's arrival has been reported at Bodø for escort by 66th Patrol Vessel Flotilla as 0800 on 16 July.
5. Report promptly on "MC" time of sailing from Bogen to Basø and Captain U-boats."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 344 (Pietsch), first operation, see Appendix II/8.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Organizational:

1022 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4870 U 1 received from Admiral Commanding U-boats:

"In accordance with the proposal of Captain U-boats, Norway, the strength of the 13th U-boat Flotilla will in future be 5 U-boats more than that of 11th U-boat Flotilla. The total number of U-boats allotted to the northern area will not be affected."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The Russians obviously expect minelaying activity from our U-boats."

Otherwise no comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

15 July, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 "Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0358 to 0751, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0310 to 0952. Shipping not seen in Thorshavn harbor because of fog at high altitude.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0245 to 0813. Operation broken off at 0525 in AB 7878 because of engine trouble. Route 80% examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: few radio messages of high to first priority to submarines in the operational area.

Iokanka area: minesweepers Nos. 103 and 111.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: minesweepers Nos. 53, 106, 110 (Kirkenes took a bearing of 130° on minesweeper No. 106 at 0852).

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

Hammerfest, Svanvik bearings in the 255° to 262° sector.

Russian radio traffic: in the afternoon moderate, otherwise slight.

Britain: no Polyarno/Archangel broadcasts.

At 1100 on 14 July the signal station on Krestovaya Bay (northwest coast of Novaya Zemlya AT 4337) reported freighter "Brama", course 040°.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 716 AA 6891)	
U 992 AA 9316)	
U 365 AB 7119)	
U 965 AB 7476)	
U 636 AB 7547)	in attack areas, depth
U 956 AB 7841)	of sweep 30 miles.
U 361 AB 7838)	
U 921 AF 1213)	
U 347 AF 1312)	
U 995 AF 1348)	
U 742 AF 2176)	
U 387 AF 2457)	

CONFIDENTIAL

U 354 AC 12 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 425, 997 Hammerfest,
U 278, 307, 344, 363, 668, 711, 737, 739,
957, 968 Narvik,
U 312, 703 Trondheim,
U 313, 315 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0145 U 362 put out from Harstad, at 0800 put in
to Tromsø.
2100 U 737 put out from Narvik for Bodø.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

12 boats in formation southeast of Jan Mayen.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Sthamer) evacuating meteorological unit "Svartisen" from Hope Island. Boat is trying to circumvent the ice off the island and break through to the coast.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Conference with Lt. Col. Boden and Lt. Köhl of G.I.S. station, Oslo on operation "Schneehuhn". U 307 (Herrle) was detailed to carry out the mission.

The following teleprinter message 6023/44 was received from Luftflotte Command 5 A 1 on the employment of aircraft for ice reconnaissance in the West Siberian Sea:

Most Secret:

- "1. 3 FW 200 would be necessary for a useful ice reconnaissance in view of the great distance and extent of the area in question. This, however, is precluded by the fuel position.
2. The experiences gained from last year's operation by BV 138s show that it is not advisable to use these aircraft again.

CONFIDENTIAL

In any case, it would be necessary to fit tanks to 2 BV 138 in Travemünde. The waste of man-hours for conversion and the fuel situation together would therefore not be justified.

3. Luftflotte Command 5 therefore regrets that no support can be given for U-boat operations this year."

The following teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 91/44 A Ops was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. from Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Plans of Captain U-boats, Norway regarding co-operation of aircraft and U-boats in the West Siberian Sea:

- (a) Aircraft operations: air reconnaissance against expected supply traffic if possible as far east as Wilkitzki Strait. It is possible, according to the observations of the radio intercept group on board a U-boat in 1943, that the appearance of U-boats in Kara Sea would keep merchant ships in the east. About 3 operations from Norwegian bases and 1 or 2 reconnaissance flights using fuelling U-boat, if impossible without an intermediate landing (BV 222).
- (b) U-boat operations: U 957, the first reconnaissance U-boat will be ready to sail within the next few days. Radio intercept group "Kentmann" is ready to be taken on board U 711, which will be available for operations on 28 July. 4 more U-boats will operate if reconnaissance reports promise success. Permission requested for operations without aircraft, first for U 711. Operational Order for operations against the West Siberian Sea route follows."

E. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I.

Most Secret

Sailing Orders.

1. Sailing order for U 921 (Werner).
2. Sailing order for U 995 (Köhntopp).
3. Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold).

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/1.

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway On board, 2 July, 1944.
Serial No. - Most Secret 3393 A Ops.

Sailing order for U 921 (Werner).

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 2 June via Bogen - Ramsund, report time of sailing from Ramsund promptly on "MC".
2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AB 88, from Lodingen to Harstad with pilot.
Submarine danger off Andfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 15 for Northern Waters U-boats, U-boat Northern Waters frequency.
4. Enemy situation: In spite of the Channel invasion, Russian convoys can be expected while the Russian offensive against Finland is in progress. Carrier groups at present appearing in Northern Waters are attacking our bases and convoys, but we must always watch for a Russian convoy running at the same time. Operations against convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Orders Nos. 8 and 10.

5. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group Trutz in attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 711 (Lango) AA 6657, U 307 (Herrle) AB 4475,
U 315 (Zoller) 4768, U 344 (Pietsch) 4495,
U 394 (Borger) 4856, U 716 (Dunkelberg) 7229,
U 992 (Falko) 7324, U 365 (Wedemeyer) 7388,
U 965 (Unverzagt) 8178, U 956 (Mohs) 8473,
U 636 (Schondol) 8493, U 361 (Scidol) 8844.

Special operation: U 737 (Brasack) North Spitsbergen.

- (b) The German Air Force will carry out reconnaissance against convoys only if definite information of sailing is available and then only if cloud cover is more than 7/10.
- Daily meteorological flights Trondheim (or Banak) - Jan Mayen and Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E (or Hope Island) - Banak.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. - Most Secret
3405 - A Ops.

On board, 3 July, 1944.

Sailing order for U 995 (Kohntopp).

1. Put out from Narvik for Bogen at 1900 on 3 July.
Report time of sailing from there promptly on "MC",
with information as to whether refuelling in Harstad
will be necessary.
2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AB 88, with pilot
from Lødingen to Harstad. Submarine danger off
Andfjord.
3. Operational Order No. 15, Northern Waters frequency.
4. Enemy situation: In spite of the Channel invasion,
Russian convoys can be expected while the Russian
offensive against Finland is in progress. Carrier
groups at present appearing in Northern Waters are
attacking our bases and convoys, but we must always
watch for a Russian convoy running at the same time.
Operations against convoys in accordance with Northern
Waters Orders Nos. 8 and 10.
5. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group Trutz in attack areas, depth of sweep 30
miles:

U 711 (Lange) AA 6657,	U 307 (Herrle) AB 4475,
U 315 (Zoller) 4768,	U 344 (Pietsch) 4495,
U 394 (Borger) 4856,	U 716 (Dunkelberg) 7229,
U 992 (Falke) 7324,	U 365 (Wedemeyer) 7388,
U 965 (Unverzagt) 8178,	U 956 (Mohs) 8473,
U 636 (Schendel) 8493,	U 361 (Seidel) 8844.

Group has been ordered to move 40 miles, course
200°, at 1600 on 3 July (except "Lange" and "Herrle").

Special operation: U 737 (Brasack) North Spitsbergen.

U 921 (Werner) will put out from Andfjord at 1500
on 3 July, U 742 (Schwassmann) will put out from
Narvik at 2000, U 347 (de Buhr) has orders to put
out from Narvik. All 3 boats will proceed to AB 88.
U 354 (Sthamer) has orders to put out from Tromsø
for AG 88.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) The German Air Force will carry out reconnaissance against convoys only if definite information of sailing is available and then only if cloud cover is more than 7/10.

Daily meteorological flights Trondheim (or Banak) - Jan Mayen and Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E (or Hope Island) - Banak.

p.p. Reche.

APPENDIX 1/3

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway On board, 7 July, 1944.
Serial No. - Most Secret
3497 - A Ops.

Sailing order for U 739 (Mangold).

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 7 July through Tjeldsund to Harstad, from Lødingen with pilot.
 2. Put out from Harstad at 0000 on 8 July through Andfjord to AF 22. Economical cruising speed. Submarine danger off Andfjord.
 3. Operational order No. 15, Northern Waters frequency. Radio silence in the formation except to report major targets, attacks or if spotted. Procedure in accordance with Order No. 8.
 4. Enemy situation:
 - (a) In view of the Russian offensive against Finland, Russian convoys can be expected in spite of the Channel invasion. We intend to intercept and attack them in accordance with Northern Waters Orders Nos. 8 and 10.
 - (b) Aircraft carriers and enemy submarines can always be expected in the operational area. Opportunities for attack!
 5. Own forces:
 - (a) 12 U-boats forming group "Trutz" in attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 307 (Herrle) AA 6944,	U 716 (Dunkelberg) 6992,
U 992 (Falke) AB 7143,	U 365 (Wedemeyer) 7416,
U 965 (Unverzagt) 7511,	U 636 (Schendel) 7574,
U 956 (Mohs) 7592,	U 361 (Seidel) 7866,
U 921 (Werner) 7956,	U 347 (de Buhr) AF 1327,
U 995 (Köhntopp) 2119,	U 742 (Schwassmann) AF 2421.
- The 6 westerly U-boats will remain submerged from 0000 to 1230, the 6 easterly boats from 1200 to 0030. Irregular courses, economical speed.
3 U-boats on return passage: U 711 (Lange) and U 344 (Pietsch) from AB 73 to Andfjord - Narvik, U 394 (Borger) to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) The German Air Force will carry out reconnaissance against convoys only if definite information of sailing is available and then only if cloud cover is more than 7/10.

Daily meteorological flights Trondheim (or Banak) - Jan Mayen and Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E (or Hope Island) - Banak.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

Most Secret

Short reports.

1. Short report from U 363 (Nees), first operation.
2. Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), fourth operation.
3. Short report from U 394 (Borger), first operation.
4. Short report from U 737 (Brasack), seventh operation.
5. Addendum to short report from U 394 (Borger), first operation.
6. Short report from U 315 (Zoller), fourth operation.
7. Short report from U 711 (Lange), sixth operation.
8. Short report from U 344 (Pietsch), first operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 363 (Nees), first operation.

21 May, 1944	Put out from Kiel.
23 May	Put in to Kristiansand (South). Readiness boat for group Central.
27 May	Put out from Kristiansand.
28 May	Put in to Bergen. Drafted to 11th U-boat Flotilla.
29 May	Put out from Bergen via inner leads with escort to AF 6741. Proceeded to AF 68 to join group "Trutz".
From 2 June	Various patrol lines, nothing sighted.
15 June	Patrol line AB 4828 to AF 2216.
20 June	"Naxos" location in AB 8487, submerged.
23 June	Set off to patrol line AB 7455 to AF 1329 after report of carrier-borne aircraft. "Naxos" location in AB 8484, submerged. Proceeded at high speed to new patrol line AB 5299 - 6772. Aircraft sighted in AB 7686, unobserved. Proceeded to patrol line AB 5471 - 8694.
26 June	Proceeded to attack area AB 7768. "Naxos" location in AB 8413, submerged.
28 June	AB 7855. "Naxos" location in AB 7852, submerged. "Naxos" location in AB 7862, submerged. Put in to Narvik on 29 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

No attack followed location. Did not submerge for 2 locations on 26 June, no attack. "Schreyer" last seen in AB 9779 at 2300 on 1 June.

22 June At 1944 heard 4 or 5 short, sharp explosions. Intervals between them about $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 second. Presumably bombs on neighboring boat "Schreyer".

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Operation without any special feature or possibility of success.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3468 -
A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teloprintor message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 313 (Schweiger), fourth operation.

30 May	Put out from Narvik at 0100, made for AB 89. Electric compressor not clear up to 180 kg. per cu. cm. Proceeded to patrol line AB 8670.
31 May	Proceeded to AB 6610, then AB 3880.
2 to 6 June	Proceeded via position lines to patrol line in AB 4810.
7 June	Proceeded to AB 7960.
14 June	Ju-compressor unserviceable.
15 June	Proceeded to AB 7310.
20 June	Proceeded to AB 4890.
22 June	AB 4850.
23 June	Attack area AB 4473. At 0200 operated on carrier group or eastbound convoy. Nothing sighted. At 1000 proceeded to new patrol line AB 5290. At 1300 proceeded to AB 5370. Operation on carrier group or convoy ended.
26 June	Proceeded to attack area AA 6942.
27 June	AA 6994.
28 June	Returning. At 1640 in AF 5628 submerging submarine with large white right corner on

CONFIDENTIAL

the forward edge of the conning tower (camouflage striping?). Very broad conning tower. No recognition signal. Presumably enemy.

1 July Put in to Molde at 1600.
3 July Put in to Bergen. No other enemy sighting before 30 June.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Operation carried out by thoroughly sound commander, no special feature or possibility of success.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3496 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret

Short report from U 394 (Borger), first operation.

- 2 June Put out from Narvik.
- 8 July Put in to Hammerfest.

Proceeded via AB 9530 to AF 2440 as safety service vessel for special aircraft on 3 June. Positions in patrol line: 4 - 6 June AB 8836, 7 June AB 8495, 8 - 15 June AF 2674, 16 - 20 June AF 2216, 21 - 22 June AB 8793, 23 - 24 June AB 8615, 25 June AB 8295, 29 June - 1 July AB 4864. Attack areas, 30 miles depth of sweep: 27 June AB 7855, 28 June AB 7768, 1 - 3 July AB 4856, 4 - 5 July AB 7129, 6 July AB 7416.

- 23 June Unsuccessful attack on suspected PQ convoy in AB 7600, no experiences.

Comments by Captain U-boats:

Operation with no possibility of success and no special feature.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3538 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 6th U-boat Flotilla.
5. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), seventh operation,
(second part).

- 27 June 1944 Put out from Tromsø with meteorological shore transmitter "Edwin".
- 7 July Put in to Hammerfest.
- 8 July Put in to Tromsø.
- 9 July Put in to Narvik.
- 30 June Reached landing place in North Spitsbergen beside "Kreuzritter" station at 1600. Station ready for evacuation; the leader, Inspector Knoespel, fatally injured in an explosion on the same day. (Presumably premature failure in slow-burning fuse.) From 1600 to 2300, set up "Edwin" near "Kreuzritter" station. Then dismantled the station and embarked the unit.
- 1 July Military funeral for Inspector Knoespel at 1200 carried out by crew of U 737. At 1500 cast off from main station in Liefde Bay (Position 12) to evacuate sub-station at Position 18 (Red Bay). From 2020 to 2221 ran on to unsuspected rocks in the entrance to Red Bay. No major damage. At 1800 took sets on board and closed down "Kreuzritter" (1 officer and 10 men).

CONFIDENTIAL

"Kreuzritter" made an excellent impression after a 9 months' stay at the Station. Return passage.

5 July

From 2300 to 0200 on 6 July landed on Bear Island and eliminated faults which had appeared in meteorological transmitter "Hermann".

No contact with the enemy. Navigational report to competent stations follows.

"Kreuzritter" disembarked in Tromsø.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Landing operations carried out skillfully according to plan by reliable Northern Waters commander in areas where there is little danger from the enemy.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3572 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/5

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Addendum to short report from U 394 (Borger)
first operation.

Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3538 A Ops of 10 July.

29 April	Put out from Kiel with escort.
1 May	Put in to Arendal. (South Norway.)
	Readiness U-boat for U-boat group Central.
15 May	Put out from Arendal. In convoy to Bergen, put in there on 16 May.
18 May	Put out from Bergen.
25 May	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via AN 2331, AF 7635, 4694, 2832, Westfjord. From 22 May to 23 May AF 49. In AF 51 strong enemy air forces, on 22 May warded off depth charge attack from "Catalina".

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 3538 2nd Issue.
A Ops.

APPENDIX II/6

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), fourth operation.

- 30 May 1944 Put out from Hammerfest.
- 10 July Put in to Bergen.
- 30 May Joined group "Grimm".
- At 2326 2 U-boats reported sighting carrier group.
- 31 May Made for AB 6256 as ordered at maximum speed.
- At 0740 in AB 9241 alarm because of land-based aircraft (type not identified), bearing 360°, range 10,000 meters, nearly head-on, medium altitude.
- 2 June Joined group "Trutz". In various patrol lines, enemy not sighted.
- 22 June At 1712 in AB 7636 alarm because of carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 130°, range 12,000 meters, medium altitude, nearly head-on. Brief hydrophone bearing in 280°, reported by short signal after submerging, aircraft in periscope.
- At 1920 in AB 7636 alarm because of carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 260°, range 10,000 meters, medium altitude, nearly head-on. 10 minutes later dull explosion in the distance, hydrophone bearing in 270°, aircraft still in periscope. Made for hydrophone bearing which quickly faded.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 2010 destroyer sighted, bearing 190°, range 14 miles, course about 060°, speed 14 knots.
At 2025 second hydrophone bearing in 210°. 3 carrier-borne aircraft in same direction. Presumed formation to be on northeasterly course. Proceeded towards it.
At 2100 destroyer on southwesterly course, lost to sight. No more hydrophone bearings. 3 or 4 carrier-borne aircraft seen continuously until 2240. After surfacing reported destroyer. Operated on probable convoy area in direction of recently ordered patrol line.

23 June At 0555 in AB 8171 alarm because of flying boat (possibly BV), bearing 180°, range 12,000 meters, medium altitude, nearly head-on.
At 0643 in AB 8144 alarm because of flying boat (possibly BV), bearing 330°, range 15,000 meters, medium altitude, approaching.

23 June -
3 July In various patrol lines.

3 July Returned to Bergen via Trondheim.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Operation without any special feature by otherwise reliable U-boat. Carrier unit on 22 June probably turned off ahead of the formation."

Captain U-boats Norway - Most Secret 3612 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/7

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Immediate. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 711 (Lange), sixth operation.

- 30 May 1944 Put out from Narvik.
- 8 July Put in to Narvik.
- Proceeded to attack area AB 8913.
- 31 May From 0400 to 2000 on 4 June operated on carrier group reported by "Hellwig", "Schaar", "Schwassmann", proceeded via AB 6226, AB 5296 to AB 8113.
- 2 June At 0320 in AB 6225 sighted thick periscope, range 1,200 meters. Looked like German sky-search periscope, first turned away, then towards it to fire T 5 torpedo. Lost to sight. Submerged and operated on electric motor noises, no periscope observation. Abandoned run-in and reported by radio.
- 4 - 7 June In patrol line in AB 8127.
- 8 - 15 June AB 8766.
- 13 June At 2033 in AB 8772 "Catalina", range 8,000 meters, altitude 2,000 meters, course 080°, unobserved.
- From 15 June In new patrol line in AB 7354.
- 15 June At 2334 starboard propeller damaged when taking on medical officer from "Herrle".
- From 20 June AB 7311.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June At 1304 in AB 7311 "Liberator", range 8,000 meters, high altitude, course 240°. At 1341 5 aircraft, type not identified, range 10,000 meters, low altitude, "Naxos" location. At 1605 2 aircraft approaching, probably "Fulmars", range 9,000 meters, low altitude.

23 June From 0000 to 1200 operated on destroyer reported by "Zoller".

From 24 June In patrol line AB 5725.

26 June Attack area AA 6994.

27 June AA 6942. At 1247 "Naxos" location becoming very loud, submerged. At 1500 "Wanze" location, 180 mc/s, fluctuating, very loud at times. "Aphrodite" set adrift to mislead aircraft. No run-in. At 1605 "Wanze" location, 180 mc/s, as it grew louder set "Aphrodite" adrift.

From 29 June At 1200 in patrol line AB 4411.

From 1 July Attack area AA 6657.

6 July Returned.

Drifting mines:

30 May	AB 8951
31 May	AB 8681
3 June	AB 6155
7 June	AB 7383
15 June	AB 8748
7 July	AB 8669

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Operation without any opportunity for the outstanding commander to attack."

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3613 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/8

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 344 (Pietsch), first operation.

20 May 1944	Put out from Bergen.
27 May	Put in to Narvik.
31 May	Put out from Narvik.
8 July	Put in to Narvik.
20 - 27 May	Moved from Bergen to Narvik via AF 84, 81, 57, 55. Very strong forces of enemy aircraft ("Sunderlands") in AF 57/55, avoided 2 aircraft while surfaced, seven alarms. No locations, no attacks. For 3 hours observed flying boat over place of submerging.
24 May	In AF 5516 at 0720 6 loud explosions on starboard quarter.
25 May	In AF 5319 at 0720 4 dull explosions astern.
1 June	Reached AB 6560, joined group "Trutz" in patrol line.
2 - 3 June	Proceeded southwest in patrol line.
3 June	In AB 6717 submerged because of continuous "Naxos" location, periodicity 40 seconds. Further locations after surfacing, suspected own interference, remained on surface, nothing sighted, no attack.
4 - 6 June	In patrol line AB 8540.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 - 22 June In various patrol lines AB 2270, 8720, 8440.
Enemy not sighted...

Since 15 June Ju-compressor out of action (total failure),
tear in cylinder liner.

22 June In AB 8841 at 1718 carrier-borne aircraft
(bi-plane). At 1936 in AB 8484 2 carrier-
borne aircraft of the same type. Submerged,
hydrophone bearings in same direction as
aircraft. Diesel and turbine. Followed up
hydrophone bearing on the surface, submerged
again because of carrier-borne aircraft.
Hydrophone bearing agreed with "Zoller"'s
report. Lost contact.

23 to 25 June New position line AB 8216.

26 June to
5 July. Various attack areas northeast and southeast
of Jan Mayen.

30 June -
2 July Port Diesel not working. Another cylinder
liner tear in 36 hours.

6 July Return passage commenced.

Drifting mines:

5 June	AB 8551
10 June	AF 2193
14 June	AF 2277
15 June	AF 8487
20 June	AB 8441
23 June	AB 8138
26 June	AB 7621
7 July	AB 9711 presumably German "meteorological transmitting buoy 106".

3.7 cm. anti-aircraft: mostly only semi-automatically clear.

Main reason: rammer was not released, therefore only 1
shot at a time.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

First operation by this U-boat without any special features
or chances of success.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 3627 - A Ops.

